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General introduction 
Thanks to Philip Kitcher’s seminal essay ‘Explanatory Unification’ (1981) the unification 
account became a very influential way of thinking about scientific explanations in the 
1980s. It was the main rival of Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical account, which 
received its full presentation in Salmon’s book Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure 
of the World (1984). In Kitcher 1989, the two approaches are compared; as can be expected, 
Kitcher argues that the unification account is superior. 
 In the 1990s, unification was still respected, but often integrated in a pluralistic 
view. For instance, Salmon writes in 1993: 
In this paper I have tried to show that there are at least two intellectual benefits 
that scientific explanations can confer upon us, namely, (1) a unified world-picture 
and insight into how various phenomena fit into that overall scheme, and (2) 
knowledge of how things in the world work, that is, of the mechanisms (often 
hidden) that produce the phenomena we want to understand. The first of these 
benefits is associated with the unification view of scientific explanation; Philip 
Kitcher (1989) is its present principal proponent. The second is associated with the 
causal/mechanical view of scientific explanation that I have advocated (Salmon, 
1984). My current view is that the two accounts are by no means incompatible. 
(1993, p. 15) 
This view is repeated in Salmon 1998 (pp. 89-90). An example of a unification account 
embedded in a pluralistic view is Weber 1999, which focuses on unification but explicitly 
acknowledges that there are other types of explanation, e.g., causal ones (see p. 480).  
 In the new millennium, unification became unfashionable. This was mainly due to 
the development of two alternative views that became very popular: the counterfactual 
theory of Jim Woodward (2003)  and the mechanistic approach, which started with 
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Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000. and is further elaborated in, e.g., Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2005 and Craver 2007.  
I experienced the unfashionable status of unification in the spring of 2010, when I 
attended a workshop about understanding and the aims of science at the Lorentz Center 
in Leiden. It was a very interesting event organised by Henk de Regt and James McAllister, 
with speakers such as William Bechtel, Michael Strevens, Lindley Darden, Sabina Leonelli, 
etc.1 At the end of the workshop Henk de Regt gathered all of us for a wrap up session. 
One of the questions he asked was whether or not there was still anyone thinking that 
unification plays a part in scientific explanation. I was at the start of my research project 
then, and I was not confident enough to raise my hand. But Theo Kuipers did, and he was 
the only one.   
Today the situation would not be much different. Most philosophers of science 
consider unification as outdated, irrelevant for explanation or infeasible. The overall aim 
of this dissertation is to bring unification back into the picture in the philosophical study of 
scientific explanation. After writing the dissertation, today I would certainly also raise 
my hand. 
This dissertation starts with a concise overview of what philosophers of science have 
written about unification and its role in scientific explanation during the last 50 years 
(Chapter 1). I introduce a few key ideas, theories and thinkers before we set off for the 
real start. I do this partially in order to provide the reader with some background 
knowledge. However, at several stages later in this dissertation (especially chapters 4, 7 
and 8) I use this overview to clarify how my approach and results differ from existing 
views on unification and its relation to scientific explanation and how I can avoid 
legitimate worries that have been raised in relation to ‘traditional’ (as opposed to my 
‘alternative’) views on unification. 
In order to bring unification back into the picture, I have followed two strategies, 
resulting respectively in Parts I and II of this dissertation. In Part I the idea of unification 
is used to refine and enrich the dominant causal-mechanist and causal-interventionist 
accounts of scientific explanation. How this is done exactly will be clarified in the 
Introduction to Part I and in Chapter 4. What is important now is the general underlying 
idea. In this part of the dissertation I grant, for the sake of argument, that explanations 
 
                                                     
1 Lorentz Center. 2010. Lorentz Center International Center for workshops in the Sciences. Available 
at:  http://www.lorentzcenter.nl/lc/web/2010/380/program.php3?wsid=380. [Last accessed 10 May 2018]. 
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are causal. I argue that unification is important from within this causalist perspective. In 
Part II I pursue an opposite strategy: I bring unification back into the picture by arguing 
that some legitimate scientific explanations are unificatory without being causal. This 
second strategy will be further clarified in the Introduction to Part II. 
Part III contains two more general reflective chapters. I clarify how my approach 
differs from the traditional views that are described in Chapter 1 and are still being put 
forward by contemporary philosophers (Chapter 7). Furthermore, the results of this 
dissertation fit into an overall pluralistic view on both unification and on scientific 
explanation (Chapter 8). 
In this dissertation I do not try to develop a new model of explanation and compare it 
to existing models. The aim is to show that there are important types of explanatory 
practice which cannot be properly analyzed if we neglect unification as a desideratum for 
explanations. What will be done here is similar in nature to what Carl Craver did in his 
book Explaining the Brain (2007). Craver’s main question is “what is required of an adequate 
explanation in neuroscience (p. vii). He proposes norms by means of which we can 
distinguish good from bad explanations in neuroscience (p. viii). The mechanistic model 
which he develops in the book is a tool for achieving this aim. In the same vein, I discuss 
questions of the form “what is required of an adequate explanation if this explanation is 
of type X?”. What these questions look like will become clear at the beginning of chapters 
2, 3, 5 and 6. Existing models of explanation (e.g. the mechanistic model and the 
counterfactual) will be used as tools for answering such questions. And – this is of course 
crucial given my aim of bringing unification back into the picture – my answer to these 
questions includes some kind of unification as a condition of adequacy. 
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Chapter 1  
A brief history of unification 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the reader will get a brief historical overview of explanatory unification 
and its main problems. A full comprehensive history of the subject is unnecessary to 
understand the main arguments in this dissertation, but a few key ideas, theories and 
thinkers need to be introduced, before we set off for the real start. This will provide the 
reader with some background knowledge. But the main reason why this overview is 
included is that in Chapters 4, 7 and 8 I will clarify how my approach to the issue of 
unification in scientific explanations differs in crucial aspects from what has been done 
till now on this subject.  
The unificationist approach of explanation has mostly been connected with Philip 
Kitcher, especially (1981) and (1989). An earlier attempt to develop a unificationist 
account of explanation can be found in the work of Michael Friedman (1974). However, 
both of them can be considered as belonging to the intellectual heritage of Carl Hempel’s 
covering-law model. They retain the main idea (viz. subsumption under a covering law) 
and add extra requirements to solve recognised problems for this model. This is why my 
overview starts with Hempel’s model and its problems (section 1.2). 
In section 1.3 the accounts of Michael Friedman, Philip Kitcher, Gerhard Schurz and Erik 
Weber are summarized. These accounts can all be considered as intellectual heirs of Carl 
Hempel. In section 1.4 the alternative approach to unification of Uskali Mäki is briefly 
outlined. After this introductory chapter concrete case studies of unification will be 
presented.  
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1.2 Carl Hempel 
1.2.1 The DN-model 
The basic idea that Hempel proclaims is that explaining a phenomenon is the same as 
deriving it as an instance of a general regularity. In the deductive-nomological model, 
this derivation is achieved through deduction, in the inductive-statistical model this 
derivation is acquired through induction. I will focus on the DN (deductive-nomological) 
model. 
The DN model imposes two conditions on genuine scientific explanations. First, the 
explanans must contain at least one empirical law, hence a nomological model. Second, 
the explanandum must be derivable from the explanans, hence a deductive model. 
However, the first condition of the DN model is too general. The law must be relevant for 
the explanation, the argument should be invalid without it. Moreover, the law by itself is 
not sufficient, laws only state what will happen if certain specified antecedent conditions 
are met. Thus, “the question “Why does the phenomenon happen?” is construed as 
meaning “according to what general laws, and by virtue of what antecedent conditions 
does the phenomenon occur?”” (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, p. 136; italics in original).  
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 137 et seq.) specify a basic pattern of scientific 
explanations, dividing an explanation in two major constituents: the explanandum and 
the explanans. The explanandum describes the phenomenon for which we want an 
explanation. The explanans, that accounts for the explanandum, consists of certain 
sentences C1, C2,…, Ck that state the specific antecedent conditions, and of a set of 
sentences L1, L2,…, Lk which represent general laws. Furthermore there are four conditions 
of adequacy (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, p. 137): 
Logical conditions of adequacy 
R1 The explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans.  
R2 The explanans must contain general laws, and these must actually be  
required for the derivation of the explanandum. 
R3 The explanans must have empirical content, i.e., it must be capable, at least in 
principle, of test by experiment or observation. 
  
  7 
Empirical condition of adequacy 
R4 The sentences constituting the explanans must be true. 
Arguments that fulfill conditions R1-R3 are potential explanations, only when condition 
R4 is fulfilled the explanation becomes an actual explanation.  A DN explanation can be 
summarized in the following scheme: 
 
Figure 1 Scheme of DN explanation according to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 138). 
It is clear from this scheme that Hempel considers DN explanations as deductive 
arguments. A DN explanation shows that the phenomenon is the result of a set of laws 
and a set of specified antecedent conditions. This argument shows that the phenomenon 
was to be expected, given the circumstances and the relevant laws.  
Hempel and Oppenheim note themselves that the same formal analysis, including the 
four conditions, can be applied to prediction as well as to explanation. The difference 
between both is pragmatic: 
If E is given, i.e. if we know that the phenomenon described by E has occurred, and 
a suitable set of statements C1, C2,…, Ck, L1, L2,…, Lk is provided afterwards, we speak 
of an explanation of the phenomenon in question. If the latter statements are given 
and E is derived prior to the occurrence of the phenomenon it describes, we speak 
of a prediction. (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, p. 138) 
The analogy between explaining and predicting immediately illustrates the main 
intellectual benefit of explanations according to Hempel: understanding the world. 
…the argument shows that, given the particular circumstances and the law in 
question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this 
sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon 
occurred. (Hempel, 1965, p. 337) 
I will end this section with a short example of the DN model constructed by Erik Weber 
et al. (2013, p. 2 etseq.) about light striking a mirror. 
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Suppose that we want to explain E: 
E This reflected beam of light a has an angle of 45° relative to the mirror from  
  which it bounced 
According to the DN model, a potential explanans could be: 
C The angle of incidence of a relative to the mirror was 45°. 
L For all beams reflecting on mirrors: if the angle of incidence relative to the  
  mirror is 45°, then the reflected beam also has an angle of 45° relative to the  
  mirror.2 
If these claims are true (condition R4), this is an explanans. 
Now that Hempel’s DN model has been briefly summarized, I can discuss some 
problems of the model and present how Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher use 
unification as a solution to those problems. 
1.2.2 Problems for the DN model 
Hempel’s classic book Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of 
Science recently celebrated its 50th anniversary3 and the views in it are still discussed in 
today’s philosophy of science. However, his DN model is not flawless. Three main 
problems emerged. 
The first problem has to do with the difference between genuine laws and accidental 
generalisations. Let us use Hempel’s own examples: 
(i) All members of the Greensbury School Board for 1964 are bald. 
If this is true, it is only accidentally so. Therefore, this generalisation should not be used 
to explain why member n of the 1964 Greensbury School Board is bald. 
 
                                                     
2 In volume I of The Feynman Lectures on Physics Chapter 26 deals with elementary optics. There we find a 
simple law about mirrors: “The simplest object is a mirror, and the law for a mirror is that when the light hits 
the mirror, it does not continue in a straight line, but bounces off the mirror into a new straight line[.] … The 
light striking a mirror travels in such a way that the two angles, between each beam and the mirror, are equal. 
(Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 2010, pp. 22-26) 
3 In November 2015 the Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science of  Ghent University hosted a workshop 
called ’50 shapes of explanation’. http://www.lrr.ugent.be/archive/50-shapes-of-scientific-explanation/ 
(accessed 25 May 2018). 
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(ii) All gases expand when heated under constant pressure. 
This second example is a law, and thus it can be used to explain why some particular gas 
sample that has been heated under constant pressure has expanded. While these 
examples may seem obvious, the criteria to distinguish true accidental generalisations 
from laws are still up for philosophical discussion. Moreover, Salmon (1989, p. 15) has 
shown that not only truth but also modality is important for the law-like statement in a 
DN explanation. Consider the following two statements: 
(iii) No gold sphere has a mass greater than 100 000kg. 
(iv) No enriched uranium sphere has a mass greater than 100 000kg. 
Statement (iii) has no modal force. It is not physically impossible to fabricate a gold 
sphere of mass greater than 100 000kg. It just happens to be so that no such sphere has 
ever been made or found in this world. If something were a sphere with mass greater than 
100 000kg, we cannot not legitimately conclude from (iii) that it is not a gold sphere. We 
can however conclude that it is not an enriched uranium sphere, since this would be 
physically impossible4. Hempel’s DN model lacks a decent account of laws to cope with 
such counterexamples.  
A second problem has to do with explanatory irrelevancies. Kyburg’s (1965) classic 
example shows that an argument can meet the criteria for a DN explanation and yet be 
defective because it contains irrelevancies: 
All samples of hexed salt dissolve in water. 
I have hexed this sample of salt. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
This sample of salt dissolves in water. 
The hexing is irrelevant to the explanation because salt dissolves in water anyway. 
Another classic example has been developed by Salmon (1971, p. 34): 
  
 
                                                     
4 The critical mass of enriched uranium amounts 52 kg, which means that exceeding this mass would result in a 
uncontrolled chain reaction and as such a nuclear explosion. 
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All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant. 
Jon is a male who regularly takes birth control pills. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Jon fails to get pregnant. 5 
As it was the case with the hexed salt, these premises are true and the inference fits a DN 
argument. However, the first premise is superfluous, males do not get pregnant, whether 
they take birth control pills or not. These examples show that a derivation can satisfy the 
DN criteria and yet fail to be explanatory. 
A third problem is the asymmetry problem. Hempel and Oppenheim  (1948, p. 138) 
have noted themselves that the same formal analysis can be applied to prediction as well 
as to explanation. Inferences from explanations to predictions are generally accepted, but 
not vice versa. Michael Scriven (1962) showed one may predict a storm when cows lie 
down in their fields, yet the observation that cows are lying down does not explain why 
the storm occurs. The most famous example to show the asymmetry problem comes from 
Sylvain Bromberger (1966): deducing the height of a flagpole from the length of the 
shadow cast by the flagpole satisfies Hempel’s conditions for a DN argument, but it does 
not explain why the flagpole has that specific height. 
The three types of counterexamples mentioned in this section show that something is 
missing from the DN model. In section 1.3 I will show how several philosophers follow 
Hempel’s unofficial view by claiming that unification is the missing ingredient in 
explanations.  
 
                                                     
5 At the 'Causality and Explanation in the Sciences' (CaEitS) conference in Ghent (Belgium) (September 2011), 
the local organizing committee came up with a couple of humoristic movies in which they capture basic 
reasoning mistakes on correlation, causation and explanation. They filmed both the example of the hexed salt 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDFAtaVFVqk (accessed 25 May 2018)) and the example of the birth 
control pills (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ulc7HiZoj4 (accessed 25 May 2018)). 
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1.3 The unificationist heirs of Hempel 
In this section four intellectual heirs of Carl Hempel will be briefly summarized: Michael 
Friedman, Philip Kitcher, Gerhard Schurz and my promotor Erik Weber. They are all 
advocates of explanatory unification, albeit it derivational unification. These accounts 
will be contrasted with my views on unification Chapter 4.  
1.3.1 Michael Friedman 
An early attempt to develop a unificationist account of explanation can be found in the 
work of Michael Friedman (1974). According to Friedman, an explanation is an argument, 
a derivation from a set of premises to a conclusion. The conclusion describes the 
explanandum and the premises describe the explanantia. Unification has to do with the 
relation between the number of premises and the number of conclusions. The smaller the 
set of premises and the larger the set of conclusions, the more our knowledge is unified:   
“this is the essence of scientific explanation—science increases our understanding 
of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have 
to accept as ultimate or given” (Friedman, 1974, p. 15). 
Michael Friedman argues that Hempel’s DN-model provides a “clear, precise, and simple 
condition that the explanation relation must satisfy”, and it gives us an objective criterion 
for explanation. (Friedman, 1974, p. 9). But, for Friedman, the DN-model lacks a 
connection between explaining and understanding. In order to explain, the conjunction 
of the universal claim and the singular claims only need to bear the appropriate deductive 
relation to the explanandum. For Hempel understanding is related to expectability, if a 
phenomenon can be expected, it is understood. For Friedman understanding is increased 
when the total number of independent phenomena that we must accept as ultimate is 
reduced. Unifying explanatory laws or phenomena in a conjoined structure increases our 
understanding of the world. So, for an argument to really explain, it must not only bear 
the appropriate relation between the explanandum and the explanans, it must also unify 
the explanandum with other phenomena. Friedman uses the kinetic theory of gases as an 
example to show how unification increases our understanding. If the kinetic theory of 
gases would only show us that any collection of molecules of the sort that gases are, which 
obeys the laws of mechanics will also approximately obey the Boyle-Charles law, it would 
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add nothing to our understanding (Friedman, 1974, p. 14). The kinetic theory of gases 
allows us to derive other gas-related phenomena, such as Graham’s law of diffusion, the 
specific heat capacities of gases, etc. At least three brute facts can now be reduced to one 
brute fact.  
In Friedman’s account the arguments that are used to explain the gas-related 
phenomena fit Hempel’s DN-model. To explain the Boyle-Charles law you construct an 
argument that shows that the gas-related behavior can be expected by deriving it from 
the kinetic theory of gases. Further, the kinetic theory of gases, the explaining law, must 
unify the explanandum with other phenomena, which indeed it does. 
 
1.3.2 Philip Kitcher 
Philip Kitcher defines an explanation as an argument, in which parts of our knowledge 
are derived from other parts of our knowledge (Kitcher, 1981). Our knowledge, or our set 
of beliefs, should be systematized to reach a maximal degree of unification. The quality 
of the systematization, and thus the degree of unification, is determined by the size of the 
conclusion set, the number of and similarity among argument patterns and the 
stringency of those patterns.   
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive 
descriptions of many phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation over and 
over again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of 
types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute). […] If a pattern sets 
conditions on instantiations that are more difficult to satisfy than those set by 
another pattern, then I shall say that the former pattern is more stringent than the 
latter. (Kitcher, 1989b, pp. 432-433, italics deleted)   
Unification, according to Kitcher, is achieved by constructing arguments in which parts 
of our knowledge are derived from other knowledge. Take K to be a set of beliefs, 
sentences we accept. Arguments that consist of arguments and conclusions that are part 
of K are systematisations of K.  “Science offers us a reserve of explanatory arguments, which 
we may tap as need arises” (Kitcher, 1981, p. 512). The explanatory store over K, E(K), is 
the set of arguments that best unifies K.  This unification is realised by argument patterns: 
“a theory unifies our beliefs when it provides one (or more generally, a few) pattern(s) of 
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argument which can be used in the derivation of a large number of sentences which we 
accept” (1981, p. 514). The notion of an argument pattern is crucial in Kitcher’s account. 
An argument pattern has three constitutive parts: 
(i) A sequence of schematic sentences, in which the nonlogical expressions are 
replaced by dummy letters. This is the schematic argument. 
(ii) A set of filling instructions that tell us how to replace the dummy letters in the 
schematic argument. 
(iii) A classification for the schematic argument; this determines which sentences 
are premises and which are conclusions, and which inference rules are used. 
Kitcher uses examples from genetics and from evolutionary biology to illustrate how 
explanatory unification works (1989), but I will his argument pattern ‘Common Descent’   
(1993, p. 83). This pattern gives an answer to the question: why do the members of G, G’ 
share P? 
(1) G, G’ are descended from a common ancestor G0. 
(2) G0  members had P. 
(3) P is heritable. 
(4) No factors intervened to modify P along the G0 – G, G0 – G’ sequences. 
Therefore, 
(5) Members of G and G’ have P. 
In this scheme there are five schematic sentences that need to be filled according to the 
following instructions: 
G, G’ and G0 need to replaced by names of groups or organisms.  
P needs to be replaced by the name of a trait of organisms. 
In the scheme sentences (1) till (4) are classified as premises and sentence (5) is the 
conclusion, deduced from the premises.  
With his account Kitcher tackles the problem of explanatory asymmetry illustrated by 
the flagpole example (1989, pp. 484-488).  
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He argues that there are at least two possible systematizations of K: 
(1) The systematization S’(K) of K with the shadow-pattern. This pattern derives the 
length of the pole from the length of the shadow. 
(2) The systematization S(K) of K that includes the origin-and-development-
pattern. This pattern traces the dimensions of objects (both natural and man-
made) back to “the conditions in which the object originated and the 
modifications that it has since undergone” (1989, p. 485). Depending on the 
object those derivations will be more or less complex, but the general pattern is 
the same in all cases. 
Kitcher argues that the systematization S’(K) that includes the shadow-pattern is worse 
than S(K) by considering two options. First, if the origin-and-development-pattern is 
added in S’(K), the number of argument patterns is increased, without increasing the 
number of derivable conclusions. The origin-and-development-pattern is sufficient to 
derive the dimensions of objects. Second, if S’(K) is favored, the numbers of argument 
patterns stays the same. But this would lead to fewer conclusions that can be derived from 
the set of patterns, e.g. what about objects that are not able to drop a shadow? Kitcher 
concludes that therefore the origin-and-development-pattern belongs to the explanatory 
store, and the shadow-pattern does not. Therefore, The best systematization is S(K). 
His approach to the problem of irrelevancies is similar. If the argument pattern “all 
hexed salt dissolves in water” is included, the set of argument patterns will be less 
unifying since another pattern, such as “all unhexed salt dissolves in water” will be 
needed too. If we remove this second pattern from the set, the number of conclusions 
that can be derived will be limited. If both patterns are replaced with the pattern “all salt 
dissolves in water”, the number of argument patterns decreases (or remains the same if 
the pattern about unhexed salt was not included) and the number of conclusions is 
increased (or remains the same if the pattern about unhexed salt was included) (1989, pp. 
482-484). 
Kitcher’s account of unification was highly influential on the literature on explanation. 
Both with philosophers that argued in favor of unification and with philosophers who 
argued against it. In 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 two philosophers, Gerhard Schurz and Erik Weber, are 
discussed since they refine the Kitcher-Style unification.  
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1.3.3 Gerhard Schurz 
Besides Friedman and Kitcher, there are other philosophers who have defended 
unification as an epistemic goal in the construction of explanations. For Gerhard Schurz 
(1999) the aim of an explanatory process is the achievement of a new cognitive state, in 
which the premises that one relies on for the answer must be in less need of explanation 
than the explanandum. In his account explanation and understanding are semantically 
related, and one cannot understand something in terms of something else that is not 
understood.  Unification, then, is the key to reach understanding.   
Schurz states that there are four key-elements in an explanatory process: the 
explanation-seeking question P, the cognitive state C of the questioner, the answer A and 
the new cognitive state C+A. A proper answer A takes the form: “P because of the reasons 
Prem" in which Prem must be true and the inference Prem => P must be correct in a broad 
sense (deductively or probabilistically). 
But this is not all, Schurz also imposes that the new cognitive state C+A must be more 
unified (>u) than C. He motivates this constraint by referring to the being-in-need-of-
explanation of question P in C, which is satisfied in C+A. This can only happen if the 
explanatory premises Prem are less in need of explanation than the explanandum P. 
Schurz justifies this condition with examples, but also in a more general way by pointing 
out that explanation and understanding are semantically related. An explanation can 
only be satisfying if and only if it provides understanding; one cannot understand 
something in terms of something else that is not understood. This gives us the following 
definition of an explanation: 
A is an explanatory satisfying answer to the question Why-P? in the cognitive state 
C iff  (i) A claims (for some Prem) Prem & Prem => P, where Prem => P is a premise-
relevant correct inference in a broad sense, and   (ii) C + A >u C  (Schurz, 1999, 
p. 98) 
This definition has both a local (i) and a global (ii) condition, so that one avoids the 
objection that unification is a global matter while explanation is a local affair. In Schurz' 
view an explanation is still a local affair, but it has global effects. The major rival for the 
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unification approach is the causality approach6. According to Schurz the main advantage 
of the unification approach is to be situated in the explanation of laws. But in the domain 
of singular facts he has to add asymmetry as an extra requirement for explanation, such 
that only inferences Prem => P are allowed that are supported by a causality theory in C. 
But the deeper analysis of causality brings him back to unification on the level of theories. 
He believes that causality is not a priori but theory-relative, since the causal theories are 
selected only for their unificatory virtues. 
“…think, the only scientifically acceptable answer can be this: the theoretical laws 
which we trust to describe the real causal mechanisms are those which unify all 
known empirical regularities in a superior way. And only because these theoretical 
laws have this overall unification power, our belief in real causal processes as 
opposed to non-causal correlations is rationally justified.” (Schurz, 1999, p. 101)  
Schurz compares different levels of unification according to their assimilation status. The 
representation of the cognitive state C of a cognitive agent AG is the main ingredient of 
unification. This cognitive state C consists of the descriptive knowledge of AG and the 
inferential knowledge of AG.  
Together they form the state of information systems: the elements of the descriptive 
knowledge are information units and the inferences assimilate information. Based on 
those constituents Schurz makes a difference between actual assimilation, potential 
assimilation, dissimilated phenomena and basic phenomena.  
The actual assimilation can only happen if there is predictability or nomic 
expectability. Potential assimilation consists of virtual or heuristic assimilation. Schurz 
speaks of virtual assimilation if an event is random without any further hidden cause and 
if there is a low probability inference Prem => Pa.  Heuristic assimilation happens if 
phenomena are derived from theories with help of initial or boundary conditions, which 
are considered plausible. Dissimilated phenomena are anomalies, they cannot be 
assimilated within the accepted theory. These are the phenomena that are in need of 
explanation according to Schurz.  
 
                                                     
6 This approach holds that an explanation mainly consists of uncovering a causal relation between the 
explanandum and the explanans. The specific nature of this relationship and of the explanans varies between 
different causal approaches. In Part I I will investigate if unification can be a virtue or even an extra requirement 
of adequacy for causal explanations. In order to do this the causal accounts of Salmon (1984, 1989, 1989), 
Woodward (2003) and Strevens (2008) will be mentioned. 
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1.3.4 Erik Weber  
Erik Weber defines unification as showing that two or more different events are instances 
of the same (set of) law(s) (Weber, 1999, p. 481). In order to account for unificatory 
explanations, he uses two other types: coexistence explanations and succession 
explanations. 
A coexistence explanation for Qa is a deductive argument in which the explanandum 
is an instance of a law of coexistence. A succession explanation for Qa is a deductive 
argument in which the explanandum is an instance from a law of succession. Those types 
of explanations are only valid if the used laws are valid. A coexistence law has the form 
(∀𝑥)(𝑃𝑥 → 𝑄𝑥) and a succession law has the form (∀𝑥)[𝑃(𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝑄 (𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑖)] in which 
t is time. Moreover, the laws have to fulfil four conditions: 
(1) the law may not be tautological or analytical 
(2) the law may not be vacuous 
(3) the law may not be an accidental generalization 
(4) the antecedent may not be irrelevant. 
Weber can now define a unificatory explanation as an explanation consisting of (1) a 
coexistence or succession explanation and (2) a derivation of the law used in this 
explanation (Weber, 1999, p. 484)]. In order for an explanation of two or more qualitative 
events to be unificatory the used law must be identical. 
Although Weber’s account is based on Kitcher’s approach there are some important 
differences.  For Kitcher the degree of unification of a set of beliefs K is directly 
proportional to the quality of the systematization of K.  Unification is thus best reached 
by iterating the same argument patterns. Weber on the other hand claims that the degree 
of unification of K is also related to the degree of unification of the members of the set, 
with how many other events is an event unified, and the cardinality of the set (Weber, 
1999, p. 489).  This means that for Weber unification is not only a matter of using the same 
patterns over and over again, but also by using patterns that contain “the same 
empirically adequate premises again and again” (1999, p. 490). Kitcher has no criterion to 
choose between two sets that are equally stringent, contain the same number of 
argument patterns and have an equally large number of derivable conclusions. By looking 
at the unification between the members of the set, Weber adds an extra criterion that 
urges us to use the same laws in explanations.  
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1.3.5 Conclusion 
Kitcher refers to the covering-law model as Hempel’s official view, but claims that he also 
holds an unofficial view: 
In contrasting scientific explanation with the idea of reducing unfamiliar 
phenomena to familiar phenomena, Hempel suggests this unofficial view: “What 
scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims at is not [an] 
intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of 
insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting phenomena as 
manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes that conform to 
specific, testable basic principles”.    (Kitcher, 1981, p. 508) 
Maybe what Kitcher says here is wishful thinking. But what is certain is that at least for 
the authors discussed here, Hempel’s idea of subsumption was the starting point for 
developing a unificationist account of explanation. 
 
I will not mention the problems for Kitcher’s, Schurz’ and Weber’s account here, but 
they will be discussed later when I contrast their traditional view on unification with my 
proposal (chapter 4). 
1.4 Alternative approaches to unification 
In his 2001 article Uskali Mäki shows that although unification is usually considered a 
virtue in science, it can also be vice. By only looking to the explananda/explanantia ratio, 
as is the case in Kitcher-style unification, and thus also in top-down unification, 
hypotheses that are not sufficiently unifying are considered as less interesting.  
The validity of utility maximization does not depend on its being an accurate 
description of the behaviour of individuals. Rather, it derives from its being the 
underlying postulate that pulls together most of economic theory; it is the major 
component of a certain way of thinking, with many important and familiar 
implications, which have been part of economics for decades and even centuries. 
[…] Alternatives such as satisficing have proved next to useless in this respect. 
While attractive as hypotheses, there is little theory built on them; they pull 
  19 
together almost nothing; they have few interesting consequences. In judging utility 
maximization, we must ask not “Is it plausible?” but “What does it tie together, 
where does it lead?” (Aumann, 1985, p. 35) 
In his 2001 article Uskali Mäki claims that the type of unification proposed by Kitcher or 
Friedman poses a formal constraint: 
Consider the example of self-seeking maximization in economic theory. […] the 
principle of unification prescribes that the results of theoretical work be derivable 
from the assumption of maximization by economic agents—deviations from this 
rule will be proscribed as ad hoc.  (Maki, 2001, p. 503)  
To cope with this worry, Mäki claims that the Kitcher-style unification is not the only 
option. Mäki distinguishes between derivational and ontological unification (2001, p. 493  
et seq.). A first kind of unification is derivational or logical unification. But, instead of 
basing the unification on inferential capabilities, one can focus on the referential and 
representational capacities of a theory. This notion of ontological unification implies that 
a set of phenomena is unified if they share the same ontic foundations. Mäki refers here 
to causes, origins and constituents. This type of unity is not only about what category the 
phenomena belong to, but also about how the phenomena are established. This is a kind 
of unification that cannot be imposed, but has to be discovered by adding the relevant 
entities and properties to your ontological framework (Maki, 2001, p. 498 et seq.). This 
ontological unification is “a matter of redescribing apparently independent and diverse 
phenomena as manifestations (outcomes, phases, forms, aspects) of one and the same small number 
of entities, powers and processes" (Maki, 2001, p. 498).  Those phenomena are ontologically 
unified if they only appear to be independent from each other, while they are in fact 
dependent on the same deeper, more fundamental structure or process. Mäki refers to 
Newtonian mechanics, where unification was realized by representing a variety of 
sublunary and superlunary phenomena as having the same causes, namely the same 
forces of gravitation. Newton's theory unifies better than previous theories since there 
are less kinds of entities referred to in order to describe the same manifestations. For 
Mäki this type of unification is about showing that disconnected phenomena are only 
apparently disconnected, since they are “manifestations of one and the same fundamental and 
relatively simple structure” (Maki, 2001, p. 499). 
In Mäki’s conceptual framework there are three possibilities: purely derivational 
unification, purely ontological unification and a mixed unification (unification that is 
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derivational as well as ontological). Since purely derivational unification poses formal 
constraints, Mäki has a clear preference for the ontological variants (purely ontological 
or mixed), because in that case the constraints are not merely formal. 
The point is that if there are limits to unification, they had better be ontological in 
character. One may hope to be able to celebrate unification as a factual discovery, 
while a more cautious attitude will be recommendable if it is imposed as merely a 
formal constraint. (Maki, 2001, p. 489)  
1.5 Summary and preview 
In this chapter a brief historical overview of explanatory unification was given. The key 
ideas of unification as presented by Friedman, Kitcher, Schurz and Weber are all part of 
the traditional approach to unification. In the next chapters it will become clear that this 
approach ignores certain scientific practices. The alternative perspective of Mäki is 
promising, but a deeper analysis is missing. In Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this dissertation I 
will construct several case studies to elaborate the idea of unification proposed by Mäki 
and show how it can appear in scientific explanation. My strategy is to elaborate his vague 
idea by looking for cases of ontological unification in scientific practice. In this way I will 
be able to rethink unification. This strategy presupposes that I temporarily bracket the 
classical accounts of unification summarised in this chapter. They will reoccur in Chapter 
4. 
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Part I  
Unification and causal explanation 
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Introduction to part I 
Over the last decades causation has taken a prominent role in theories of explanation. 
Causal-mechanist and causal-interventionist accounts have become dominant and have 
pushed unificationism into the background. In this first part, two lines of argument will 
be developed to imply that by neglecting unification altogether the baby is thrown out 
with the bathwater. Each line of argument relates to an important question that – rather 
surprisingly – no one in the philosophical literature seems to have asked. 
The first question is: are there cases in which unification is an explanatory virtue, 
while the aim of explanation is not unification? In these cases (if they exist) the aim of 
explanation is different (e.g. to provide information about the causes of the explanandum 
or about the mechanisms that produce it), but it is better to try to reach this aim in a 
unified way. My answer is positive. In Chapter 2 two examples will be constructed – one 
about mercury thermometers and one about the ideal gas law – to demonstrate how 
unificatory information can have a surplus value. Unifying causal explanations can result 
in a higher explanatory power (this is a first possible virtue) and they can result in more 
cogent explanations (this is a second possible virtue). 
The second question is: are there cases in which unification is a necessary condition 
for a satisfactory explanation? If such cases exist, these explanations have a double aim: 
to provide causal information and to unify.  In Chapter 3 I construct two examples from 
scientific practice – one about social revolutions and one about general anaesthesia – to 
demonstrate that scientists are interested in similarities between particular facts or 
between regularities. Answers that aim to provide an adequate explanation for these 
resemblance questions need both causal information and unification.  
In Chapter 4 I will clarify some theoretical-philosophical implications of my results. 
My strategy to search for cases of ontological unification in scientific practice, and to use 
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them to rethink unification, resulted in a new possible relation between unification, 
causality and explanation.  
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Chapter 2  
Unification: unnecessary but virtuous 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter7 I will argue that unification can be an explanatory virtue, even in types of 
explanation where the aim of the explanation is not unification. In the literature on 
scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and 
explanations of laws. In this chapter I will focus on explanations of laws, more specifically 
mechanistic explanations of laws. I investigate whether providing unificatory 
information in mechanistic explanations of laws has a surplus value. Unificatory 
information – in this context –  is information about how the mechanism that explains 
the target law (the law that is the explanandum of the explanation considered) relates to 
other mechanisms (which explain other, related laws). I argue that providing unificatory 
information can lead to explanations with more explanatory power (Jim Woodward’s 
(2003) concept of explanatory power will be used for that) and that it may lead to more 
strongly supported explanations. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 some basic information on 
laws and mechanisms is given. In section 2.3 an example is presented about the behaviour 
of mercury thermometers, which will be analysed in section 2.4. In Section 2.5 I present a 
second example: the ideal gas law. In Section 2.6 this second example will be analysed and 
the results of this analysis will be compared with those of section 2.4.  In Section 2.7 the 
relation between Sections 2.3-2.6 will be discussed. The aforementioned sections provide 
 
                                                     
7 This chapter is based on the published paper ‘The role of unification in micro-explanations of physical laws’ 
(Weber & Lefevere, 2014). 
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a positive answer for the first question of part I: are there cases in which unification is an 
explanatory virtue, while the aim of explanation is not unification? 
2.2 Laws and mechanisms 
In this section two of the key concepts used will be clarified: law and mechanistic 
explanation. I will proceed by explicating the aims and the method of this chapter.  
I will not attempt here to give a definition of what a scientific law is. Rather, I will give 
a non-exhaustive list of types of laws which I intend to cover. First, there are quantitative 
laws, typically expressed by means of a mathematical formula. An example that I will use 
is the Ideal Gas Law (IGL): 
For equal quantities of gas in a container, the product of pressure P and volume V is 
proportional to temperature T, with a proportionality constant R (the ideal gas 
constant), or mathematically expressed: 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇. 
Second, there are laws in which capacities are ascribed to classes of objects, for instance: 
In mercury thermometers the mercury level first drops and then rises when they 
are rapidly immersed in hot water. 
Asters are short-day plants (i.e. they start to flower when the night length exceeds 
some critical value). 
Petunias are long-day plants (i.e. they start to flower when the night length is below 
some critical value). 
These laws describe how the objects that belong to the class react to a certain stimulus. 
Third, there are causal generalisations about populations, for instance: 
Smoking causes lung cancer. 
Alcohol causes liver cancer. 
These claims are about a population (in these cases: humans) though this population is 
not always explicitly mentioned. It is claimed that in this population there is a cause-
effect relation between two variables.  
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What is a mechanistic explanation of a law? Starting with Machamer, Darden and 
Craver’s seminal paper ‘Thinking about Mechanisms’ (2000) a mechanistic tradition has 
developed in the philosophy of explanation. For laws, mechanistic explanations are 
defined as follows: 
A mechanistic explanation of a law is a description of the underlying mechanism. 
A description of a mechanism is usually called a model of the mechanism. The core idea of 
the mechanists is that, to have explanatory value, the model has to describe the 
mechanism in terms of its entities, its activities and the way these entities and activities 
are organized. I look at some characteristic quotes. Bechtel & Abrahamsen write: 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (2005, p. 423)  
Carl Craver writes: 
[M]echanisms are entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the 
explanandum phenomenon. (2007, p. 6, italics removed)  
These quotes show that mechanists have no unique way of defining what a mechanism is. 
However, Phyllis Illari and  Jon Williamson have constructed a definition that expresses 
the core consensus among philosophers in the mechanistic tradition: 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such 
way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 
123)  
This definition includes the three key terms which mechanists use: entities, activities and 
organization. I have to make a brief remark about the concept of organisation. This has 
to be interpreted liberally, so that it includes random interactions between components. 
In a mechanistic explanation, the behaviour of the macro-system is explained by means 
of component parts, the activities of these parts and the way these entities and activities 
interact. The term “organisation” is used by mechanists (and here) to denote this 
interaction, even if this interaction is “chaotic” and thus not “organised” in a strict sense.8  
 
                                                     
8 This and other borderline cases of mechanisms are discussed in (McKay Illari & Williamson, 2012). 
 28 
Not every explanation of a law is a mechanistic explanation. Take for instance: 
General law:   All waves reflect. 
Auxiliary hypothesis:  Sounds are waves. 
Explanandum:   Sounds reflect. 
In this explanation the explanandum law is subsumed under a more general law by 
means of an auxiliary hypothesis. This explanation does not refer to the (activities of the) 
entities of which sounds are composed, so it is not a mechanistic explanation. 
The aim of this chapter is to find out what the surplus value is (if any) of providing 
unificatory information in mechanistic explanations of laws. Unificatory information is 
information about how the mechanism that explains the law, which is my target, relates 
to other mechanisms which may explain other laws. In order to make this a legitimate 
aim, I have to make two strongly interconnected assumptions: 
1) In explanatory texts that provide a mechanistic explanation of a law, it is possible 
to separate the information that is required for explaining the target law from 
additional unificatory information. 
2) Scientists, when writing explanatory texts, can opt to be minimalistic (i.e. only 
provide information relevant for explaining the target law) or can choose to add 
unificatory information. 
I will look at examples of explanations of laws and I will show that these assumptions are 
supported. For each case, I construct two possible explanations: a minimal one (without 
unificatory information) and an elaborate one (with unificatory information) and then 
compare the relative merits of these two explanations. 
2.3 Mercury thermometers 
The example used here is inspired by an example of Carl Hempel (1965, p. 246). A mercury 
thermometer is rapidly immersed in hot water. A temporary drop of the mercury column 
is observed, followed by a swift rise. This event can be explained (according to Hempel’s 
DN model) by subsuming it under the following law: 
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L:  In all mercury thermometers that are rapidly immersed in hot water, the 
mercury level first drops and then rises. 
Hempel uses this law as part of the explanans in his example, because he wants to give an 
example of an explanation of a particular fact.  In my example, the law is the 
explanandum. Three general laws are relevant for explaining L: the law of thermal 
expansion of fluids, the law of thermal expansion of solids and the law of heat conduction. 
The law of thermal expansion of fluids is: 
(1) 𝑣 = 𝑣0 + 𝑣0𝛽∆𝑇 
(𝑣: final volume; 𝑣0: initial volume, 𝛽: expansion coefficient of the fluid considered; 
∆𝑇: rise (+) or fall (-) of the temperature).  
The law of thermal expansion of solids is: 
(2) 𝑙 = 𝑙0 + 𝑙0𝛼∆𝑇 
(𝑙: final length; 𝑙0: initial length; 𝛼: coefficient of linear expansion of the solid 
considered).  
Finally, the law of heat conduction says that the quantity of heat 𝑑𝑄 (joules) which, in a 
time period 𝑑𝑡, flows between any two plane surfaces normal to the direction x of heat 
flow in a time period 𝑑𝑡 , is given by the equation 
(3) 𝑑𝑄 = −𝐾𝐴 (
𝛿𝑇
𝛿𝑥
) 𝑑𝑡  
(𝐾: thermal conductivity coefficient (joule/°C.sec.m); 𝐴: area of the surfaces; 
𝜕T
𝜕𝑥
: 
temperature gradient).  
Mercury thermometers consist of glass tubes which are partly filled with mercury.  The 
law of thermal expansion of fluids, when implemented for mercury, gives us the equation:  
(4) 𝑣 = 𝑣0 + 𝑣0 × 0.00018 × ∆𝑇𝑚   
(𝑣: final volume of the mercury; 𝑣0: initial volume of the mercury; 0.00018: 
coefficient of expansion of mercury; ∆𝑇𝑚: the temperature rise of the mercury).  
On the other hand, the tube of the thermometer will expand in accordance to the 
following equation, which is an implementation of the law of thermal expansion of solids:  
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(5)  𝑟 = 𝑟0 + 𝑟0 × 0.000008 × ∆𝑇𝑔    
(𝑟: final radius of the tube; 𝑟0: initial radius of the tube; 0.000008: coefficient of 
linear expansion of glass; ∆𝑇𝑔: the temperature rise of the tube).  
As glass is a bad thermal conductor, only the temperature of the tube will initially rise 
(∆𝑇𝑔 > 0). The temperature of the mercury will remain unchanged, ∆𝑇𝑚 = 0 and thus 
also 𝑣 = 𝑣0. The relation between the level of the mercury and its volume is given by the 
geometrical formula  
 (6) ℎ =
𝑣
𝜋𝑟2
       
(ℎ: height of the mercury column; v: volume of the mercury; 𝑟: radius of the tube). 
From this formula and 𝑣 = 𝑣0 we derive that 
(7) ℎ =
𝑣0
𝜋𝑟2
       
The initial mercury level is given by 
(8) ℎ0 =
𝑣0
𝜋𝑟2
        
Because the temperature of the glass tube rises, 𝑟 is larger than 𝑟0. The two last equations 
and 𝑟 > 𝑟0 imply that 
 (9) ℎ < ℎ0     
In other words, the mercury level drops in a first phase. In a second phase, the 
temperature of the mercury will start to rise after a few instants as a result of the heat 
conduction. This let the mercury expands due to the thermal expansion law of fluids. 
Because the expansion coefficient of mercury is large, the expansion will be greater than 
the extension of the tube. Consequently, the mercury level will rise. 
2.4 Analysis of the mercury example 
The explanation in Section 2.3 fits the aforementioned definition of a mechanistic 
explanation: it identifies the components (glass tube, mercury) and describes how they 
behave (equations (4) and (5)); and equations (6)-(9) are consequences of the organization 
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of the parts (the most important organization-fact is that that mercury is inside the glass 
tube).  
As suggested in section 2.2, scientists can opt to be minimalistic or they can choose to 
add unificatory information. In order to argue for this claim, let me separate the 
information that is required for explaining the target law from the additional unificatory 
information. Equations (1) and (2) are not really necessary for describing how mercury 
thermometers work. All that is needed is (4) and (5), and these can be known 
independently (by means of experiments with mercury and glass). Similarly, equation (3) 
is not used in the derivation. Instead, the instantiation is used where K is substituted for 
the thermal conductivity coefficient of glass. 
In order to get a better grip on what is going on here, it is useful to distinguish 
functional laws from parametric laws (Ajdukiewicz, 1974, pp. 318-323). Let us first look at 
an example of a functional law: 
For all free-falling material objects 𝑥 near the surface of the earth and for all 
numbers 𝑠 en 𝑡: if s is the distance covered by 𝑥 and 𝑡 the time during which 𝑥 is 
falling, then 𝑠 =
9.81𝑡2
2
. 
This is Galileo’s law. Formally, we can write this as: 
(∀𝑥)(∀𝑠)(∀𝑡) [(𝑆(𝑥) = 𝑠 ∧ 𝑇(𝑥) = 𝑡) → 𝑠 =
9.81𝑡2
2
] 
The general form of functional laws is: 
For all objects 𝑥 in domain D and all numbers 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛: if 𝑀1(𝑥) = 𝑟1, 𝑀2(𝑥) =
𝑟2, … , 𝑀𝑛(𝑥) = 𝑟𝑛, then 𝐹(𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛) = 0.  
An example of a parametric law is: 
For all gas samples 𝑥 with fixed temperature there is a parameter 𝑘 such that for all 
numbers 𝑝 en 𝑣: if 𝑝 is the pressure of 𝑥 and 𝑣 its volume at the same moment of 
time then, 𝑝 × 𝑣 = 𝑘. 
Formally, we can write this as: 
(∀𝑥)(∃𝑘)[(∀𝑝)(∀𝑣)[(𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑝 ∧ 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑣) → 𝑝 × 𝑣 = 𝑘]] 
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The general form of parametric laws is: 
For all objects 𝑥 in domain D there is a parameter 𝑘 such that for all 
numbers𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛: if 𝑀1(𝑥) = 𝑟1, 𝑀2(𝑥) = 𝑟2, … , 𝑀𝑛(𝑥) = 𝑟𝑛, then 
𝐹(𝑘, 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛) = 0. 
The explanation presented in Section 2.3 consists of (i) a derivation of the law to be 
explained from functional laws about the behaviour of the parts and knowledge about 
their interaction, and (ii) information (contained in parametric laws) about similar 
behaviour of related objects. The parametric and functional laws are logically 
independent. The parametric laws are not derivable from the functional ones because the 
parametric laws are more general, as they are about a larger class of objects; the 
functional laws are not derivable from the parametric laws because the functional laws 
are more precise, since they contain a specific value for the parameter. As a consequence, 
there is unificatory information which can be easily separated from the rest of the 
explanation. The explanation as a whole consists of a part that tells us how things work 
in the case at hand, and a part that connects this mechanism to potential mechanisms in 
similar cases. If the latter part is deleted, we have a minimal explanation. If it is added, 
we have an elaborate explanation. I will now compare the value of these two possible 
constructions. 
In my evaluation I use Jim Woodward’s views on explanation, introduced in his book 
Making Things Happen: “explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of 
counterfactual dependence” (2003, p. 191). He discusses a classic example (2003, p. 187): 
All ravens are black. 
a is a raven. 
––––––––––––––– 
a is black. 
He claims that this is not a satisfactory explanation because it  
… doesn’t tell us about the conditions under which raven a would be some other 
colour than black. (2003, p. 193)  
This fits into his general idea: the argument above tells us that we could have expected 
that a is black, given that we knew that it was a raven. But expectability is not enough for 
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Woodward: an explanation must also tell how the explanandum would change if the 
initial conditions would be different. In other words, adequate explanations … 
… locate their explananda within a space of alternative possibilities and show us 
how which of these alternatives is realized systematically depends on the 
conditions cited in the explanans. They do this by enabling us to see how, if these 
initial conditions had been different or had changed in various ways various of 
these alternatives would have been realized instead. (2003, p. 191) 
Before I apply this idea to my case, let me give a simple example of a good and a bad 
explanation. According to Woodward’s views on explanation, the following argument is 
useless: 
All pendula with a length of 1 metre have a period of 2.006 seconds.  
This pendulum has a length of 1 metre 
–––––––––––--------------------------------------------------------------–––– 
This pendulum has a period of 2.006 seconds 
However, the following argument is an adequate explanation: 
For all pendula: 𝑃 = 2𝜋√𝐿 𝑔⁄      
All pendula with a length of 1 metre have a period of 2.006 seconds.  
This pendulum has a length of 1 metre. 
–––---------------------------------------------------------------–––––––––––– 
This pendulum has a period of 2.006 seconds. 
In this second argument, the law which also occurred in the first argument is no longer a 
premise, it is derived from the general pendulum law. This general law is superfluous 
from an expectability perspective, but it is necessary in order to provide the 
counterfactual information. The second explanation tells us namely how the period 
would be different if the length of the pendulum were different. 
 Let me now apply Woodward’s view on explanatory power to the mercury example. 
The minimal explanation gives some counterfactual information. We can calculate what 
would happen if the expansion coefficients of glass and mercury would be higher or lower 
than they actually are. The elaborate explanation gives the same counterfactual 
information, but offers something extra. It offers insight in what would happen if the 
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thermometer would be made of different materials. What if the tube of mercury 
thermometers would not be made of glass, but of another transparent material? The 
equations (1) – (3) tell us that similar laws would apply, and that what happens if the 
differently composed thermometer is immersed in hot water depends on the thermal 
conductivity and expansion coefficient of the other material. 
Woodward summarizes his idea by saying that the explanations must answer “what-
if-things-had-been-different questions” and that explanations which answer more such 
questions are better than explanations that answer less such questions. In our mercury 
example, both the minimal and the elaborate explanation satisfy Woodward’s minimal 
condition. But the elaborate explanation answers more what-if-things-had-been-
different questions and is therefore better. 
I can take the analysis one step further: why is it interesting to have many answers to 
what-if-things-had-been-different questions? One reason is practical. If the real situation, 
the real behaviour we are explaining, is not our ideal, the answers inform us about the 
possibilities of creating an alternative, more desirable situation. So the unificatory 
information can have a practical value. 
Another reason one may give is that this is what understanding is all about: systematic 
knowledge of counterfactual patterns of dependence is intrinsically valuable because it 
provides understanding of the world. Such claim is not uncontroversial. Hempel has 
claimed that science serves two basic human motives: the capacity to predict and control 
and sheer intellectual curiosity (1965, p. 333). No problem so far. However, he equates this 
intellectual curiosity with the desire to show that everything could be expected by means 
of certain laws and initial conditions. In other words, Hempel identifies understanding 
with expectability.  In order to argue that answers to what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions are intrinsically valuable, I need a different, stronger implementation of the 
idea of intellectual curiosity.  
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2.5 The ideal gas law 
In this section I present as a second example the relation between the ideal gas law (IGL) 
and the kinetic theory of gas (KTG) to show that unification can be an explanatory value. 
In this case the advantage of unification is stronger than in the previous example, since 
it adds credibility to the overall argument.  
The IGL is about standard, isolated quantities of gases in closed spaces. It claims a 
proportional relationship between the pressure P, the volume V and the temperature T: 
IGL: 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇   in which R is the ideal gas constant. 
For an equal quantity n of gas in a container, the product of pressure P and volume V is 
proportional to temperature T. This proportionality constant, R, is the same for all ideal 
gases and is therefore called the ideal gas constant. To explain why this proportionality 
holds, we need to understand the underlying machinery. To derive the IGL from the  KTG 
I will use Kuipers’ account of explanations of laws (Kuipers, 2001, pp. 82-104). According 
to Kuipers explanations of laws have different forms, but contain only steps of five types: 
application steps, aggregation steps, identification steps, correlation steps, and 
approximation steps. As a rule, these steps occur in this order, but exceptions are possible. 
Not all explanations contain steps of all types, and some types may occur more than once. 
KTG assumes the following basic hypotheses: 
a) The ideal gas consists of molecules, and the intermolecular distance in these 
gases is much larger than the dimensions of the molecule itself. Therefore, 
we can consider those molecules as point masses. 
b) The motion of this molecules is governed by Newton’s laws. 
c) The collisions of the molecules with each other or with the walls of the 
container are in correspondence with Newton’s second and third law, and 
thus considered perfectly elastic. 
The first step is to apply these laws to one molecule with a mass 𝑚 and a velocity 𝑣 
colliding with the wall of the container. This is the application step of the KTG to the IGL. 
We consider a cubical box of volume 𝑉, with side length 𝐿  and a wall surface 𝐴 (= L2). In 
that box a molecule will collide with one of the walls at a velocity 𝑣𝑥,𝑖. We know that 
collisions between opposite walls in the 𝑥-direction on average will happen in intervals 
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of ∆𝑡𝑖 = 2
𝐿
𝑣𝑥,𝑖
. In that collision the 𝑥-component of the momentum will be reversed from 
𝑚𝑣𝑥,𝑖 to −𝑚𝑣𝑥,𝑖 . 
(1) This gives us the following force on the wall: 𝐹 =
2𝑚𝑣𝑥,𝑖
∆𝑡𝑖
 
The second step is an aggregation step. By means of a statistical auxiliary hypothesis the 
individual law is applied to a larger number of molecules. We assume the following 
auxiliary hypothesis: 
(a) The ideal gas is considered a homogeneous distribution of 𝑁 molecules, 
which are in constant random motion. 𝑁 is in the order of 6.022 × 1023, the 
number of Avogadro 𝑁𝐴. 
This results in the following aggregated law: 
(2) 𝐹 = ∑
2𝑚𝑣𝑥,𝑖
∆𝑡𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . 
By using ∆𝑡𝑖 = 2
𝐿
𝑣𝑥,𝑖
 as an identity hypothesis, we can perform a transformation step on 
(2), which gives us: 
(3) F = ∑
mv²x,i
L
N
i=1 =  
2
L
∑
mv²x,i
2
N
i=1     
To further proceed, we use the following auxiliary hypothesis:  
(b) the kinetic energy for one particle in one dimension is defined as: T =  
1
2
mv².  
and apply a second aggregation step: 
(4) Since there are 𝑁 molecules in the container, moving in three dimensions, this  
gives us a total kinetic energy 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡 of :   
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  
1
2
𝑚 ∑ (𝑣²𝑥,𝑖 + 𝑣²𝑦,𝑖 + 𝑣²𝑧,𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  = 𝑇𝑥 + 𝑇𝑦 + 𝑇𝑧 
Now we apply an identification step, since we assumed that the N molecules are moving 
in a constant random motion.  
(c) Therefore, we can say that  Tx =  Ty =  Tz, and thus we get: 
(5) 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  3𝑇𝑥 
If we implement this in (3) we get: 
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(4) 𝐹 =  
2
𝐿
 
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡
3
 
Now, another auxiliary hypothesis is added:  
(d) the pressure P is defined as a force 𝐹 exerted on a surface 𝐴 , here the wall 
of the box:   𝑃 =  
𝐹
𝐴
 
Combined with (4), we get another identification step: 
(6)    𝑃 =  
2
𝐿𝐴
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡
3
  = 
2
3
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑉
 
By means of the statistical auxiliary hypothesis of the virial theorem, the total kinetic 
energy of a system is connected with his temperature 𝑇 in the following formula: 
(e) 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡 =
3
2
𝑁𝑘𝑇  in which 𝑘 is the Boltzmann constant.  
We can apply this to (6) and have a third identification step, which gives us: 
(7) 𝑃𝑉 =  𝑁𝑘𝑇 
In another auxiliary hypothesis the Boltzmann constant 𝑘 is related to the ideal gas 
constant 𝑅 as: 
(f) k =
R
NA
 
As a final result we perform a last identification step on (7) and derive the Ideal Gas Law: 
(8) 𝑃𝑉 =
𝑁
𝑁𝐴
𝑅𝑇 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇 
2.6 Analysis of the IGL explanation 
The explanation fits the previously presented definition of a mechanistic explanation: it 
identifies the components (box, wall, molecules) and describes the activities (linear 
motion of the molecules) and how they interact (perfectly elastic collisions, no attraction 
between molecules, randomly distributed direction of motion of the molecules). 
Like in the mercury example, I can construct here a minimal explanation and an 
elaborate one. The minimal explanation is the explanation obtained by taking the result 
of the application step (equation (1)) as a premise (i.e. by removing the application step). 
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Let me call the result of that move the “minimal IGL explanation” while I call the one 
presented in Section 2.5 the “elaborate IGL explanation”.  
There is an important difference between the IGL case and the thermometer case. In 
the thermometer case, the additional information in the elaborate explanation did not 
deductively imply the premises of the minimal explanation. Although the additional 
information results in more explanatory power, it could be removed without harming the 
credibility of the explanation. The reasons for accepting the explanation remain intact if 
this information is removed. In the case of the IGL the information that is left out in the 
minimal explanation provides an argument for believing equation (1): this equation can 
be logically derived from it. 
This difference creates room for a second advantage that unificatory information may 
have. It provides support for premises one may otherwise doubt.  Indeed, if the 
application step in the explanation in Section 2.5 is removed, it is unclear why one should 
believe that equation (1) is correct. There certainly is not a possible experiment to 
support it (that would require a setup where exactly one gas molecule is put in a container 
to measure the force it exerts on the wall of the container). The reasons for accepting this 
premise are theoretical rather than experimental. The elaborate IGL explanation 
incorporates, at least partially, the necessary theoretical reasons for believing equation 
(1). The minimal explanation leaves out these reasons. As a consequence, the elaborate 
IGL explanation is more cogent.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that there are cases in which unification is an explanatory 
virtue, while the aim of explanation is not unification.  The two examples focused on 
unification as a potential explanatory virtue in mechanistic explanations of laws.  In both 
cases there was one target law, and I investigated whether and why unification is an 
explanatory virtue in such contexts. 
It was demonstrated that in the context of mechanistic explanations of laws, providing 
unificatory information can have two advantages: it can result in a higher explanatory 
power and in more cogent explanations. This was done without claiming that these 
advantages are exhaustive: there may be other virtues attached to unification in this 
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context. However, I think I have discovered and described two important ones (i.e. 
advantages that occur frequently in scientific practice). 
In the next chapter the focus is on the second question: are there cases in which 
unification is a necessary condition for a satisfactory explanation? Are there explanations 
with a double aim: to provide causal information and to unify? 
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Chapter 3  
Unification as a necessary ingredient of 
explanations  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter9 I will argue that there are indeed explanation-seeking contexts in which 
unification is one of the necessary conditions for a satisfactory explanation.  Resemblance 
questions (see section What are resemblance questions?) play a crucial role in the way I 
develop my argument. Although they do occur in scientific practice, they have been 
largely neglected in the philosophical literature. My aim in this chapter is to show that 
questions of this type cannot be adequately answered without unification. The first 
example, in section 3.3, demonstrates that resemblance questions about particular facts 
demand what I call causal network unification. This means that answers to such 
resemblance questions must give information about the causal network and at the same 
time explicate the unifying factors in that network. In the second half of this chapter I 
show that resemblance questions about regularities require what I call mechanism 
unification. Explanations of this type also have two conditions of adequacy: they need to 
provide information about the causal mechanisms, but in a unified way. In section 3.3. the 
general considerations will be presented, and in 3.4. they will be further clarified with an 
elaborate case study.  
 
                                                     
9 This chapter is based on the published paper ‘Unification, the answer to resemblance questions’ (Weber & 
Lefevere, 2017). 
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3.2 What are resemblance questions? 
Before we can connect unification to resemblance questions, the terminology that will be 
used in this chapter needs some clarification. Let us first look at explanation-seeking 
questions about particular facts. The simplest possible format of such questions is: 
 Why is it the case that X? 
Here X is a description of a particular fact. We use the label “plain questions about facts” 
to denote questions of this form. Examples are: 
 Why did the French revolution occur in 1789?  
 Why is Belgium a monarchy? 
 Why did the space shuttle Challenger explode? 
Bas van Fraassen (1980) drew attention to a second type of explanation-seeking question: 
contrastive questions. Their simplest form is “Why X rather than Y?”. Here are some 
examples: 
Why did John paint a portrait of the Queen, rather than a landscape? 
Why did John – rather than Bill – paint a portrait of the Queen? 
Resemblance questions are a third type of explanation-seeking questions. Suppose we 
observe that both Peter and Mary have blood group A. Then we can ask the following 
question: 
 Why do Peter and Mary both have blood group A? 
Similarly, if we observe that Peter and Mary both have blue eyes, we can ask 
 Why do Peter and Mary both have blue eyes? 
As is clear from these examples, resemblance questions about particular facts focus on 
similarities between two or more facts, rather than on differences (as contrastive 
questions do) or on just one fact (as plain questions about facts do). 
The same distinction can be made with respect to regularities. It is possible to ask plain 
questions, contrastive questions and resemblance questions about regularities.  
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Examples of plain questions are: 
Why do children of blue-eyed parents always have blue eyes? 
Why are all ravens black? 
Examples of contrastive questions are: 
Why do pigeons have the capacity to find their way back home, while other 
sedentary birds do not have that capacity? 
Why do woodcocks migrate during the night, while pigeons cover long distances 
during the day? 
Examples of resemblance questions are: 
Why do both humans and desk calculators have the capacity to perform exact 
numerical calculations? 
Why do bats and hedgehogs hibernate? 
3.3 Causal network unification 
Scientists do ask resemblance questions about particular facts, even when it is not 
possible to subsume them under a law. Answering them requires then what I call causal 
network unification. I first give a general characterisation of this kind of unification. Then 
I give an elaborate case study. Finally, I clarify how causal network unification answers a 
part of the question “what is required of an adequate explanation if this explanation 
addresses a resemblance question?” 
Suppose that John and Peter both have lung cancer. When asked for an explanation for 
this similarity, we may give the following account: 
Smoking is a positive causal factor for lung cancer. 
John smokes. 
Peter smokes. 
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Giving this explanation is a very simple form of what we call causal network unification. 
The general scheme in which this explanation fits is: 
(A) X is a positive causal factor for E. 
  Object a has X. 
  Object b  has X. 
When putting forward such explanation, it is claimed that the two objects about which 
we have a question have one causal factor in common. The explanation declares X to be 
a causal factor and asserts that it is present in both objects. 
 Causal network unification can be defined as the act of providing an explanation for a 
similarity between two events or more events presenting one causal network and 
applying it to all events involved. A causal network is a set of (possibly connected) causal 
factors. To apply a network to an event means to assert that all its factors are present in 
the causal ancestry of this event.  
 To clarify this, let me give a more elaborate example. Suppose one asks why John 
and Peter both started to smoke at the age of 15. This question can be answered by 
presenting the following causal network and applying it: 
Parental separation (X) is a positive causal factor for smoking initiation at 
adolescent age (E). 
Parental separation (X) is a positive causal factor for high level of rebelliousness (Y). 
A high level of rebelliousness (Y) is a positive causal factor for smoking initiation at 
adolescent age (E). 
Smoking parents (Z) are a positive causal factor for smoking initiation at adolescent 
age (E). 
This causal network contains three causal factors. Y mediates between X and E, while Z 
influences E independently of Y and X.10 To apply this network to Peter and John means 
to claim that their parents were divorced, that their parents smoked and that Peter and 
John had a high level of rebelliousness. 
 
                                                     
10 This is not a toy example. The causal relation between parental separation and smoking initiation is 
investigated in Kirby (2002). He uses rebelliousness as a mediating variable and presents the smoking status of 
the parents as another potential causal factor. So, this network contains a selection from real scientific research 
and results. 
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Given the definitions I gave above, the general format of an explanation that results 
from an act of causal network unification is the following: 
 
(B) X is a positive causal factor for E. 
 Y is a positive causal factor for E. 
 Z is a positive causal factor for E. 
 … 
 Object a has X, Y, Z, … . 
 Object b has X, Y, Z, … . 
 Object c has X, Y, Z … . 
 … 
If there are connections between the variables (e.g. mediating variables as in the example 
above) the explanation also contains claims specifying these connections11. 
If one assumes that the motivation behind resemblance questions about facts is 
curiousness about causal factors the events have in common, scheme (A) represents the 
minimal information an explanation has to give in order to be a minimally adequate 
answer. In this sense causal network unification (which results at least in an explanation 
of type (A)) is required for answering resemblance questions about facts. Scheme (B) gives 
a standard format in which the information provided by more elaborate explanations can 
be represented and compared. 
The material used for the elaborate example is taken from an article of Michael Taylor 
on revolutionary collective action (1988) which discusses Theda Skocpol’s classic States 
and Social Revolutions (1979). By using comparative methods, Skocpol has formulated a so-
called “structural” explanation for three successful modern social revolutions in 
agrarian-bureaucratic monarchies (the French, Russian and Chinese revolution). The 
structural conditions that, in her view, make a revolution possible relate to the 
incapacitation of the central state's machineries, especially the weakening of the state's 
repressive capacity. The revolutions can be successfully mounted only if these structural 
 
                                                     
11 Readers acquainted with causal graph theory (e.g. Pearl 2009 will notice that these causal networks a s we use 
them can be graphically represented in DAG’s (directed acyclic graphs). 
 46 
preconditions are met.  The weakening is caused by external military pressure: because 
of the backward agrarian economy and the power of the landed upper class in the 
agrarian-bureaucratic monarchy, the attempt to increase the military power leads to a 
fiscal crisis. Escalating international competition has an economic (fiscal) impact and thus 
influences the state’s repressive capacity negatively. That makes social revolutions 
possible. The foreign military pressure that made the respective social revolutions 
possible, was the following: 
(1) Bourbon France (1787-89) was financially exhausted after the war for American 
independence and because of the competition with England in general. 
(2) Manchu China (1911-16) was involved in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the 
Boxer debacle (1899-1901). 
(3) Romanov Russia (1917) was involved in World War I.  
Skocpol’s theory gives an answer to the following resemblance question: 
Why was there a revolution in Bourbon France, Manchu China and in Romanov 
Russia? 
Before I put this answer in the format given in Section 3.1, let us have a look at what 
Taylor adds to Skocpol’s theory.  According to Michael Taylor there is another causal 
factor which the three revolutions have in common, viz. a strong sense of community 
among the peasants: 
When the peasant community was sufficiently strong, then, it provided a social 
basis for collective action, including revolutionary collective action and rebellions 
and other popular mobilizations. (1988, p. 68) 
Taylor shows how the participation of vast numbers of peasants in collective action could 
be explained by means of economic incentives and selective social incentives. Without 
incentives to motivate participation, collective action is unlikely to occur even when 
large groups of people with common interests exist. Using this account of collective 
action, Taylor argues that peasant collective action in revolutions was based on a strong 
sense of community and that this is mainly why the large numbers of people involved 
were able to overcome the free-rider problem familiar to students of collective action and 
opted for conditional cooperation. Taylor’s idea that a strong sense of community is a 
positive causal factor for social revolutions does not contradict Skocpol’s ideas: they 
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propose different but compatible claims about factors that are causally relevant for social 
revolutions. 
 The work of Skocpol and Taylor is an illustration of the fact that scientists 
sometimes address resemblance questions about facts. When put into the format of causal 
network unification (B), Taylor’s answer is:  
 
Large external military operations (X) are positive causal factors for social 
revolutions (E). 
Fiscal crises (Y) are positive causal factors for social revolutions (E). 
Weakening of the state’s repressive capacity (Z) is a positive causal factor for social 
revolutions (E). 
Large external military operations (X) are positive causal factors for fiscal crises (Y). 
Fiscal crises (Y) are positive causal factors for weakening of the state’s repressive 
capacity (Z). 
A strong sense of community among peasants (Z’) is a positive causal factor for 
social revolutions (E). 
Bourbon France, Manchu China and Romanov Russia have X. 
Bourbon France, Manchu China and Romanov Russia have Y. 
Bourbon France, Manchu China and Romanov Russia have Z. 
Bourbon France, Manchu China and Romanov Russia have Z’. 
 
Skocpol’s answer the leaves out Z’ as causal factor and the corresponding claim that it is 
present in the three states (the claims are in italics). Taylor’s answer is richer, but the 
basic structure is the same: they use causal network unification as defined in earlier in 
this section. 
The questions we are dealing with in this section have the following form: 
(C) Why do objects a, b, c, … have property X? 
My claim is that such questions should be answered by means of an explanation that 
can be schematically represented by format (B) (with scheme (A) as a bottom line). Such 
explanations are both causal (because they identify factors that are present and causally 
relevant) and unifying (because they claim that factors of the same type are present in each 
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case. So my claim is that questions of type (C) must be answered by means of a causal 
explanation (viz. by constructing and applying a causal network). But there is an extra, 
unification-imposing condition: we have to use the same causal network for all events 
mentioned in the question. In terms of norms for explanation (cfr. Craver 2007) simply 
giving a causal explanation is not sufficient, it should be of a specific type. 
 It is important to notice that we may fail to meet this extra condition even if we try. 
For instance, it is possible that we find out that no known positive causal factor for lung 
cancer is present in both John and Peter. In such cases, the resemblance remains 
unexplained: it turns out to be accidental. Whether or not the type of unification that I 
presented here is possible in a specific case, is a contingent matter. By trying to give an 
explanation of type (B), we either find an explanation of the resemblance or determine, 
that given the current state of knowledge, the resemblance is accidental.12 
3.4 Resemblance questions and mechanism unification: 
general considerations 
I now shift my attention from resemblance questions about particular facts to 
resemblance questions about regularities. Because the case study is longer and I need 
more general background (e.g. on mechanism and the mechanistic model of explanation, 
I split the part on mechanism unification into two sections: this one containing the 
general considerations and the next one containing the case study. 
It is well-known that why-questions are ambiguous. If I ask: “Why are all ravens 
black?” this may be a question about the origin of the colour or about the function of the 
colour. In the first case, the why-question can be rephrased as “How is black feather 
colour in ravens produced?” In the second case, it can be rephrased as “What is the 
function of black feather colour in ravens?” In the same vein, why-questions about 
similarities can stem from different underlying ideas about kinds of explanations that are 
sought four. For instance, the example about bats and hedgehogs may be a motivated by 
 
                                                     
12 If our knowledge of relevant causal factor increases, this may change because an adequate explanation may 
become possible. 
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a desire to know the common function(s). In that case, the question can be more precisely 
formulated as  
What is the common function of hibernating in bats and hedgehogs? 
I will confine myself to resemblance questions that have a different type of motivation, 
viz. insight in the mechanisms that produce a behaviour or capacity. If this kind of insight 
is sought, the sample question about exact calculation can be rephrased as: 
What are the common features of the mechanisms that produce the capacity to 
perform exact numerical calculation in humans and in desk calculators? 
This question fits into the following general format: 
(D) What are the common features of the mechanisms that produce capacity E in 
objects of type X, Y, Z, …. ? 
Mechanisms are to be understood here as follows: 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such 
way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 
123)  
Illari and Williamson present this definition as an expression of the core consensus 
among philosophers in the mechanistic tradition. Many slightly different 
characterizations have been given in the last two decades. But they all contain a common 
core idea, and thus relate back to the definition used in 2.2:  
A mechanism is a collection of entities and activities that are organized such that 
they realize the macro-level behaviour of a system. 
We have identified the type of questions we consider and we know what the key term 
(mechanism) means. But what do answers to questions of type (D) look like? Illari & 
Williamson characterise mechanistic explanations as follows: 
All mechanistic explanations begin with (a) the identification of a phenomenon or 
some phenomena to be explained, (b) proceed by decomposition into the entities 
and activities relevant to the phenomenon, and (c) give the organization of entities 
and activities by which they produce the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, 
p. 123) 
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This is a dynamic characterisation, which tells us how mechanistic explanations are 
construed. Illari & Williamson do not give a (static) definition of the end product. The 
following definition is complementary to what they say: 
A mechanistic explanation for a phenomenon is a description of the mechanism that 
produces this phenomenon. 
A description of a mechanism is often called a model of the mechanism. 
The dynamic and static characterisations cover explanations in which one capacity is 
explained (i.e. answers to plain questions). To make the step towards answers to questions 
about common features in mechanisms, it is important to see that models of mechanisms 
can vary in richness. A model of a mechanism can be very rich, in the sense that it provides 
a lot of details about the entities, activities and organisation of the mechanisms. Or it can 
be rather abstract, in the sense that it leaves out a lot of details. This richness/abstraction 
axis is important for us because questions of type (D) are questions about shared features 
of mechanism. By definition, a model that correctly describes the shared features has to 
omit all features that are not present in all the types X, Y, Z, … Hence, a model that 
correctly describes these features will always be quite abstract. 
With this background information in place, we can now define what we mean with 
mechanism unification. The act of mechanism unification consists in providing the 
richest possible mechanistic model that is correct for all types X, Y, Z,… Mechanism 
unification in this sense produces the most informative correct answer to questions of 
type (D). It results in explanations that are both mechanistic and unifying. Questions of 
type (D) must be answered by means of a mechanistic explanation. But there is an extra, 
unification-imposing condition: one should try to find the richest possible model that is 
valid for all types of objects included in the question. In terms of norms for explanation: 
simply giving a mechanistic explanation is not sufficient, it should be of a specific type. 
All this is analogous to Section 3, where the explanations had to be both causal and 
unifying. 
 Mechanism unification as defined here is complementary to network unification 
discussed in 3.3: it is an attempt to answer resemblance questions about regularities (type 
(D)) while causal network unification is an attempt to answer resemblance questions 
about particular facts (type (C)). While causal network unification results in intra-level 
explanations (the causal factors are situated at the same level of abstraction as the 
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explanandum), mechanism unification results in an interlevel explanation: the objects 
whose capacities are explained are decomposed into smaller entities.  
3.5 Resemblance questions and mechanism unification: a case 
study 
Our aim here is to show that questions of type (D) do occur in scientific practice. The case 
study we use is about general anaesthesia.  Our main source is the book The Wondrous Story 
of Anesthesia (Eger II, Saidman, & Westhorpe, The Wondrous Story of Anaesthesia, 2014)13. 
General anaesthesia was first practiced on October 16, 1846. On this day, Dr. William 
T.G. Morton, a young dentist from Boston, and Dr. John Collins Warren, the Chief of 
Surgery at Harvard performed the first surgery with general anaesthesia. Dr. Morton used 
an inhaler with volatile ether to put the patient to sleep and Dr. Warren removed a 
tumour in the patient’s neck. It was the first time this happened: till then patients were 
kept in a conscious state, though e.g. nitrous oxide was often used to suppress pain. The 
patient, Gilbert Abbott, described his experience as a slight pressure followed by 
wonderful dreams (Robinson & Toledo, 2012, p. 143). With volatile ether the history of 
general anaesthesia took a real start. Volatile ether not only causes unconsciousness, but 
also amnesia, analgesia (insensibility to pain) and muscle relaxation. “General 
anaesthesia” refers to a state in which these four factors are present.  
Only a year later the Scottish obstetrician James Simpsons discovered the anaesthetic 
effects of chloroform. It became the “British” anaesthetic while ether remained the 
“Yankee dodge” (Eger II, Saidman, & Westhorpe, The Wondrous Story of Anaesthesia, 
2014, p. 28). In the first decade of the 20th century several scientists administered 
anaesthetics intravenously: ether, chloroform, hedonal, barbiturates and thiopental. 
(White, 2014, p. 630). In the 1960s etomidate and ketamine were synthesized but it was 
propofol that displaced thiopental as the most important intravenous anaesthetic in the 
1980s. Simultaneously anaesthetic inhalation machines were developed to control the 
 
                                                     
13 This recent book consists of two parts. First the history of anesthesia is reconstructed chronologically. In the 
second part the history of anesthesia is described per geographical region or per subject. I have entered the 
individual chapters to which I refer separately in the bibliography. 
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amount of volatile ether, chloroform and nitrous oxide and to make use of rebreathing to 
minimize the consumption. These machines enabled the use of ethylene as an 
anaesthetic. Another agent that was discovered in that period was cyclopropane. The new 
fluorine chemistry needed for the development of the atomic bomb also gave us modern 
anaesthetic compounds halogenated with fluorine. In much of the world, halothane was 
the inhaled anaesthetic of the 1960s; enflurane of the 1970s; and isoflurane of the 1980s 
(Eger II, Saidman, & Westhorpe, 2014, p. 132). In the 1990s desflurane and sevoflurane 
were released for clinical use, but sevoflurane won the popularity poll. The advances 
slowed down in the 2000s, when only sugammadex was released as a new anaesthetic. In 
today’s operating rooms the use of combined intravenous and inhaled anaesthetics 
remains the most popular approach for general anaesthesia (White, 2014, p. 638). 
The discoveries listed above lead to the following resemblance question:  
What do the mechanisms by which the chemical substances X, Y and Z induce 
general anaesthesia (i.e. cause unconsciousness, amnesia, analgesia and muscle 
relaxation) have in common? 
Several scientists tackled this question. Already in 1847 von Bibra and Harless linked the 
phenomenon of anaesthesia to dissolving and removing lipids in the brain: 
With all its chemical attributes intact ether in the nervous system first affects the 
components for which it has the greatest affinity, the fatty ones. It partly dissolves 
them, and the solution gets taken up by the venous blood after traversing the 
capillaries by endosmosis. Partial dissolution of the fat by ether must of course 
necessarily alter the components of the nervous tissue and nullify their mode of 
action. (von Bibra & Harless, 1847) 
 In 1875, after experiments on frogs, Claude Bernard suggested that there ought to be one 
common mechanism for general anaesthesia for all living organisms, despite the diversity 
of the used agents. He suggested that a reversible coagulation of nerves underlay the 
production of anaesthesia by some means that applied to all forms of life – a unitary 
mechanism of anaesthesia. (Eger II, Saidman, & Westhorpe, 2014). 
At the turn of the 20th century Meyer and Overton independently discovered a positive 
correlation between the lipid solubility of the anaesthetic compound in olive oil and their 
anaesthetic potency (Meyer, 1899 and Overton, 1901). This led to a reversed version of the 
lipid hypothesis. Contrary to von Bibra and Harless, Meyer and Overton suggested that 
anaesthetics dissolve in the lipids. In this way anaesthetics changed the state of brain cell 
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lipids, resulting in narcosis. The lipid hypothesis served as a unitary mechanism of 
general anaesthesia, suggesting that when general anaesthesia occurred the 
concentration of the anaesthetic agent in the lipid cell membrane of the neurons would 
be the same for all anaesthetics. In the 1960s many researchers sought a mechanistic basis 
for the Meyer-Overton hypothesis. The 1970s saw a variation of lipid theories. But there 
were several questions that lipid theories could not answer: the effect of body 
temperature on the membrane lipids, the absence of anaesthesia with some lipid soluble 
drugs and variable anaesthetic effects with enantiomer drugs14. Despite the numerous 
papers on lipid theory, the question remained how the effect on the membrane lipid cells 
could be extrapolated to the membrane proteins, since these proteins were thought of as 
the eventual target.    
The lesson we can draw from this brief survey is that from 1847 till around 1980 there 
were several attempts to answer the resemblance question about general anaesthesia. 
Lipids played a crucial role in these attempts. In the first attempts, it was posited that all 
anaesthetics dissolve fatty brain cell membranes. Mechanism unification results here in 
an abstract description of the mechanisms that leaves out many details, e.g. on how the 
anaesthetics reaches the brain (inhaled vs. intravenous anaesthetics). What the 
description does have to contain is the claim that one entity (the anaesthetic) performs 
an activity (dissolving) on another entity (lipid brain cell membranes). In the later 
attempts, again the details about how the anaesthetics enter the brain have to be left out 
in order to describe a unified mechanism. The entities that are present in the description 
of the unitary mechanism are the same, but the claim about activity is different: it is now 
claimed that the brain cell membranes affect the anaesthetics (they absorb them) rather 
than the other way around. 
In the 1980s Franks and Lieb discovered that general anaesthetics can also interact in 
lipid-free environments (1982) (1984). They showed that agents able to inhibit two types 
of proteins (luciferases and cytochrome P450) have anaesthetic potencies. By the 1990s 
the lipid theory was largely abandoned and the focus shifted to proteins. With this shift 
the search for a unitary mechanism also faded into the background, since the question 
now became: which proteins are involved?  In the last decades researchers examined the 
effect of anaesthetics on specific protein targets. Among those targets the GABAA 
 
                                                     
14 Enantiomers have identical chemical and physical properties except for their ability to rotate plane-polarized light. More 
info on enantiomers can be found on http://www.chemguide.co.uk/basicorg/isomerism/polarised.html.  
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receptors, glycine receptors, NMDA receptors and anaesthetic-activated potassium 
channels were considered important in general intravenous anaesthesia (Franks, 2014, p. 
603). For inhaled anaesthetics the understanding is much less complete, since here the 
spinal cord and not the brain is the mediator for immobility. Identifying the specific 
molecular targets progresses slowly and no consensus has been reached. Currently there 
are two main views regarding the targets of inhaled anaesthetics. Franks & Lieb (1994) 
believe that only a few targets are important, while Eckenhoff (2001) and others believe 
that many targets contribute in a small amount to anaesthesia through inhalation. 
Researchers conduct studies in which they inhibit or block certain targets to explore the 
change in anaesthetic potency of that target. For example, a study in 2002 shows that 
acetylcholine receptors do not contribute to the immobility induced by inhaled 
anaesthetics, but may be important to amnesia (Eger II, Gong, Raines, & Flood, 2002). 
Many questions remain unanswered at the molecular level, and the search for how 
individual anaesthetic agents function still continues.  
The resemblance question was left aside only for a brief period. George Mashour (2004) 
is strongly convinced we should not abandon the quest for a unitary hypothesis for the 
mechanism of general anaesthesia. 
Although general anaesthesia may be mediated by complex pharmacologic and 
neurologic mechanisms, we should not abandon the quest for a unitary hypothesis. 
Although such frameworks may be simplified, the lack of a guiding paradigm may 
ultimately impede the development of investigation. (Mashour, 2004, p. 428) 
Mashour proposes to use the concepts of cognitive binding and unbinding to provide a 
unitary mechanism. Cognitive binding is the phenomenon that despite the evidence that 
our brain subdivides perceptual processing into different modules, we experience our 
perceptions as unified. To explain this phenomenon several solutions have been 
suggested: binding by convergence, binding by assembly and binding by synchrony. 
Binding by convergence claims that higher-order neurons collects the information from 
various lower order neurons and binds them together. Binding by assembly replaces a 
single binding unit by a dynamic, self-organizing cell assembly, “neurons that fire 
together, wire together” (Mashour, 2004, p. 429).  Binding by synchrony connects neurons 
in the temporal dimension, such as the 40-Hz γ-band oscillations. Mashour argues that 
these three mechanisms probably function in complex relation with each other. His key 
point however is that whatever the specific mechanism or combination of mechanisms 
for cognitive binding is, it is cognitive unbinding that causes general anaesthesia. Studies 
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showed that the γ-band synchronization that occurs between cortices, in the 
hippocampus and in the temporal lobe, in conscious state is interrupted when 
anesthetized  (John et al., 2001, John, 2001, Ma et al., 2002 and Uchida, et al., 2000). 
Evidence is found that isoflurane, an anaesthetic agent, interrupts the ability of neurons 
- that are located in the cortical region connected to visual pattern recognition - to bind 
the patterns from their component parts. The neurons were still responsive to the signals 
from component patterns, but they were unable to bind them into an integrated 
representation.  Anaesthesia can be connected with the disruption of cognitive binding 
through convergence and synchrony. Although the specific details of the process are still 
the subject of research, for Mashour cognitive binding/unbinding provides a common 
mechanism that integrates processes at the cellular, system or global scale of the brain 
(2004, p. 431).  
Like in the explanations based on the lipid theories, acts of mechanism unification 
based on cognitive binding/unbinding theory must leave out all the details about how the 
anaesthetic reaches the brain cells. What is included in the unitary mechanism that is 
proposed are neurons (entities) that signal to other neurons (an activity), respond to 
signal of other neuron (another activity) and can bind together in the three ways 
described above (i.e. they can organize themselves in certain ways). The crucial claims is 
that the capacity of self-organisation units that allows integrated representations is 
impeded by all anaesthetics. 
This case study shows that an actual resemblance question – what are the common 
features in the different mechanisms that are responsible for the anaesthetic capacity of 
the different anaesthetic agents? – has been addressed by scientists over a long period. 
Even though the first theory that claimed to provide the answer – the lipid theory – was 
falsified, the question itself remains present in today’s science. Mashour does not ask how 
a specific anaesthetic agent works, he wants to know what the common features of 
general anaesthesia mechanisms are, and finds them in the theory of cognitive 
binding/unbinding. The descriptions of mechanisms leave out many details (as is normal 
in case of mechanism unification) but the main ingredients of mechanistic explanations 
are present (entities, activities and organisation).  
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3.6 Limited attention for resemblance questions 
An added bonus of the attempts to bring unification back into the picture, is that I have 
drawn attention to resemblance questions. The case studies in  3.3 and 3.5 show that 
resemblance questions are important in scientific practice. So philosophers should pay 
attention to them, and they have not done that sufficiently in the past. I elaborate on this 
issue in this section. 
After giving several examples of why-questions about particular facts, Carl Hempel 
writes: 
[A]nd in that case the explanatory problem can again be expressed in the form ‘Why 
is it the case that p?’, where the place of ‘p’ is occupied by an empirical statement 
specifying the explanandum. Questions of this type will be called explanation-seeking 
why-questions. (1965, p. 334) 
As is clear from the examples that Hempel gives before he offers this general 
characterisation, “p” can be a particular fact or a generalisation: 
A scientific explanation may be regarded as an answer to a why-question such as: 
‘Why do the planets move in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus?’, ‘Why does 
the moon look much larger when it is near the horizon than when it is high in the 
sky?’, ‘Why did the television apparatus on Ranger VI fail?’ ‘Why are children of 
blue-eyed parents always blue-eyed?’ ‘Why did Hitler go to war against Russia?’. 
(1965, p. 334) 
So he assumes that all explanation-seeking questions about particular facts and about 
regularities are, in our terminology, plain questions. 
 This assumption has been adopted by many philosophers of explanation after 
Hempel. For instance, Wesley Salmon (who only analyses explanations of facts, not 
regularities) consistently describes the explanandum as “the fact-to-be-explained” (see 
e.g. Salmon W. C., 1984, p. 13 and pp.15-19). And all his examples fit the simple format 
“Why is it the case that p?”. The same goes for other prominent defenders of causal 
approaches to explanation (e.g. Cartwright, 1983; Humphreys, 1989 and  Hausman, 1998).  
 Kitcher also adopts this view. He describes his aim as … 
… to determine the conditions under which an argument whose conclusion is S can 
be used to answer the question “Why is it the case that S?”. (1981, p. 510) 
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Again, only plain questions are considered. 
The examples I gave in 3.3 and 3.5 show that this assumption is not justified. Scientists 
sometimes aim at answering resemblance questions, i.e. questions about similarities 
between at least two events or at least two regularities. If we do not pay explicit attention 
to resemblance questions, an important type of explanatory practice is neglected in our 
philosophical analysis. 
Contrastive questions (the remaining type I distinguished in 3.2) did receive a lot of 
attention from philosophers of explanation. This is due to the work of Bas van Fraassen 
(1980), who challenged the traditional assumption in the opposite way (compared to what 
I have done here). According to van Fraassen a good why-question is always contrastive, 
as in the examples given in 3.2: 
 Why did John paint a portrait of the Queen, rather than a landscape? 
Why did John rather than Bill paint a portrait of the Queen? 
Van Fraassen (1980) does not deny that people ask non-contrastive why-questions. For 
instance, it is possible that someone asks the following question: 
Why did John paint a portrait of the Queen? 
However, van Fraassen claims that such questions are inaccurate expressions of the 
cognitive problem the person has. The real problem is captured by a contrastive question, 
for instance one of the two questions above.  
 Van Fraassen’s view entails a strong claim: all non-contrastive questions which 
scientists ask are inaccurate formulations of contrastive questions for which they really 
want an answer. Even if one does not agree with this, one has to admit that van Fraassen 
did a good job by drawing attention to the fact that many why-questions that scientists 
ask are contrastive in nature. 
There is a specific type of resemblance questions that did get a lot of attention from 
philosophers of explanation: questions about extremely improbable coincidences. 
Salmon gives the following example: 
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Two students, Adams and Baker submit essentially identical term papers in a 
particular course. There is, of course, the logical possibility that the two papers 
were produced entirely independently, and that the resemblance between them is 
a matter of pure chance. Given the overwhelming improbability of this sort of 
coincidence, no one takes this suggestion seriously. Three reasonable explanatory 
hypotheses are available: (1) Baker copied from Adams, (2) Adams copied from 
Baker, or (3) both copied from a common source. (1984, p. 207)   
In the cases I have considered, there is no such extremely improbable coincidence. The 
fact that there has been a social revolution in France does not make revolutions in other 
countries improbable. The fact that Peter has lung cancer does not make the fact that 
John has lung cancer improbable. So, the questions I have been dealing with in 3.3 differ 
from the ones Salmon and other philosophers have discussed, though these are also 
questions about resemblances. My questions are about sets of events that, taken together, 
are not improbable at all but nevertheless somehow raise an interest in what they may 
have in common. The same goes for the questions in 3.4 and 3.5. For instance, the fact 
that ether is an anaesthetic does not make the existence of other anaesthetics 
improbable. 
As Salmon rightly says in the quote above, we do not take “separate causation” 
seriously as explanation of extremely improbable coincidences. In order to explain the 
joint occurrence, we assume that there is a causal connection between the events: a causal 
relation form the first event to the second, from the second to the first, or a common 
cause. This is not how I explain the resemblances in 3.3; I do not claim that there is a causal 
connection between John’s and Peter’s lung cancer or between the social revolutions. The 
resemblance questions I have discussed are answered by showing that the causes are of 
the same type. Questions about extremely improbable coincidence are answered by 
assuming a causal connection between the events to be explained. 
 In sum, philosophers of explanation have paid attention to a specific subclass of 
resemblance questions. I have discussed another type here. The way in which they have 
to be answered is completely different.  
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3.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued that resemblance questions, although they appear to be a 
blind spot in philosophy of science, do occur in scientific practice and that unification is 
required to answer them successfully. I have demonstrated this by means of two 
examples: one from sociology and one from anaesthesiology. 
 In the case of resemblance questions about particular facts causal network 
unification is needed in order to answer them. In this type of unification one causal 
network is presented and applied to two or more events to point out the common causal 
factors that are present in the causal ancestry of all events we consider. 
 When resemblance questions about regularities are asked, mechanism unification 
is necessary to focus on the shared elements of the underlying mechanism. The act of 
mechanism unification consists in providing the richest possible model that is correct for 
capacity E in objects of types X, Y, Z, etc.   
To capture my overall views on unification, it is important to note that - contrary to 
Kitcher – I do not claim that unification is necessary in every explanatory context. It is 
crucial in the context of resemblance questions. In Chapter 7, where I discuss explanatory 
pluralism, I come back to this. 
 Moreover, resemblance questions can liberate the idea of unification from its 
Kitcherian connotations. My concepts of causal network and mechanism unification are 
not derivational, and therefore allows one to see unification as valuable even if one rejects 
covering law conceptions of explanation. This topic will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4  
Unification: an enrichment for causal and 
mechanistic accounts 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter some theoretical-philosophical implications of my results will be clarified 
and elaborated. My strategy to search for cases of ontological unification in scientific 
practice, and to use them to rethink unification, resulted in a new possible answer to the 
following question: 
How do unification, causality and explanation relate to one another? 
In order to clarify my answer to this question, I will start with an overview of different 
positions that have been taken by philosophers of explanation about the relation between 
these three concepts: 
(1) Unification is always the aim of explanation. An explanation can be causal, but 
this is not the aim of the explanation. 
(2) Explanation always needs to be causal. Unification can be a surplus value, but it 
is not the aim of the explanation. 
(3) Unification and causality are both explanatory, but in a different way (and 
therefore complementary). What is the aim of an explanation is contextually 
determined.  
(4) Unificationist explanation and causal explanation are possible types of 
explanations among other types. What is the aim of an explanation is 
contextually determined. 
 62 
Position (3) is usually called the complementarity thesis, while position (4) is a pluralistic 
perspective. 
In section 4.2 these four positions will be further elaborated. In section 4.3 I argue that, as 
a consequence of my views on unification, there is another possible relation between 
unification and causal explanation:  
(5) Unification can be embedded as an additional aim in causal accounts of 
explanation. 
In section 4.4 I will give two suggestions about how this embedding can look like in 
existing philosophical theories of explanation.   
4.2 Unification, causality and explanation 
Several positions about the relation between unification, causality and explanation have 
been defended: 
A first position is that explanations always need to be unifying. Often this can 
(accidentally) be reached by causal explanation, but unification is the aim of the 
explanation. Kitcher, for example, sees no reason to require that explanations are causal. 
Problems for Hempel, like asymmetry and irrelevance, can be solved without invoking 
causation (1981, pp.522-525; 1989 pp.482-487). So, if explanations are causal, they are 
causal by accident. 
A second position defends that explanations always need to be causal. In the past there 
were philosophers who explicitly stated that all explanations are causal, e.g. Wesley 
Salmon (1984) and David Lewis (1986). Today, philosophers are more careful. James 
Woodward (2003), for example, does not take this strong position it in ‘Making Things 
Happen’ and Michael Strevens does not affirm it in ‘Depth’ (2008). Woodward 
acknowledges that unification is ‘unquestionably intuitively appealing’ (Woodward, 2003, 
p. 358). However, ‘considerations having to do with unification do not automatically pick 
out those derivations that are explanatory from those that are not’ (Woodward, 2003, p. 
361). So, derivations can be unifying by accident, but they are explanatory because they 
are causal.  
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A third position is the complementarity thesis. In this position the aim of an 
explanation depends on the explanation-seeking context. In some contexts, the aim will 
be causation, in others it will be unification. To reach full understanding of the world, 
both types of explanation are necessary. Salmon, the main defender of this position, 
writes in 1993: 
In this paper I have tried to show that there are at least two intellectual benefits 
that scientific explanations can confer upon us, namely, (1) a unified world-picture 
and insight into how various phenomena fit into that overall scheme, and (2) 
knowledge of how things in the world work, that is, of the mechanisms (often 
hidden) that produce the phenomena we want to understand. The first of these 
benefits is associated with the unification view of scientific explanation; Philip 
Kitcher (1989) is its present principal proponent. The second is associated with the 
causal/mechanical view of scientific explanation that I have advocated (Salmon, 
1984). My current view is that the two accounts are by no means incompatible. 
(1993, p. 15) 
This view is repeated in Salmon 1998 (p. 89-90). Salmon argues that explanation by 
unification and causal explanation both produce understanding, albeit a different type of 
understanding (1998, p. 78). If both types can be combined, this creates an enhanced 
understanding of the world we live in. Salmon refers back to the formulations of 
Friedman (1974, p.19) of global and local understanding, and Kitcher’s similar distinction 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to explanations (1985, p. 638). Salmon 
argues that understanding starts as a local activity: the first aim is to understand 
individual facts, and generalizations or laws are built upon that individual understanding. 
But, for Salmon, both are needed to grasp the world we live in.    
A fourth position is explanatory pluralism, in which unificationist explanation and 
causal explanation are possible types of explanations among other types. Schurz 
mentions the expectability paradigm as a third approach to explanation next to causal 
explanation and unificationism (2014). Weber focuses on unification but he explicitly 
acknowledges that there are other types of explanation, e.g. causal ones (1999, p. 480).  
The most influential pluralist approach to explanation is from Bas van Fraassen (1980). 
Van Fraassen denies that there are fixed properties of explanation. What counts as a 
satisfactory answer to an explanation-seeking question in science depends on the 
context. An explanation is “salient to a given person because of his orientation, his 
interests, and various other peculiarities in the way he approaches or comes to know the 
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problem – contextual factors” (van Fraasen, 1980, p. 125). There are no general criteria 
for explanations, it all depends on contextual factors.  
Unification in the aforementioned positions is usually considered in its classical sense. 
I will argue in 4.3. that my views on unification lead to a fifth position about the relation 
between unification, causality and explanation.  
4.3 My views on unification 
In order to argue that my views on unification lead to a new position about the relation 
between unification, causation and explanation, I take two preparatory steps. First, I show 
how my results from Chapter 3 answer some questions about ontological unification that 
Mäki (2001) leaves unanswered (section 4.3.1). Second, I will show that my cases from the 
previous chapter constitute purely ontological unification, which is different from 
unification as conceived in the classical accounts presented in Chapter 1 (4.3.2).  
4.3.1 Ontological unification 
The aim of this dissertation is to bring unification back into the picture. In this first part 
I tried to do this by searching for examples of ontological unification in scientific practice. 
For the sake of clarity, I repeat Mäki’s characterisation of ontological unification as seen 
in Chapter 1: 
Ontological unification is a matter of redescribing apparently independent and 
diverse phenomena as manifestations (outcomes, phases, forms, aspects) of one and 
the same small number of entities, powers, and processes. Those phenomena are 
thereby revealed to be only apparently independent; as a matter of actual fact, they 
are dependent on the same underlying structure of entities, forces, and processes. 
(2001, p. 498) 
Although this characterisation is vague (cf. the many ontological categories occurring in 
it), the concept of ontological unification is a useful tool to draw attention to a broad 
range of possible unification-related scientific practices. This is, in my view, the main 
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merit of Mäki’s paper: drawing attention to the fact that unifying phenomena may mean 
that we show that they share the same ontic foundations (causes, origins, constituents). 
Mäki’s proposal leaves a number of important questions unanswered: 
(a) What does ontological unification look like in scientific practice? What types of 
ontological unification are there?  How do these types work? 
(b) Why is ontological unification important? What kinds of questions does it 
address? 
Causal network unification and mechanism unification are specific instances of 
ontological unification. The ontic foundations were respectively the common causal 
factors and the common features in causal mechanisms. These types of unification 
provide a partial answer to the questions mentioned in (a). This is not a complete answer, 
because other types of ontological unification will be presented in Part II of this 
dissertation. The fact that unification is a necessary ingredient for, at least, resemblance 
questions provides an answer to the questions in (b).  
4.3.2 Derivational versus bottom-up unification 
As we have seen in 1.4.2, Mäki characterises derivational unification as follows: 
Combining the two ideas that explanation is a matter of inference or derivation and 
that explanation involves unification of phenomena gives us the notion of 
derivational unification. (2001, p. 493) 
Causal network unification does not presuppose that we derive the explananda that we 
want to unify from overarching premises. Neither does mechanism unification. So, the 
forms of unification that I have proposed in Chapter 3 are purely ontological: they are 
ontological and non-derivational. I will call this type of unification also bottom-up 
unification. 
Because they are purely ontological, the types of unification I propose are different from 
what is proposed in the accounts of unification presented in Chapter 1: 
(a) in the account of Weber unification is mixed (ontological plus derivational), 
(b) in the accounts of Kitcher and Schurz unification is clearly derivational (while it 
is unclear whether they require an ontological component).  
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I will now elaborate on these two differences. In Weber’s account (1999) unification 
happens if one can show that two (or more) events are instances of the same (set of) 
law(s). The idea of subsumption is very much present in this account. Unification is 
reached by constructing arguments in which the explananda are subsumed under the 
same law. So, we have derivational unification.  
The unification act is based on the use of laws. This use of laws implies that unification 
has an ontological aspect. So, the proposal in Weber 1999 promotes a form of mixed 
unification: derivational and ontological at the same time. 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, a main idea of Kitcher (which he shares with Hempel) is 
that, while all explanations are arguments, the converse is not true. He uses argument 
patterns to distinguish explanations from non-explanatory arguments. For an individual 
with knowledge K, an argument A can only be an explanation if it is acceptable relative to 
K (i.e. if the premises of A are members of K). But not all acceptable arguments are 
explanations: an acceptable argument is an explanation if and only if it instantiates an 
argument pattern that belongs to a privileged set of argument patterns. This set of 
argument patterns is privileged because it has a higher unifying power with respect to K 
than any other conceivable set of argument patterns. The unifying power of a set of 
argument patterns is determined by four factors: (i) it varies directly with the number of 
accepted sentences (i.e. the number of elements of K) that can be derived by means of 
acceptable arguments that instantiate a pattern in the set; (ii) it varies conversely with 
the number of patterns in the set; (iii) it varies directly with the stringency of its 
members; and (iv) it varies directly with the degree of similarity of its members. 
I already mentioned a similarity between Hempel and Kitcher: explanations are 
arguments but not vice versa. Relatedly, there is a second similarity between Hempel and 
Kitcher: the basic act one has to perform to explain something is to construct an 
argument which shows that the explanandum is to be expected. The main difference is 
that, from Kitcher’s perspective, there is a good and a bad way to do this. The good way is 
to use only arguments that belong to the explanatory store (the set of arguments that 
instantiates an argument pattern that belongs to the privileged set of argument patterns). 
The bad way is to use these plus other Hempelian DN explanations. The first strategy 
results in a unified knowledge system (according to Kitcher’s account of unification) 
while, in Kitcher’s view, the second strategy results in an uninteresting kind of 
expectability. In Kitcher’s account, there are no ontological constraints imposed, so this 
may be purely derivational unification.  
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Unification in the account of Schurz (1994, 1999) may also be purely derivational.  In 
Schurz’ account unification is not an all-or-nothing characteristic, but is gradual. He 
compares different levels of unification according to their assimilation status. As I will 
argue, neither type of assimilation or non-assimilation can be categorized in the class of 
bottom-up unification, they are all instances of derivational unification. 
An explanation for Schurz means that a cognitive state is reached in which the 
explanandum is inferred by a set of premises that are in less need of explanation, because 
they are unified. This unification is gradual because a set of premises can be more or less 
assimilated with a given theory. The actual assimilation can only happen if there is 
predictability or nomic expectability. This is exactly what happens in derivational 
unification. Potential assimilation consists of virtual or heuristic assimilation. Schurz 
speaks of virtual assimilation if an event is random without any further hidden cause and 
if there is a low probability inference Prem => Pa. Heuristic assimilation happens if 
phenomena are derived from theories with help of initial or boundary conditions, which 
are considered plausible. Both virtual and heuristic assimilation have a top-down 
direction. Dissimilated phenomena are anomalies, they cannot be assimilated within the 
accepted theory. These are the phenomena that are in need of explanation according to 
Schurz. The last assimilation status is the class of basic phenomena. According to Schurz 
they are the fundamental theories with which every fact or empirical law will assimilate 
or dissimilate. 
Schurz cannot exclude merely formal constraints. Both in the actual and in potential 
(virtual or low probability) inference assimilation some sort of subsumption is needed, 
thus there is no room for non-derivational unification, such as bottom-up unification. 
One can be tempted to think that dissimilated phenomena are eligible for bottom-up 
unification, since they are not derivable from a theory. However, the goal for Schurz is to 
find a theory (or adapt a theory) so that the dissimilated phenomena are no longer 
dissimilated. In bottom-up unification we do not presuppose an accepted theory in which 
the phenomena have to fit, there is no theory presupposed at all. 
The main difference between the accounts of Kitcher and Schurz on the one hand and 
my views on unification on the other hand is that, for them, the activity that is required 
for unification is deduction: an explanandum has to be derived from an argument pattern 
(Kitcher) or from a theory (Schurz). However, this does not necessarily mean that 
unification is purely derivational. The result of classical unification can be mixed: both 
derivational and ontological, but this is not a requirement for Kitcher or Schurz. 
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A major advantage of my view is that it allows us to think about the value of unification 
in contexts where the explanation does not have the form of an argument. The 
explanations that involve causal network or mechanism unification are not derivational. 
That is important, because it means that they are interesting even if one rejects covering 
law conceptions of explanation, such as Hempel’s and Kitcher’s. I developed tools that 
adherents of non-derivational views on explanation (such as the causal and mechanistic 
account) can use to think about the value of unification. This idea will be further 
elaborated in Section 4.4. 
4.3.3 Consequences for the relation between explanatory unification 
and causal explanations 
In 4.2 I showed that there are four positions taken about possible relations between 
unification, causality and explanation. Note that these positions all consider unification 
as derivational unification. Section 4.3 enables me to further specify these positions: 
(1) Explanation always needs to be unifying. An explanation can be causal, but this 
is not the aim of the explanation. 
(2) Explanation always needs to be causal. Unification can be a surplus value, but it 
is not the aim of the explanation. 
(3) Unification and causality are both explanatory, but in a different way (and 
therefore complementary). What is the aim of an explanation is contextually 
determined.  
(4) The pluralistic position: unification and causal explanation are possible types of 
explanations among other types. What is the aim of an explanation is 
contextually determined. 
A consequence of considering unification as purely ontological, viz. non-derivational and 
based upon shared underlying causal processes and structures, is that another relation 
between unification and causal explanation is possible: 
(5) Embedding: unification can be embedded as an additional aim in causal accounts 
of explanation. 
Because causal accounts are ontological, such embedding is only possible if unification is 
also ontological. This is why I had to show that my views on unification are ontological  
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(4.3.1.). Furthermore, because causal explanations are non-derivational, the embedding 
of unification in those explanations is only possible if unification is considered non-
derivationally (4.3.2).   
4.4 Embedding unification in causal accounts of explanation 
I will now make two concrete suggestions about how existing causal accounts of 
explanation can be optimized for answering resemblance questions by using unification 
as a second aim of a satisfactory explanation. In this way I can clarify how embedding will 
work in scientific practice. 
4.4.1 Unification as reverse difference-maker in causal accounts 
Michael Strevens’ book Depth. An Account of Scientific Explanation (2008) contains an 
elaborate account of explanatory relevance. Strevens considers and rejects what he calls 
the “minimal causal account of event explanation”. According to this account … 
[A]n event is explained by whatever other events causally influence it, together 
with the laws and background conditions in virtue of which they do so. (Strevens, 
2008, p. 41) 
His argument against this view is: 
The most obvious difficulty facing the minimal causal account is the apparently 
unreasonable vastness of a complete causal explanation. As I pointed out above, in 
a quasi-Newtonian world like our own, an event’s minimal explanation ought in 
principle to mention anything that has ever exerted a gravitational force on the 
objects involved in the event, anything that had previously exerted a force on these 
exerters, and so on. But all scientific explanations, even the most well regarded, 
describe much less than the complete causal history of the explanandum. (Strevens, 
2008, p. 43) 
Thus, the question arises: how do we decide which causal information to include in the 
explanation and which information to exclude? In order to answer this question, Strevens 
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develops an optimizing procedure which is the core of his kairetic account in chapters 3 
and 4 of his book.  
The kairetic theory provides a method for determining the aspects of a causal 
process that made a difference to the occurrence of a particular event. The essence 
of the theory is a procedure that does the following: given as input a causal model 
M for the production of an event e, the procedure yields as output another causal 
model for e that contains only elements in M that made a difference to the 
production of e. A model that contains explanatory irrelevancies is then “distilled” 
so that it contains only explanatorily relevant factors. (Strevens, 2008, p. 69) 
The need for such a procedure has been recognised by many philosophers before 
Strevens, e.g. Peter Lipton: 
Suppose that my car is belching thick, black smoke. Wishing to correct the 
situation, I naturally ask why it is happening. Now imagine that God (or perhaps an 
evil genius) presents me with a full Deductive-Nomological explanation of the 
smoke. This may not be much help. The problem is that many of the causes of the 
smoke are also causes of the car’s normal operation. Were I to eliminate one of 
these, I might only succeed in making the engine inoperable. By contrast, an 
explanation of why the car is smoking rather than running normally is far more 
likely to meet my diagnostic needs. (Lipton, 1993, p. 53) 
Like Strevens, Lipton claims that a good explanation is one in which explanatorily 
irrelevant details are weeded out. Strevens provides a procedure for doing this in a 
systematic way15. 
 An obvious move in optimisation is that we leave out factors that did not make a 
difference. Strevens calls this elimination of causal factors. However, Strevens also 
discusses the possibility of abstraction: 
I throw a cannonball at a window, and the window breaks. Does the fact that the 
cannonball weighs exactly 10 kg makes a difference to the window’s breaking? The 
natural answer to this question is no. The fact that the cannonball is rather heavy 
 
                                                     
15 Strevens claims that the criterion for identifying a model containing only the necessary difference-makers 
resembles unificationism’s criterion for identifying the most unifying theory, such as abstractness, cohesion 
and generality (2004). 
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made a difference, but the fact that it weighed in at exactly 10 kg did not. (Strevens, 
2008, p. 96)  
In such cases, the optimizing procedure ensures that the proposition “The ball’s mass was 
10 kg” is not in the explanation, but that e.g. the proposition “The ball’s mass was greater 
than 1 kg” is in it. This is what Strevens calls abstraction (2008, p. 97). Abstraction is more 
refined than elimination because it is gradual, while elimination is all or nothing. 
The desideratum of keeping only causal factors that make a difference is certainly 
plausible in cases where we want to answer a contrastive question, such as in Lipton’s 
example. This is also what Strevens has in mind in his 2008 book, though he does not 
formulate the questions in a contrastive way. 
 In order to see how I can improve on this, we have to look at the issue of optimisation 
from a different perspective, viz. resemblance questions. What is needed for such 
questions is an opposite optimizing procedure: one that throws out the difference-makers. 
The social revolutions example of Chapter 3 (3.3) can illustrate this. The complete causal 
story about any of the three revolutions contains claims that are irrelevant for explaining 
the other revolutions because they point at differences rather than at common causal 
factors. For instance, what is usually called the Russian Revolution (October 1917) was 
preceded by a revolution in February which ended the regime of the tsars but was not a 
big social revolution. This information is irrelevant for answering the resemblance 
question. In order to explain the resemblance, the focus needs to be on the factors that 
were present in all three cases: external military/economic pressure and a strong sense 
of community. Other factors, the difference makers, have to be removed from the 
complete causal history. 
In sum, my critique on Strevens is that his optimizing procedure is not universally 
valid. A second, opposite optimizing procedure is needed for contexts in which his 
procedure leads to the wrong result. 
By embedding unification in Strevens’ causal account, and using it as a guiding 
principle for a second optimizing procedure, his account can be applied to the context of 
resemblance questions. 
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4.4.2 Unification and optimising mechanistic explanations 
Unification can also be embedded in a mechanistic account: it can be the guiding principle 
behind a procedure for optimising mechanistic explanations in certain contexts (viz. 
resemblance questions). 
According to this account a mechanistic explanation for a phenomenon is a description 
of the mechanism that produces this phenomenon. Mechanisms are to be understood as 
follows: 
A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities organized in such 
way that they are responsible for the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, p. 
123)  
Mechanisms not only explain why a phenomenon occurs, but also, by giving information 
about the entities, activities and organization, how the phenomenon occurs.  
Within this mechanistic view on explanation, there is a group of philosophers who 
regard models that are more complete and more specific as superior to mechanistic 
models that are more abstract (e.g. Machamar, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Darden, 2006 and 
Craver, 2007). According to Machamer et al. (2000) abstract mechanistic models that omit 
details are not explanations, they are merely schemas that need to be filled with 
descriptions of parts and activities. Darden (2006) agrees and sees such abstract models 
as templates for explanations. Craver sees such a ‘mechanisms sketch’ as an incomplete 
model of a mechanism (2007, p.13).  
Arnon Levy and William Bechtel are not convinced of this and focus on the merit of 
abstraction in mechanistic modelling (Bechtel, 2009 and Levy & Bechtel, 2013).  Levy and 
Bechtel conclude that 
It is always possible and, we argue, often desirable to overlook the more concrete 
aspects of a system and represent its organization abstractly as a set of 
interconnections among its elements. Oftentimes such a detail-poor representation 
will be well suited for the explanatory purposes at hand. (2013, p. 255) 
This is because 
biologists expect similarities among the mechanisms responsible for the same or 
similar phenomena in related organisms. (2009, p. 763) 
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Bechtel constructs an example about circadian rhythms to illustrate this (2009). The idea 
is that there is a 24-hour rhythm that affects body temperature, metabolism functions, 
mental functions and sexual activities in almost all living organisms. Instead of 
constructing a different mechanistic model for every type of organism, biologists assume 
that certain parts of the mechanism are conserved throughout different species.  
From Chapter 3 it should be clear that I agree with Levy and Bechtel. The analysis of 
the case study about general anaesthesia provides an argument in favour of their claim 
that mechanisms which omit details can still be explanatory. 
My results from Chapter 3 allow me to add two important elements to Levy and 
Bechtel’s claims about the value of abstraction in mechanistic explanations.  
First, the value of abstraction depends on the type of explanation-seeking questions. 
In their example, biologists ask a resemblance question, since they focus on similarities 
between different species. Levy and Bechtel argue convincingly that sometimes 
abstraction is necessary, but they do not specify why and under which conditions. My 
analysis of mechanism unification implies that abstraction is necessary when answering 
questions of the following form: 
What are the common features of the mechanisms that produce capacity E in objects 
of type X, Y, Z, …. ? 
The question in the example of Levy and Bechtel can be rephrased as such a resemblance 
question: 
What are the common parts of the mechanisms that produce capacity C in species 
A and B? 
Second, by clarifying the type of question that is asked in their example, it becomes clear 
why abstraction is a necessary requirement for the model to be explanatory. The 
explanation has to provide a mechanistic model and it has to be unifying. In order to meet 
this second condition of unification, some degree of abstraction is necessary.  
In explanation-seeking contexts that demand both abstraction and a mechanist model, 
unification can be the guiding principle on the completeness/abstraction axis. The most 
optimal mechanistic explanation is the one that provides the richest possible mechanistic 
model that is correct for all types X, Y, Z,… Mechanism unification produces the most 
informative correct answer to such resemblance questions.  
In this sense, the idea of unification can be embedded as an optimization strategy in 
accounts of mechanistic explanation.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
By rethinking unification ontologically I have shown that there is a new position possible 
about the relation between unification, causation and explanation. Unification can be 
embedded in causal accounts of explanations. In 4.4 I have given two suggestions how 
unification can be an enrichment for causal accounts of explanations. My ontological 
conception of unification is not only closer to scientific practice, it can also help to 
improve philosophical theories on causal explanation. 
This finalizes the first part of this dissertation: bringing unification back into the 
picture by searching for cases of unification in causal explanations.  
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Part II 
Unification and non-causal explanations? 
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Introduction to part II 
In the second part of my dissertation I continue my strategy of digging into scientific 
practice to find cases of ontological unification. In order to do so, I will again bracket the 
classical accounts of unification in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Of course, once the case 
studies of ontological unification are developed, a comparison with the philosophical 
literature becomes useful; I will do this in part III. 
In Part II I add a second set of brackets. I distance myself from the dominant literature 
that all explanations must be causal. I will investigate whether there are cases of 
ontological unification in non-causal explanations.  
In Chapter 5 optimality explanations in biology will be investigated. These are highly 
generalized explanations about population traits. Since a good optimality model needs to 
be applicable to the whole population and to future populations of a species, or even to a 
set of populations, the unifying aspect will not be difficult to uncover. What is at stake 
here is whether or not this is an example of a causal unifying explanation or a non-causal 
unifying explanation. In the case of optimality models, it will be argued that the 
explanation itself is not causal, but is based on physical dependency relations. These 
relations supervene on causal relations in the world. I call this physical dependency 
unification.   
In Chapter 6 I will use an example of chemical systematization, better known as the 
periodic table, to show that something unifying is happening in the absence of causal 
relations. It will be argued that the QM model for the systematization of chemical 
elements can be explanatory, even in the absence of causal explanations. Furthermore, if 
one accepts the possibility of such a non-causal explanation, then a new kind of 
ontological unification becomes possible. I will call this structural unification. 
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Chapter 5  
Unification in biological optimality explanations 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will focus on a type of explanation that is often used in evolutionary 
biology to “investigate adaptations by representing the evolution of a particular phenotype as a 
function of the relative fitnesses of a set of possible trait values” (Rice, 2012, p. 685). Explanations 
of this type are usually called optimality explanations. Elliott Sober has characterized 
them as equilibrium explanations (1983). Contrary to dynamic models, optimality models 
do not present the history of individual changes of a species that produced the 
equilibrium of a population. Instead, an optimality model gives an explanation as to why 
the current phenotypic trait is the optimal one as compared to other possible trait values.  
The idea is that natural selection will eliminate the non-optimal phenotypes from the 
population.   
It is quite clear that a good optimality model needs to be applicable to the whole 
population and to future populations of that species. The phenotypic traits are considered 
at population level, the individual trajectory of how that trait is developed in individuals 
within that population is not relevant. In case of highly generalized patterns the model 
needs to be applicable to multiple populations now and in the future. In section 5.2 two 
examples of optimality models are given. The first example is about a system-specific 
resemblance question, the second example is about a highly generalized pattern. I will 
show that optimality models provide answers to resemblance questions. Similar to the 
resemblance questions in previous chapters, here too ontological unification will be 
required in order for such an answer to be satisfactory. My aim in this chapter is to 
explicate what kind of ontological unification is present in optimality models. 
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First, I will argue that optimality explanations are not an instance of previously 
discussed types of ontological unification in section 5.3. To give a positive argumentation 
for the claim that optimality models provide another type of ontological unification, 
some difficult issues must be tackled. In section 5.4 I will argue that optimality models are 
not causal explanations. In section 5.5 I argue that, despite the fact that they are non-
causal, they do provide some kind of ontological (and derivational) unification. I will call 
this kind physical dependency unification. In section 5.6, I will show that these non-causal 
physical dependency relations used in optimality models supervene on existing causal 
relations.  
5.2 Optimality explanations as answers to resemblance 
questions 
In this section it will be clarified how an optimality explanation works by presenting two 
examples, one about dung flies (5.2.1) and one about the equilibrium of sex ratios (5.2.2). 
Although the term ‘unification’ is not mentioned in papers about optimality models I will 
show that they form answers to resemblance questions and therefore presuppose a form 
of ontological unification. Furthermore, the two examples illustrate two types of 
optimality models: models about system-specific phenomena and models about highly 
generalized patterns that are system-transcendent.  
5.2.1 Dung flies: system-specific resemblance question 
In evolutionary biology scientists use highly idealized mathematical models to explain 
the current state of populations. They do so by showing that the current state is the result 
of an optimization strategy, favored by natural selection. In this model optimization 
theory, a mathematical technique, is used to determine control variables and design 
variables. An optimality model will connect possible strategies to optimize the design 
variables, within the context-specific constraints and tradeoffs. After identifying all the 
components of the optimality model, the optimal strategy of the design variables can be 
deduced. The model shows why a certain state, or a certain variable is to be expected in a 
certain population or set of populations. (Rice, 2015) 
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In order to clarify how optimality models work, the example from Parker and Stuart 
on copulating time in dung flies (1976) will be used, as it is summarized by Collin Rice 
(2012). Apparently dung flies (Scatophaga stercoraria) copulate for 36 minutes on average 
(design value). Through experiments and observations Parker and Stuart found out that 
female dung flies mate with multiple males (context-specific constraint). If this occurs, 
the second male fertilizes around 80% of the eggs, while the first male only fertilizes 
around 20%. This explains why a male dung fly guards the female for some time before 
flying off to another mate. The average time a male dung fly spent on searching a mate 
and guarding the female after copulating was 156 minutes. The total cycle is 156 + c 
minutes, where c is the time spent copulating. Experiments showed that an increased 
copulating time resulted in a higher average number of fertilized eggs.  However, there is 
a tradeoff: the time spent copulating one female, decreases the available time the male 
has to search other mates. Moreover, the return (number of fertilized eggs) gained from 
longer copulating time does not increase linearly, but becomes smaller and smaller over 
time, this is another tradeoff.  Parker and Stuart use an optimization strategy to 
determine the maximal tradeoff between copulating time and the rate of fertilized eggs 
across several cycles. They calculated that the optimal copulation time is 41 minutes, 
close to the observed value of 36 minutes.  
The model that Parker and Stuart built provides accurate predictions based on 
empirically observed parameters. According to Elliot Sober it captures the major 
constraints and tradeoffs involved in the shaping by natural selection of this behavior. It 
is an adaptationist explanation of a single characteristic in a single species, since the 
model assumes that natural selection will maximize the optimization criterion. (Sober E. 
, 2000, p. 135). Sober sees two positive features in their model. First, Parker and Stuart did 
not just use ‘fitness’ as a criterion, but they stated a very specific criterion of optimality: 
maximizing the number of eggs fertilized per time unit. Second, they measured exactly 
what the investment returns are and were able to make accurate predictions. Rice 
emphasizes another feature of the model: the explanation uses a number of idealizing 
assumptions, such as an infinite population, randomized mating, the inheritance of 
copulating strategies. By idealizing these factors, it is assumed that other evolutionary 
factors would not keep the population of dung flies from reaching this optimal strategy 
(2012, pp. 688-689). The strategy that optimizes the criterion, here the amount for 
fertilized eggs, is the equilibrium point of the evolving population. Rice calls it an 
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equilibrium explanation that shows why a particular strategy is the best available 
solution: 
Once the strategy set and the optimization criterion have been identified, an 
optimality model describes an objective function, which connects each possible 
strategy to values of the design variable(s) to be optimized. […] Certain trade-offs 
and context-specific limitations will constrain the optimal design. […] Once these 
components are specified, one can deduce which of the available strategies will 
yield the optimal value(s) of the design variable(s). The strategy that optimizes the 
model’s criterion, in light of various constraints and trade-offs, is deemed the 
optimal strategy. By mathematically representing the important constraints and 
trade-offs, an optimality model can demonstrate why a particular strategy is the 
best available solution. (Rice, 2015, pp. 591-592) 
Now, let us take a closer look at the explanation-seeking question in the example of the 
dung flies. Starting from the observation that dung flies copulate for approximately 36 
minutes, we can ask contrastive questions and a resemblance question. An example of a 
contrastive question is: 
Why do dung flies copulate for approximately 36 minutes instead of 5 minutes or 1 
hour? 
The resemblance question is: 
Why do all dung flies copulate for approximately 36 minutes? 
This resemblance question asks why there is so little variation. What is at stake is why do 
they all behave more or less the same? 
In the model of Parker and Stuart both the contrastive and the resemblance question are 
answered. My focus will be on the resemblance question. A satisfactory answer to those 
questions needs to show that phenomena are dependent on the same deeper, more 
fundamental structure or process, in this case the biological and environmental factors 
that influence the copulating behavior of dung flies. This means that ontological 
unification will be required to provide a good answer to this resemblance question.   
In section 5.3 of this chapter I will investigate whether the ontological unification here 
is similar to the previously discussed types of ontological unification. If not, another 
conception of unification needs to be constructed for this type of explanations. 
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5.2.2 Sex ratios: resemblance questions about highly generalized 
patterns 
The example used in section 2.1 is an optimality explanation of a system-specific 
phenomenon. Optimality models are also used to explain highly general patterns.  In 
order to show how optimality models work on this higher level, Fisher’s model of 
equilibrium sex ratios (1930) is used as summarized by Rice (2015).   
Fisher asked a very basic biological question: why is the sex ratio in populations often 
1:1? For my argument it is not necessary to elaborate on all the specific, mathematical 
procedures that are used in the construction of this model. The optimizing criterion in 
Fisher’s model is the amount of mating opportunities, thus he assumes that natural 
selection will favor strategies that optimize this criterion. If there is an imbalance 
between sex ratios, producing offspring of the minority sex is the best way to propagate 
one’s genes. There will be an advantage for parents who produce the minority sex, since 
their children have more mating opportunities, and thus more expected offspring. The 
births of the minority sex will become more common in the population, until there is a 
sex ratio of 1:1 and the fitness advantage fades. The reasoning applies both to female and 
male sex as the minority sex. A 1:1 sex ratio is the stable equilibrium state of a population, 
since it is the only state in which selection does not favor the production of the minority 
sex and thus is an evolutionarily stable strategy.  In this model it is important to see that 
there is a perfectly linear tradeoff between the ability and the cost to produce sons and 
daughters. The resource cost of raising a daughter is the same as raising a son. One fewer 
son, means one more daughter, and vice versa.  
As in the previous example this model also makes idealizing assumptions such as 
randomized mating, an infinite population, equal access to resources etc. Furthermore, 
the model assumes that other evolutionary factors will not influence the population from 
reaching this equilibrium, namely a 1:1 sex ratio.  
Starting from the observed 1:1 sex ratios, several contrastive questions can be asked. 
For instance:  
Why is the sex ratio in most populations 1:1 instead of 1:2? 
The explanation-seeking question that Fisher addressed is a resemblance question: 
Why do all populations have a 1:1 sex ratio? 
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In other words:  why is the sex ratio the same for all populations, regardless of the species 
to which they belong? 
This type of explanation-seeking question focuses on similarities between two or more 
populations, rather than on differences (as contrastive questions do). Just as in the 
example with the dung flies the optimality model here answers the resemblance question 
as well as contrastive questions. The difference is that while the optimality model about 
dung flies is a question about particular facts, the optimality model about sex ratio is an 
attempt to answer a higher-level resemblance question about regularities.  
5.3 Optimality models and previously discussed types of 
ontological unification 
If optimality models would be instances of causal network unification or mechanism 
unification, my task of explicating the kind of ontological unification that is involved 
here, would be rather easy. However, as will be shown in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, this easy 
route does not work. 
5.3.1 No causal network unification 
Consider the following resemblance questions: 
i. Why do all dung flies copulate for approximately 36 minutes? 
ii. Why do all populations have a 1:1 sex ratio? 
The general format of these questions is the following: 
I. Why do all objects of population P have property X? 
II. Why do all populations have property X? 
In order to provide causal network unification (as in Chapter 3), positive or negative 
causal factors need to be determined that are present in the causal ancestry of all objects 
(organisms or populations). Remember the general format of an explanation that results 
from an act of causal network unification: 
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X is a positive causal factor for E. 
Y is a positive causal factor for E. 
Z is a positive causal factor for E. 
… 
Object a has X, Y, Z, …  
Object b has X, Y, Z, …  
Object c has X, Y, Z …  
… 
Thus, objects a, b and c have property E.  
The causal factors X, Y and Z are present in the causal ancestry of the objects. This means 
that these factors make a difference and if one intervenes on a cause X it would lead to a 
change in the effect Y. In order to show that these models are no causal network 
unification, I turn to the argument of Collin Rice. 
Rice (2012, 2015) firmly disagrees with Angela Potochnik (2007, 2010) and other 
philosophers who see optimality explanations as a special type of causal explanations. He 
gives two arguments for his position, a bad one and a good one. I will use both, but not in 
the same way. The first argument is useful for my claim that optimality models are not 
causal network unification. The second argument will be used in section 5.4. to show that 
they are not causal. 
Rice’s first argument states that optimality explanations are not causal explanations 
because they are synchronic instead of diachronic. Optimality models are a separate kind 
of explanations since they are based on optimization theory, a mathematical technique 
to “determine what values of some control variable(s) will – given a set of tradeoffs and 
constraints – optimize the value of some design variable(s)” (2012, pp. 695-696). 
Optimality models do not focus on specific parts of causal processes, but they are based 
on a completely different set of relationships: population-level constraints and tradeoffs. 
To create such a model a lot of causal information is censored: “all information about 
step-by-step dynamics of the evolving system” is omitted (2012, p. 698). Besides 
censoring, there is another feature of optimality models: the essential use of idealization. 
Removing idealizations, such as infinite populations, randomized mating, a constant 
payoff structure and the exact copying of parent’s phenotypic strategies by their 
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offspring, would eliminate the explanatory value of the optimality models. These models 
focus on population-level relations that are synchronically represented and leave all the 
dynamics out of the explanation. Therefore, Rice argues, they are non-causal 
explanations. 
In representing a trade-off, a biological optimality model does not reference any 
causal processes of the biological population or any events within the population’s 
causal history […] Nowhere does the model describe a causal process (or causal 
trajectory) that unfolds over time or any events that occur prior to the explanandum. (Rice, 
2012, p. 699; italics added) 
Rice is too quick to classify optimality explanations as non-causal because of the 
synchronic relations they model. His argument rests on the arbitrary demand about the 
temporal asymmetry: in a causal explanation the explanans must occur before the 
explanandum. Let us compare this to Woodward’s notion of explanations: 
I suggest below that the distinguishing feature of causal explanations, so conceived, 
is that they are explanations that furnish information that is potentially relevant 
to manipulation and control: they tell us how, if we were able to change the value 
of one or more variables, we could change the value of other variables. (2003, p. 6) 
Nowhere does Woodward demand that causal explanations need to be dynamic. Causal 
explanations are causal because they provide information about the conditions under 
which the phenomenon would be different. So, Rice’s first argument is not cogent with 
respect to the claim that optimality models are non-causal explanations. I come back to 
this in section 5.4. 
However, Rice’s argument is useful in determining whether or not optimality models 
are an instance of causal network unification. The fact that optimality models describe 
synchronic relations implies that they do not give information about the causal ancestry 
of the phenomenon. No causal process or causal trajectory is described. Causal network 
unification was characterized in a way that excludes synchronicity: in causal network 
unification  “one causal network is presented and applied to two or more events to point 
out the common causal factors that are present in the causal ancestry of all events we 
consider” (section 3.7). Because of the synchronic nature of optimality models, they do 
not meet this requirement and are not an instance of causal network unification. The 
notion of causal ancestry is crucial in the latter.  
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5.3.2 No mechanism unification 
Let us look back at the resemblance questions from 5.2 (and rephrased in 5.3.1). If we treat 
these questions as a request for mechanism unification, we get: 
What are the common features of the mechanism which makes dung flies copulate 
for approximately 36 minutes? 
What are the common features of the mechanism which makes sure that in almost 
all populations the sex ratio is 1:1? 
In order to decide if the components of an optimality model can function as features of a 
mechanism, I use Stuart Glennan’s distinction between causal production and causal 
relevance. This difference arises in the discussion whether or not natural selection is a 
cause, and thus eligible to be used as a causal explanation.  
Optimality explanations do not focus on population-genetic mechanisms but on the 
determination of evolutionary stable phenotypes. Orzack and Sober define this 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as: 
A phenotype of an individual is optimal (relative to a variety of alternatives) 
because it outperforms the other phenotypes and thereby results in a higher 
fitness. […] As a result, other phenotypes are eliminated from the population (or 
nearly so) or prevented from invading. (1994, p. 3) 
The idea is that natural selection must lead to the occurrence of an evolutionary stable 
strategy (ESS) observable in a stable phenotype, such as a 1:1 sex ratio or an average 
copulation time of 36 minutes in the dung fly population.  But does natural selection really 
‘cause’ this ESS?   
There are two opponent views in this matter. The dynamical view sees selection as a 
force that causes evolutionary change. In this view population level causation is 
defended. The statistical view claims that natural selection is epiphenomenal and merely 
a statistical outcome of individual causal processes. Glennan tackles the discussion by 
bringing up a distinction between a causal process and causal relevance (2009, p. 327).  
Causal productivity is a relation between events. Glennan illustrates how this definition 
of causality is used in the literature of mechanisms and causal processes. In this meaning 
causality is about events producing another event, about objects doing something. He 
gives some examples:  
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The bowling ball knocked over the pin. 
The explosion made Edward deaf. 
The firing of neuron A caused the firing of neuron B. (2009, p. 327)  
Causal relevance is a relation of dependence between a fact (or an event) and an event, 
and it is closely connected to counterfactual approaches to causation as can be found in 
Woodward 2003. Causal relevance solves problems with causation by omission or with 
causality based on properties. For instance: 
If I had turned off the shower faucet, the bathroom would not be flooded. 
The fact that the soccer ball weighs around 450g is relevant for it breaking the 
window. 
With this distinction in mind, Glennan argues that natural selection does not cause the 
higher frequency of a trait in a population, since a population or a population level 
property is not causally productive. Populations do consist of parts, but that is not enough 
to consider them as objects or entities. The criteria to be considered as an entity is to have 
parts with a stable structure that can engage in an activity as a unified entity. Glennan 
illustrates this with a fish and a water bug. “When a fish kills a water bug, it kills the whole 
water bug, it cannot kill its legs but not its body. On the other hand, when a fish kills a 
water bug, it does not kill the whole population of water bugs.” (2009, p.333).   
Glennan saves natural selection from epiphenomenalism by showing that population 
level traits can be causally relevant without being causally productive. When biologists 
invoke fitness to explain the higher frequency of a specific phenotype in a population, it 
is not the reproductive rate of the phenotype in itself that is causally relevant, but the 
ratio of the reproductive rate of that phenotype compared to that of variants. This is a 
population level property; thus, causal relevance is not limited to the individuals that 
make up the population. 
In my view Glennan gives good reasons to accept natural selection and population level 
properties as causally relevant. But what is important for me here, is that in his line of 
reasoning he also gives me an argument not to accept population-level properties as 
being eligible as explananda for mechanistic explanations. Glennan gives the following 
definition of a mechanism, which is very similar to the one Illari and Williamson have 
given: 
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A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and 
interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon.  (2017, p. 
17) 
From this definition it follows that only higher-level properties of systems that are 
produced by the activities and interactions of lower-level entities can be given a 
mechanistic explanation. In Glennan’s view biological populations do not satisfy this 
condition: 
This is because populations are not typically entities that enter into productive 
causal relations. (Glennan, 2009, p.335). 
A population is not a system, it is a logical aggregation. Therefore, there is no mechanism 
that produces the properties of a population: 
If we manipulate a population level property like the relative frequency of a 
frequency dependent trait, we will have a causal influence on selective outcomes. 
Because a population is a logical aggregation of rather than a causal product of the 
individuals of which it is composed, when one manipulates a property of the 
population one ipso facto manipulates the properties of individuals within the 
population. (Glennan, 2009, p. 336) 
In sum, optimality models operate at the population level, which cannot be seen as a 
system in the ‘mechanism’ sense; thus, these models are not instances of mechanism 
unification because they do not constitute mechanistic explanations. 
5.3.3 Preview 
In this section I argued that optimality models are not instances of causal network or 
mechanism unification. There is no easy way to clarify how ontological unification 
operates in these optimality models. In the remainder of this chapter I take three steps in 
order to get grip on the kind of unification used here. First, I claim that the explanations 
provided by optimality models are not causal (5.4). Second, I investigate whether they are 
explanatory at all. I will claim that they provide explanations because they describe 
shared physical dependency relations. These relations make ontological unification 
possible in these models. I will call this physical dependency unification (5.5). Finally, I will 
further clarify this type of unification by arguing that it supervenes on causal relations 
(5.6).  
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5.4 Are optimality models causal?  
There has been a debate about whether or not optimality models are causal explanations 
between Collin Rice (2012, 2015) and Angela Potochnik (2007, 2010). This debate will be a 
thread throughout this and the following sections. In a sense, they are both right and 
wrong. This will become clear after showing how unification operates in optimality 
models. But first things first, are these models causal or not? 
Rice gives two arguments to claim that they are not. I have discussed the first argument 
in section 5.3.1 and showed that it is not cogent to argue that optimality models are not 
causal, but it was sufficient to show that they do not use causal network unification. 
His second argument is more convincing: trade-offs are not causes; thus, they cannot 
provide causal explanations. Let us take a step back and first show why these trade-offs 
are so important. In 5.3.1. we saw that one of the key features of optimality models is their 
degree of idealization and generalization. A lot of causal information is censored. The core 
of the model is not the representing of causal processes but representing population-level 
constraints and tradeoffs. It is the relation between trade-offs that explains why the 
current state of a population is as it is. In the case of the dung flies there were two trade-
offs: the time spent copulating one female decreases the available time the male has to 
search other mates and the number of fertilized eggs gained from longer copulating time 
does not increase linearly, but becomes smaller and smaller over time. This is also the 
case in the example of the sex ratios. The particular initial conditions and the causal 
trajectory of the system are not important in the optimality model. The causal trajectory 
of how a parent produces a child is irrelevant here. It is equally unimportant what causal 
factors play a role in choosing a specific mate. What does matter is that the cost for raising 
a child is independent of its sex, that mating opportunities are better for offspring of the 
minority sex, that members of the minority sex will produce more offspring of that same 
sex since they have better mating opportunities. By mathematically representing these 
trade-offs and context-specific constraints, it is possible to deduce from an optimality 
model why a particular strategy is the best available solution (Rice, 2015, p. 592).  
It is difficult to accept trade-offs as causes. First, the representation of tradeoffs is 
inaccurate if they are compared with the actual mechanisms that are active within the 
population. For instance, in the model it is assumed that trade-offs are constant. Second, 
trade-offs are relationships between values. It is indeed difficult to see how ‘average 
fertilization rates’ cause ‘copulating time’ or how the trade-off between population-level 
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averages is a cause for the equilibrium state that is the explanandum. That the relation 
between trade-offs and the equilibrium state is non-causal can be related to Glennan’s 
claim that populations are logical aggregations. Yes, it is true that trade-off values can be 
different, but it is not possible to manipulate a trade-off directly. Therefore, optimality 
models cannot be captured by an interventionist account. The idea that an optimality 
model is modular is only an illusion according to Rice: 
I maintain that the apparent modularity of these relationships within the idealized 
model is merely an illusion created by the use of several idealizations and 
abstractions that eliminate the complexity of the causal networks of real-world 
biological systems. Modular relationships within an idealized mathematical model 
cannot establish modularity of causal relationships in the model’s target system(s). 
(Rice, 2015, p. 605) 
The only manipulation that is possible is on the level of the individual that make up the 
population. In sum, I agree with Rice that the core relations that make up the optimality 
model are non-causal, even if they are in a way counterfactual. However, I disagree with 
his second conclusion: “the explanatory claim and the causal claim are independent of 
one another” (Rice, 2015, p. 605). I will explain this in section 5.6.   
An obvious question that arises now is: are optimality models explanatory at all given 
that they are not causal. I will investigate this in the next section. 
5.5 Optimality explanations: shared physical dependency 
relations 
That optimality models do not use causes is not an argument in itself that they are non-
causal explanations: one can also deny that they are adequate explanations at all. For 
instance, Michael Strevens (2008, p.288) argues that optimality models give us minimal 
causal information: the actual causal history must be within the set of possible causal 
trajectories, limited by context-specific constraints and trade-offs. But the actual causal 
information is ‘black-boxed’. This implies that optimality models are at best only partial 
explanations: 
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Because a model that secretes some mechanisms in its explanatory framework does 
not confer what I called […] ‘deep’ of ‘full’ understanding of the phenomenon that 
constitutes its target, the black-boxing model is limited in its explanatory power. A 
deep explanation of the ecosystem’s stability must flesh out the model’s black boxes 
rather than leaving the causal details in the framework. (Strevens, 2008, p. 159) 
The problem for Strevens is that the features of optimality models are discretely multiply 
realizable kinds. There is no single, stable explanation across all populations, even if there 
is a single high-level structure that is shared among the populations. His conclusion is 
even more fare-reaching:  
The sense in which the black-boxing model explains the stability of a wide range of 
ecosystems is at best partial, then: the model does not itself explain stability in each 
such system; it rather provides the schema for the individual, case-by-case 
explanations. (Strevens, 2008, p. 160) 
Strevens’ position contradicts my approach. My analysis starts by considering how these 
models are used by scientists: as explanations. Optimality models are not temporary 
explanations or steps towards an explanation. They are the best-suited explanations for 
the task at hand: providing highly idealized equilibrium explanations, or in my terms: 
providing answers to resemblance questions.  
Woodward’s view is more in line with scientific practice here. His notion of explaining 
is broader than causal explanations: 
An explanation must answer a what-if-things-had-been-different question, or 
exhibit information about a pattern of dependency. (2003, p. 201)  
This means that if I can show that optimality models exhibit information about 
dependency relations, they are explanations. Woodward uses the criterion of mirroring 
physical dependency relations to distinguish explanatory derivations from non-
explanatory derivations: 
The idea is that these derivations trace or mirror the relations of physical 
dependency that hold between the explanans conditions and the explananda 
phenomena-relations that would be revealed if, for example, we were to physically 
intervene to alter the explanans conditions. (2003, p. 201) 
If I can show that optimality models mirror such physical dependency relations, they can 
be classified as explanatory according to Woodward’s view.  
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In order to do so, I will use Weber, Van Eck and Mennes’ interesting analysis of the 
epistemic value of biological ascriptions, or functional explanations: 
Biological advantage ascriptions are valuable because they provide the means for 
answering questions of the following form: “What would happen if (due to 
mutation) in some individuals of species s item i’ would have a different property e’ 
(while the habitat remains unchanged)?” (201+) 
Their conclusion is that functional explanations provide answers to questions of the form: 
what would happen if a disturbance occurred.  If such a disruption would occur, similar 
causal processes and mechanisms would be activated in the individuals that make up the 
population (or set of populations).   
Let me explain this by comparing it, as Weber, Van Eck and Mennes do, with 
Woodward’s contrastive account (201+). 
For Woodward an explanation must show how the explanandum would change if the 
initial conditions were different. In other words, adequate explanations 
… locate their explananda within a space of alternative possibilities and show us 
how which of these alternatives is realized systematically depends on the 
conditions cited in the explanans. They do this by enabling us to see how, if these 
initial conditions had been different or had changed in various ways, various of 
these alternatives would have been realized instead (2003, p. 191). 
In Woodward’s view an explanation must give an answer to the question: what if things 
had been different? What if we could intervene in the relevant causal factors of the 
explanandum and change one or more factors, would the explanandum be different or 
not? In order to give a satisfactory answer to that question, counterfactual dependence 
must be established.   
Functional explanations not only look back or focus on the present, but they are also 
prospective. They give information about what might happen in the future if the current 
state of affairs would change. Biological ascriptions formulate reasons to prefer one 
theoretical possibility above others. In this sense, functional explanations are not causal 
explanations, since they do not rely on reconstructing causal processes or causal 
relevance from the past to the present. Instead functional explanations use theoretical 
possibilities to argue how future states of affairs might be if the current state is disrupted.  
Optimality models work in a similar way. In order to explain the current state they do not 
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reconstruct a causal ancestry, but they show that future states may be different if trade-
offs are changed due to genetic mutations or environmental factors.  
The explanation in optimality models is based on structural relationships between 
trade-offs and constraints. Optimality explanations tell us what would happen if the 
relationship between those tradeoffs and constraints changes, e.g. because of a change in 
the habitat of the population or because of a genetic mutation. By focusing on these 
structural relationships optimality models can answer forward-looking resemblance 
questions of the type: 
What would happen to phenotypic trait X of a population (or a set of populations) if 
the current state of affairs (environmental or genetic) would change? What would 
happen if a disruption occurs that disturbs the current evolutionary equilibrium? 
An optimality model can answer such questions because it exhibits the dependency 
relations between context-specific constraints, trade-offs and the state of a population, 
even if these relations are not causal. The deductive structure of the optimality model 
mirrors counterfactual physical dependency relations, and so, they qualify as 
explanations.  The explanatory unification that occurs in these models will be called 
physical dependency unification. 
5.6 Physical dependence unification supervenes on causal 
relations in the world  
In this final section I will do something that I have tried to avoid until now in this 
dissertation: making metaphysical claims. This is where Angela Potochnik’s role in the 
debate about the status of optimality models comes in handy (2007, 2010). Her perspective 
on the causal aspect of optimality explanations is interesting, but she uses it in a wrong 
way. I will show that Potochnik and Rice are arguing about different issues. In their debate 
epistemological and metaphysical claims are intertwined with one another. This will be 
important for the further characterisation of my notion of physical dependency 
unification. 
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5.6.1 Ontological supervenience 
Rice argued that optimality models are not-causal, since they are purely structural, highly 
idealized explanations. However, there is a difference between idealizing and denying the 
existence of causal trajectories. Rice too speaks of causal information:  
The actual strategies are, however, causally relevant to the evolutionary process 
that occurred. This causal information, however, is explicitly not included in the 
explanation provided by the optimality model. (2015, p. 599) 
To clarify this, Potochnik’s argument that optimality models are causal explanations can 
help. It is true that optimality models use highly simplified assumptions instead of 
complex dynamics , but that does not mean that they can use any simple assumption: 
Optimality models are epistemically dependent on unrepresented features of 
genetic transmission. The success of the simplifying assumptions that optimality 
models use to stand in for genetic dynamics must be established on a case-by-case 
basis. (Potochnik, 2010, p. 226) 
An optimality model can only be successful if the model parameters and background 
assumptions are confirmed by other research. If this were not the case, an optimality 
model would be an example of purely derivational unification. 
My views on the metaphysical underpinnings of optimality models is as follows. It is 
true that the explanandum is derived from the optimality model, but the dependency 
relations in the model (the trade-offs) are based on causal relations in the world. This 
implies that optimality models do not presuppose some ‘spooky’ metaphysics in which 
there would be physical dependency relations in the world that do not supervene on 
causal relations. 
The causal relations on which the physical dependency relations in the model 
supervene do not explain the equilibrium, but they are relevant for the model. The non-
causal physical dependency relations between populations, population level traits, the 
environment, fitness and selection trail supervene on existing causal relations in the 
world. Epistemologically speaking, optimality models are non-causal, in the sense that 
their explanans does not contain causes of the explanandum (5.4). Ontologically speaking, 
they are causal, because the physical dependency relations that make the model 
explanatory, supervene on causal relations in the world.  
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Potochnik attempts to construct an example in support of her claim that optimality 
models provide causal explanations. I will now show that her example is in fact an 
argument for my views on the metaphysical underpinnings of optimality models.  
5.6.2 An example: the reproduction of bacteriophages 
Potochnik’s example is about the reproduction of bacteriophages by lysis. Viruses that 
infect bacteria (bacteriophages) reproduce by a process, called lysis, whereby the virus 
multiplies itself inside the infected bacterium. In a next stage the viral particles burst out 
into the environment and kill the host bacterium in the process. Wang et al. (1996) and 
Bull et al. (2004)  examined the different stages of phage lysis and found a fitness trade-
off between early and late lysis. When bursting out early the new viral particles can start 
reproducing and the time between generations is shorter. When the lysis happens later 
more particles are accumulated in the host cell. The optimal lysis time depends on the 
length of the different stages in the life cycle. The optimality model of Wang et al. (1996) 
and Bull et al. (2004) breaks down the life of a bacteriophage in three phases: 
1) Dispersal phase: when a viral particle is being released from the host until it 
infects a new host. 
2) Juvenile phase: when the bacteriophage infects a new host until the first 
progenies have matured inside the host. 
3) Adult phase: when the first progenies have matured until the host is lysed.  
The longer phases (1) and (2) take, the longer lysis should be delayed, according to the 
optimality model. This model is an instance of a highly generalized pattern: organisms 
with longer life cycles benefit from delaying the age at which reproduction begins 
(Potochnik, 2010, p. 219). There are different dynamics of lysis timing in different phage 
populations, but the selection pressure is the same, therefore 
any model of lysis timing that incorporated genetic dynamics would apply only to 
a narrow range of bacteriophage populations. Such an explanation would obscure 
the key determiner of bacteriophage lysis timing: the time it takes to reproduce is 
balanced against the number of progeny in a way that maximizes reproductive 
potential. (Potochnik, 2010, p. 220) 
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The specific causal trajectories are left out of the optimality model, since it focuses on a 
different set of relationships: population-level constraints and tradeoffs.  
This does not mean that the causal information is completely irrelevant. It black-
boxed. For instance, optimality explanations determine traits as heritable without 
characterizing the actual genetic causes. But the success of these optimality models is 
dependent on what is inside the black-box. Potochnik calls this epistemic 
interdependence (Potochnik, 2010, p. 226 etseq.). When Bull et al. (2004) assess the model 
developed by Wang et al. (1996), they do so by using genetic information. There are two 
assumptions in the model: first, the only reproductive option for phages is lysis and 
second, lysis timing can vary without changing other traits of the bacteriophage. Both 
assumptions are tested and corroborated by digging deeper into the genetic system of the 
bacteriophages.16 So, even though the optimality model in itself is not a causal 
explanation, it is dependent on genetics and its causal relations.  
This analysis is in accordance with Glennan’s position. Optimality explanations do not 
refer to detailed biographies of organisms, but 
while these biographies may be unnecessary for our explanation, it is these 
organisms and their life histories that produce change. Without the individual 
organisms, there are no populations, and without the activities and interactions of 
these individual organisms, there are no changes in populations. (2009, p. 338) 
This is exactly what is needed to make an optimality model not ‘spooky’: the population 
level traits supervene on existing causal relations at the level of the individual organisms. 
While Rice focusses on the non-causal features of optimality models on the 
epistemological level, the arguments that Potochnik gives are relevant at the ontological 
level. In their papers they intertwine epistemological and ontological claims. 
 
                                                     
16 For more detail, see Bull et al. (2004) and Potochnik (2010). 
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5.7 Conclusion 
Now I have all the elements to characterize the kind of ontological unification that is 
present in optimality explanations. I have called this   physical dependency unification. This 
kind of unification has three features:  
(1) It does not constitute a causal explanation. 
(2) It explains by mirroring physical dependency relations in the world. 
(3) It is not metaphysically spooky, since the physical dependency relations 
supervene on causal relations in the world. 
As in the other types, physical dependency unification offers a way to answer a 
resemblance question. Contrary to the other types, it does not figure in a causal 
explanation. The difficulty here was that populations, population level traits etc. could 
not be treated as causes. However, optimality models provide information about physical 
dependency relations (albeit at a highly generalized level) and thus they are explanatory: 
they tell us how tradeoffs relate to one another and how they result in an evolutionary 
stable state in a population. There are no references to causal processes in the model. The 
model is constructed by applying mathematical optimization procedures to physical 
dependency relations. Comparable to functional explanations, optimality models do not 
rely on reconstructing causal processes or causal relevance from past to present. On the 
other hand, the unifying power of optimality models is not purely derivational, it still is 
ontological unification because it refers back to physical dependency relations that exist 
in the world. How those relations arise, is black-boxed in the model.  
Thus, epistemologically speaking, optimality models form non-causal explanations, in 
the sense that their explanans does not contain causes of the explanandum. Nevertheless, 
the success of the model is based on an epistemic dependency on ontological causal 
factors such as genetic information, environmental information etc. Throughout this 
dissertation I have taken on Woodward’s view that an explanation is about physical 
dependency relations. This commits me to a certain form of realism about explanatory 
relationships: explaining is more than exposing a logical or deductive relation: 
Derivational relations do not have a role to play in explanation that is independent 
or prior to such dependency relations, but rather matter only insofar as (or to the 
extent that) they correctly represent such relationships. (Woodward, 2003, p. 202) 
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Metaphysically speaking, this kind of unification is still causal, because the physical 
dependency relations that make the unification explanatory, supervene on causal 
relations in the world. This means that no ‘spooky’ metaphysics are presupposed. 
Therefore, physical dependency unification is ontological in two ways: (1) it is not 
purely derivational, because it is based on physical dependency relations; (2) it commits 
me to a minimal realistic position about the ontology of explanations.  
In the next chapter I will investigate whether there exists a kind of ontological 
unification that does not supervene on causal relations in the world.  
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Chapter 6  
Systematization of chemical elements 
6.1 Introduction 
The periodic table is one of the best-known systems of classification in science. A periodic 
table is a diagrammatic representation of all the known chemical elements ordered 
according to their atomic numbers. The Russian chemist Dimitri Mendeleev stated in a 
presentation to the Russian Chemical Society in 1869 that there was a dependency 
between the chemical properties and the atomic weights of the elements. If the chemical 
elements are ordered according to the atomic weight the chemical properties of elements 
appeared to reoccur after certain definite intervals: the properties exhibit a periodicity.  
Since 1869, over 700 different versions of the periodic table were published (Scerri E. , 
2007, p. 20). 
As we will see further in this introductory section, contemporary versions of the 
periodic table differ in important respects from those in the 19th century. However, they 
share an important property: they encode information about which elements display 
similar chemical behavior.  
My first aim in this chapter is to show that this property of all periodic tables implies 
that they suggest explanation-seeking questions of a type that is familiar from Part I and 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation: resemblance questions (section 6.2). 
Quantum mechanical models of the behavior of electrons (which describe an electron 
configuration for each kind of atom) can provide explanations in response to these 
resemblance questions. These explanations are presented in section 6.3. Given what we 
have established in Part I, it makes sense to ask the following questions: 
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a) Do these explanations provide causal network unification as discussed in 
Chapter 3? 
b) Do these explanations provide mechanism unification as discussed in Chapter 3? 
The second and third aim in this chapter is to argue that the answers to these questions 
is negative (sections 6.4 and 6.5). 
Given these negative answers, the question arises: are the QM models explanatory if 
they are non-causal? In section 6.6 I will argue that they are. 
The fourth aim is to argue that there may be a type of ontological unification that is 
based on physical dependency relations that do not supervene on causal relations. I will 
call this structural unification (section 6.7). 
These specific aims fit into the overall goal of this chapter: to explicate what is going 
on in the quantum mechanical explanations. As a whole, this chapter is an additional 
argument in favor of the thesis that explanatory unification without causation is possible. 
I want to convince the reader that, like in Chapter 5, we have non-causal explanations 
that provide ontological unification. The difference is that no underlying causal relations 
are present here.  
6.1.1 18th and 19th century 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give a full account of the discovery of the 
periodic law. However, I will provide some context based on the book of Eric Scerri ‘The 
periodic table: its story and its significance’ (2007). Antoine Lavoisier, the French chemist, 
used his own fortune to make one of the finest balances of his day and he started weighing 
different reacting substances.  Next to his great discovery of the oxygen theory of 
combustion and the law of conservation of mass, his quantitative approach paved the way 
for laws of chemical combination and an empirical approach to chemistry. At the end of 
the 18th century Jeremias Benjamin Richter did measurement experiments that led to the 
concept of equivalent weights. Now properties of elements could be compared on a 
numerical scale. In 1803 John Dalton, famous for the atomic theory, published what could 
be seen as the first list of atomic weights. In the next 60 years the atomic weight would 
become the main criterion to arrange chemical elements. By means of numerical 
  103 
relations such as triads17 predecessors of Mendeleev’s table were created, that actually 
were successful in capturing the correct classification of the main group elements known 
at that time. What is missing here is the periodicity of types of elements at regular 
intervals. For this we had to wait until the 1860s. Several factors contributed to the rapid 
discoveries of many periodic tables in that decade. In 1860 a first international meeting 
of chemists was held in Karlsruhe. Here one set of atomic weights was accepted, instead 
of many systems before. Another factor is the development of the new technique of 
spectroscopy that led to the discovery of new chemical elements. Spectroscopy led to 
more elements and thus fewer gaps in systematizations and now every element had its 
own unique spectral fingerprint, which led to a better understanding of chemical 
elements. Scerri (2007) examines the six discoverers of periodicity in his book, but the 
leading discoverer is Dimitri Mendeleev. His version of the periodic system had by far the 
greatest influence on chemistry at his time and still today.  
The main organizational principle of his periodic table was the atomic weight of 
elements. Stephen G. Brush formulates the core idea as follows: 
 “The periodic law (as formulated in the nineteenth century) states that when the 
elements are listed in order of atomic weight, properties such as valence will recur 
periodically for example, after seven elements.” (Brush, 1996) 
This central organizational principle enabled Mendeleev to design a two-dimensional 
classification of the elements known at his time. Ordered according to atomic weight the 
elements Li, Be, B, C, N, O and F were put in the first column. Since the next known 
element Na was chemically similar to Li, Mendeleev put Na in a new column, next to Li 
(see figure 2). 
 
                                                     
17 Johann Wolfgang Döbereiner (1829) ordered some chemical elements by their physical properties in triads. 
For instance, he observed that strontium had an atomic number that was intermediate to that of calcium and 
barium, and these three elements had similar properties.   
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Figure 2 Mendeleev’s published periodic system, of 1869.  
(Mendeleev, 1869, p. 70)    
 
Mendeleev ends his first paper with eight explicitly stated points, the first of which being 
the periodic law and the last being the prediction that many yet unknown elements are 
to be discovered to fill the gaps. In 1871 he published a third paper with many different 
formats of the periodic table and detailed predictions about these elements that are yet 
to be discovered.   
At the end of the 19th century, the noble gas Argon was discovered by Lord Rayleigh 
and William Ramsay. The discovery of helium, krypton and xenon followed soon 
thereafter. Suddenly a whole group of elements was discovered without being predicted 
by the periodic table.  The noble gases formed a serious threat for Mendeleev’s system. At 
first, Mendeleev denied that argon and helium were new elements, as he would not accept 
elements to be competely inert. In 1900 Ramsay suggested to Mendeleev that argon and 
the other noble gases should be added as a new group, between the halogens and the 
alkali-metals. As such, each period would be extended by one element. Mendeleev wrote 
as an answer to this suggestion: 
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“This was extremely important for him [Ramsay] as an affirmation of the position 
of the newly discovered elements, and for me as a glorious confirmation of the 
general applicability of the periodic law.”18 
The periodic table passed the test and this led to the version of the periodic table that is 
familiar to many people: the one with eight groups. (Scerri E. , 2007, p. 151 etseq.) 
6.1.2 20th  and 21st century  
Since Henry Mosely, the periodic table is no longer ordened according to atomic weight, 
but by atomic number. Moseley concluded from spectrometric research that certain 
radioactive characteristics correlated with the atomic number, but not the atomic mass. 
Therefore he proposed the atomic number as a more basal property of an element than 
the atomic mass (Moseley, 1913). In the Rutherford atomic model an atom has a nucleus 
with a positive charge equal to the total number of positive charged protons on the 
nucleus (the neutrons in the nucleus are neutral). The atom as a whole is electrically 
neutral, thus the number of positively charged protons (p) is equal to the number of 
negativily charged electrons revolving around the nucleus (e). Thus, the atomic number 
z = p = e. This new ordering principle solved certain problems with Mendeleev’s table and 
provided a more natural ordering principle.  
Let us  continue with the periodic law itself. Hettema & Kuipers call the core idea in 
such tables Mendeleev’s Periodic Law (MPL), and formulate it as follows: 
 MPL 𝑒 ~ 𝑒′  iff | 𝑧(𝑒′)|  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 8  
in which z orders the elements according to mass, with the requirement that there can 
be only one element with a specific atomic number, thus if 𝑧(𝑒) = 𝑧(𝑒′), then 𝑒 = 𝑒′ 
(1988, p. 396)19  MPL generates at least two predictions: the number of elements in 
between two chemically similar elements and the existence of similar elements at certain 
distances from a given element. This is why Mendeleev’s table had empty spaces for 
 
                                                     
18 As cited by J.R. Smith, Persistence and Periodicity, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1975, p. 460. 
Also see D. Mendeleev, An Attempt Towards a Chemical Conception of the Ether. This statement appears in the 
Russian edition of 1902 as a footnote. 
19 Isotopes form an exception to this rule: isotopes are elements with a small difference in atomic weight, but 
with identical chemical properties. This is solved when the elements are no longer ordered according to atomic 
weight but according to their atom number. See below. 
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elements that were not yet discovered.  To summarize, Mendeleev’s periodic law has four 
properties: 
(i) Ordered according to atomic weight, there is a repetition of chemical 
properties. 
(ii) There is a constant period length.  
(iii) Every period contains 8 elements. 
(iv) If there is an empty space, this predicts a yet unknown element. 
Scerri compares this to a musical scale: a returning note, denoted by the same letter, 
sounds like the original note, but is not identical to it, being an octave higher or lower 
(2007, p. 18). 
Empirical evidence shows that the periodicity, unlike notes on a Western musical scale, 
is neither constant nor exact. The length of a period varies and the elements within any 
column of the periodic table are not exact recurrences of each other. The periodic table 
as it is standardized by IUPAC20 is organized in 18 vertical groups and 7 horizontal periods. 
This systematization follows the ordering according to increasing atomic number. The 
first period contains two elements, the second and third each contain eight, the fourth 
and fifth contain eighteen and so on. This means that the original properties (ii) and (iii) 
are no longer applicable: the period length is no longer eight, and no longer constant. 
Moreover, even though there is a neat ordering according to atomic number, the visual 
representation shows a certain discontinuity: in the first, second and third period there 
are no similar elements for elements in group 3 to 12.   
This means that also the original property (iv) is no longer valid. Only the original idea 
of (i) remains, albeit in a more approximate nature21.  
  
 
                                                     
20 See https://www.iupac.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IUPAC_Periodic_Table-28Nov16.jpg (last 
accessed on 1 July 2018). 
21 The approximate nature of the periodic law could question the use of the term ‘law’. But this is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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6.1.4 Summary  
In the previous paragraphs we have shown that the notion of periodicity no longer has 
the same meaning as it did in the early days of the periodic law. The main thing that has 
been preserved is the idea of similarity in chemical properties between groups of 
elements. Now that we have clarified this, we can proceed to the next step: show that 
there are resemblance questions involved.  
6.2 Raising explanation-seeking questions 
In Mendeleev’s first table, elements with similar properties were arranged in the same 
horizontal rows. In the IUPAC periodic table these elements are vertically ordered and 
are numbered from 1 through 18. Horizontally, the atomic number z of elements increases 
from one period or row to the next. The arrangement of the elements is a visualization of 
the fact that the chemical elements exhibit a certain repetition in their properties, such 
as: 
- Elements of group 1in solid state are good electrical conductors..22 
- Elements of group 3 through 12 are very hard and have very high melting and 
boiling points, are good electrical conductors and are malleable. 
- Elements of group 18 do not form compounds and have very low boiling and 
melting points.23 
- Elements of group 17 easily form compounds with elements of group 1 and 2.24 
This systematization of chemical elements in the table has several practical uses. 
Fernelius describes the table as “the font of much chemical information” (1986, p. 263). It 
 
                                                     
22 The alkali-metals include hydrogen (H), lithium (Li), sodium (Na), potassium (K), rubidium (Rb), caesium (Cs) 
and francium (Fr).  
23 Group 18 contains the so-called “inert gases” or “noble gases”: helium (He), neon (Ne), krypton (Kr), xenon 
(Xe) and radon (Rn). 
24 Group 17 contains the so-called “Halogens”: fluorine (F), chlorine (Cl), bromine (Br), iodine (I), astatine (At) 
and tennessine (Ts) 
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is a visual representation of certain trends of element properties useful for solving 
chemical problems.  
The arrangement in the table provides information about common chemical 
characteristics, and immediately generates important explanation-seeking questions. For 
example, all the elements in group 1, also known as the alkali metals (Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs and 
Fr) have common properties, such as  
- they are good electrical conductors, 
- they have relatively low melting points, 
- they have a high reactivity, even violently with atmospheric oxygen and water, 
- they have a low density, 
- their compounds are white or colourless and 
- they are soft and cannot withstand force. 
This raises several resemblance questions, e.g.: 
Why are lithium, natrium, potassium, rubidium, caesium and francium good 
electrical conductors? 
Why do lithium, natrium, potassium, rubidium, caesium and francium have low 
melting points? 
Similar questions arise in other groups, e.g.: 
Why are helium, neon, krypton, xenon and radon not found in compounds? 
Why do titanium, zirconium, hafnium and rutherfordium have very high melting 
points? 
These explanation-seeking questions focus on the common factors in certain regularities, 
chemical properties in this context. These resemblance questions fit into the following 
general format: 
Why do the elements in group X have the properties X1, X2, X3,….Xn? 
Before we can investigate what kind of unification is present here (cfr. second till fourth 
aim of this chapter) we have to know what the explanations look like. 
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6.3 How to answer the explanation-seeking questions raised 
by the systematization? 
6.3.1 The electron and the quantum mechanical explanation 
The successful systematization of the chemical elements in the periodic table begs for an 
explanation:  
Although the periodic table was an outgrowth of Mendeleev’s periodic law 
formulated in 1869, this early grouping of elements with similar properties was 
done empirically, just by seeing how the material behaved. The odd shape of the 
periodic table, however, simply begs for an explanation, and quantum mechanics 
has given it. (Kelter, Mosher, & Scott, 2009, p. 250) 
Although Mendeleev remained opposed to an explanation in terms of atomic structure, 
the traditional explanation for the periodic system invokes electron configurations. J.J. 
Thomson’s discovery of the electron in 1887 gave him a place in the annals of physics, but 
he also put forward the first explanation of the periodic table in terms of electrons. Even 
today, most physicists and chemists believe that the electron holds the key to 
understanding the periodic table. In fact, it is not the odd shape that is explained by 
quantum mechanics25. The atom models explain the many regularities that have been 
empirically discovered for the groups (vertical columns) and series (horizontal rows) of 
the table (see the examples in section 6.2). 
A core idea of the contemporary model of atoms is that they consist of a dense 
positively charged nucleus and electrons that are clustered around this nucleus. We owe 
this idea to Ernest Rutherford’s work in 1909-1911. Another core idea of Rutherford, viz. 
that the electrons revolve around the nucleus like planets around the sun, did not survive. 
In the quantum mechanical models, the behavior of electrons is characterized mainly in 
terms of orbitals. Given the indeterministic nature of quantum mechanics, it is impossible 
to predict the exact location of an electron. However, one can determine a spatial region 
in which the electron is present with a certain probability (e.g. a region in which the 
 
                                                     
25 For a detailed technical discussion on the quantum mechanical explanation, see Philips 2003 chapters 9 to 
11). 
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electron is present with 0.9 probability, i.e. a region in which the electron is present 90% 
of the time). Such regions are called orbitals. Each electron occupies an orbital and there 
can be no more than two electrons in the same orbital. 
Orbitals have certain properties. Thus, by saying that an electron occupies an orbital, 
we say something about where the electron is: 
- Each orbital has an energy level, determined by the principal quantum 
number (the energy level is the most probable distance of the electron(s) in 
the orbital to the nucleus); 
- Each orbital also has a shape determined by the angular momentum 
quantum number; 
- Each orbital also has a spatial orientation, determined by the magnetic 
quantum number. 
Energy levels are denoted by natural numbers (1,2, 3,…) while the shapes of the orbitals 
are denoted as s, p, d and f.  
According to the quantum mechanical picture, atoms have a shell structure. The first 
shell is at energy level 1 and has only one, s-shaped orbital. So the first shell can contain 
no more than two electrons. The second shell is at energy level 2; it has one s-shaped 
orbital and three p-shaped orbitals. The latter have a different spatial orientation 
(determined by the third quantum number). It can contain 8 electrons. Each atom has a 
so-called electron configuration. This configuration tells us which shells are (partially or 
fully) filled and which shells are empty. And it also tells us how the shells are filled (which 
orbitals). For instance, the configuration of hydrogen atoms is 1s, which mean that they 
have one electron in the s-shaped orbital of level 1 and nothing at higher levels. The 
configuration of helium atoms is 1s², which means that they have two electrons in that 
orbital and nothing elsewhere. The configuration of lithium is 1s²2s, which means that 
the first shell is filled (like helium), that there is one electron in the s-orbital of energy 
level 2, and nothing in the p-shaped orbitals of level 2 or at higher levels. 
The electron configuration obeys the following principles: 
a) the Aufbau principle states that as protons are added to the nucleus, electrons 
are successively added to orbitals of increasing energy, beginning with the 
lowest-energy orbitals. This rule is often accompanied by a diagram like the 
one shown in figure 3, which represents the Madelung or n + l rule. 
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b) Hund’s rule which states that when electrons fill orbitals of equal energies, 
they occupy as many different orbitals as possible. 
c) the Pauli exclusion principle which states that only two electrons can occupy a 
single orbital, and if they do so, they have opposite spins (spin up and spin 
down respectively, the fourth quantum number).  
 
Figure 3 Madelung (or n + l rule) for the order of filling of orbitals  
(Chang, 2000, p. 601). 
 
 
The electron configuration allows us to explain some of the regularities mentioned in 
Section 6.2: 
- The elements of group 1 have a single electron in the highest energy level; 
the rest of the configuration is like that of the preceding inert gas. This 
outlying electron is relatively free to move about. This explains their 
conductivity. 
- The elements of group 18 are atoms with a closed-shell structure: their outer 
shell is completely filled. As a result, these atoms are difficult to excite, they 
are non-reactive. 
- The elements of group 17 need only one more electron to form a closed shell. 
Since the acquisition of an extra electron is energetically favourable, these 
atoms are very reactive. And they can obtain the required electron easily 
from elements of group 1, since these have outlying electrons. 
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6.3.2 Critique on QM explanation 
There are several issues with the quantum mechanical explanation of the systematization 
of chemical elements. First, Eric Scerri argues that probability-based orbitals do not exist 
according to quantum mechanics (1997, p. 549). The explanation in terms of electronic 
configuration and the number of outer-shell electrons an atom possesses is at best an 
approximate explanation. Second, in the most-used formats of the periodic table, every 
period ends with a noble gas, an atom with a closed shell structure. There is no strict 
quantum mechanical explanation for this. The reason why a period closes at the known 
noble gases is an empirical matter. In chapter 9 of his book Scerri demonstrates that Niels 
Bohr did not deduce electron configurations from physical principles, but he was working 
backward from chemical and spectroscopic facts. The claim that the periodic table is 
deductively explained by quantum mechanics is therefore problematic: 
A feature that seems to generally go unnoticed is the need to assume the empirical 
order of shell filling rather than trying to derive it from the theory. The order in 
which orbitals are occupied with electrons is not derived from first principles. It is 
justified post facto and by some complex calculations. (Scerri, 2007, p. 237) 
The three principles for electronic configuration as mentioned in 6.3.1. are essentially 
empirical, they are not derived from the principles of quantum mechanics. These 
principles summarize the knowledge from empirical data on atomic spectra. There are 
plenty of examples where the electronic configuration of an atom does not strictly follow 
the principles. For instance the element potassium. The configuration of the preceding 
element argon is 1s², 2s², 2p6, 3s², 3p6. The expected configuration for potassium would 
thus be 1s², 2s², 2p6, 3s², 3p6, 3d1 according to the pattern that the next electron should be 
added at the next available orbital at increasing distances from the nucleus (Hund’s rule). 
Empirical evidence shows a different configuration for potassium: 1s², 2s², 2p6, 3s², 4s1. In 
the next element calcium the new electron also occupies a space in the 4s orbital, but in 
element 21, scandium, the orbital energies have reversed, giving the 3d orbital a lower 
energy. (Scerri, 2007, pp. 234-235). 
Furthermore, having a particular electronic configuration is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition to belong to the same group within the periodic system. Nickel, 
palladium and platinum belong to group 10 but each shows a different outer-shell 
configuration. They are grouped together because of similar chemical properties. Helium, 
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beryllium and magnesium on the other hand do share the same outer-shell structure of 
two electrons, yet they do not fall into the same group.  
Nevertheless, the QM explanation of the systematization of chemical elements is 
considered as an explanation in science (e.g. Ostrovsky 2001 and 2006,  Schwarz & Rich 
2010), even by its critics (e.g. Scerri 1998,  Anderson, Gomatam, & Behera, 2014).  
6.3.3 Summary and preview 
In section 6.2 we showed that the systematization of chemical properties in the periodic 
table raises the type of explanation-seeking questions that came into the focus of this 
dissertation. In this section we clarified what the QM explanations look like. We are now 
ready to start the philosophical analysis. It will be argued that these explanations are not 
an instance of causal network unification (6.4) nor of mechanism unification (6.5). Since 
the mechanistic and the interventionist account of causal explanations do not fit what 
happens in the QM explanation, the question arises whether QM provides any causal 
explanation at all. In section 6.6 I will argue that QM models provide structural 
explanations. If structural explanations exist, then a kind of ontological unification that 
is based on those structural explanations becomes a possibility. I will call this structural 
unification (6.7).  
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6.4 The QM explanations do not use causal network 
unification 
Let us investigate whether the QM explanations are an instance of causal network 
unification. 
Consider the following resemblance question: 
Why are helium, neon, krypton, xenon and radon not found in compounds? 
The general format of this question is the following: 
(A) Why do objects of type A, B, C, … have property X? 
This format is different from the resemblance question from Chapter 3 about the three 
social revolutions.  
There we had: 
(B) Why do objects a, b, c, … have property X? 
Although these questions appear to be very similar, they are not. In question (A) the 
explanandum is a similarity about a capacity, e.g. conductivity, being a compound (or 
not), etc.  In question (B), as seen in Chapter 3, the explanandum is a similarity between 
events. 
There is a second difference. To provide causal network unification (as in Chapter 3), 
positive or negative causal factors need to be determined that are present in the causal 
ancestry of all objects (organisms or populations). Remember the general format of an 
explanation that results from an act of causal network unification: 
X is a positive causal factor for E. 
Y is a positive causal factor for E. 
Z is a positive causal factor for E. 
… 
Object a has X, Y, Z, …  
Object b has X, Y, Z, …  
Object c has X, Y, Z …  
… 
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Thus, objects a, b and c have property E.  
The causal factors X, Y and Z are present in the causal ancestry of the objects. This means 
that these factors make a difference and if one intervenes on a cause X it would lead to a 
change in the effect Y.  
QM models provide synchronic explanations. The state of a compound (e.g. 
conductivity of an atom) at time t is explained by the state of the constituents (electron 
configuration) at the same time t.  The fact that QM models describe synchronic relations 
implies that they do not give information about the causal ancestry of the phenomenon. 
No causal process or causal trajectory is described. Causal network unification was 
characterized in a way that excludes synchronicity: in causal network unification “one 
causal network is presented and applied to two or more events to point out the common 
causal factors that are present in the causal ancestry of all events we consider” (section 
3.7). Because of the synchronic nature of QM models, they do not meet this requirement 
and are not an instance of causal network unification. The notion of causal ancestry is 
crucial in the latter.  
 One could argue that the criterion of causal ancestry is too strict, and that there is 
some other type of causal unification. But what could function as a causal factor in this 
case? The interventionist account of causation, as proposed by Woodward (2003) 
maintains that causes are factors that make a difference. This means that if intervenes on 
a cause X, it would lead to a change in the effect Y. This also means that a cause X should 
be able to take at least two values (theoretically). Furthermore, it must be clear how cause 
X is connected to effect Y, the causal relation needs to be identified.  
Lauren Ross (2017) claims that the QM explanation of the periodicity and group trends 
are causal explanations. The atomic features of an element serve as causes, according to 
Ross, since “changes in these features produce changes in these properties” (Ross, 2017, 
p. 11). If one were to intervene in the electron configuration of an element, this would 
produce changes in the properties of that element.  
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Figure 4 Blocks of the periodic table (Ross, 2017, p. 12) 
 
Based on the work of Charles Janet the chemical elements in the periodic table can be 
seen in blocks. Each element in such a block has the same atomic orbital type. The 
ordering by increasing atomic number also shows a periodic pattern in valence electron 
configuration according to the Mandelung rule (figure 3). Elements in the s-block have 
valence electrons in s-orbitals, elements in the p-block have valence electrons in p-
orbitals etc. Each orbital is progressively filled across a period (vertical column), and the 
position in the block tells us how many electrons occupy the respective orbital. For 
instance, an element in the first position of the p-block, has a single valence electron in 
the p-orbital.  
If the electron configuration is the cause of certain chemical properties of an element, 
experiments should be able to explicate the causal relation between both. It is indeed so 
that experiments show that atomic alterations can cause changes in the chemical and 
physical properties of a substance, and result in the transmutation of one element into 
another. Rutherford succeeded in converting nitrogen into oxygen through alpha 
particle bombardment (Rutherford and Soddy 1903). These bombarding techniques led to 
the synthesis of new elements (lantanides and actinides).  
Now, this all seems to add up for individual elements, but what about the initial 
resemblance question about groups in the periodic table: 
Why do objects of type A, B, C, … have property X? 
Is there a common causal structure that can be invoked to explain the similarity of the 
elements? As seen in section 6.3.2, there are several problems with the QM explanation, 
especially when it is treated as a causal, interventionist explanation. If the electron 
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configuration functions as a causal explanation, it should be possible to predict which 
configurations relate to particular properties and to predict where chemical properties 
recur in the periodic table.  In 6.3.2. it was made clear that the electron configurations 
and the periodicity were often discovered empirically, not by uncovering a causal 
structure. 
Neither is it the case that resemblance questions as mentioned before can be answered 
by uncovering a common causal structure in terms of electron configuration. The Aufbau 
principle has no less than 20 exceptions (Scerri, 1998). Having a specific electronic 
configuration is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to belong to the same group 
within the periodic system (see examples in 6.3.2.).  
Even if the electron configuration is the key to understanding the properties of an 
individual chemical element, it can be doubted if this happens in a causal way. 
Furthermore, it does not explain the periodicity of those properties. Therefore, a 
satisfactory answer to the resemblance question at hand is not a type of causal network 
unification.  
6.5 The QM explanations do not use not mechanism 
unification 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Consider the following question:  
Why are lithium, natrium, potassium, rubidium, caesium and francium good 
electrical conductors? 
If we treat this question as a request for mechanism unification, we get: 
What are the common features of the mechanisms which respectively make lithium, 
natrium, potassium, rubidium, caesium and francium good electrical conductors? 
The main point I want to make in this section is that this is not a viable interpretation, 
because there are no such mechanisms. One cannot give a mechanistic explanation of the 
regularity that makes Lithium a good electrical conductor, because there is no known 
mechanism that produces this conductivity. The same holds for Natrium and the other 
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elements of Group 1. Since there are no mechanisms, there can be no mechanism 
unification. 
In Sections 6.5.2 till 6.5.3 I argue that, while the quantum mechanical explanations are 
clearly bottom-up explanations, they are not mechanistic explanations in the way the 
latter are usually understood. Bottom-up explanations are explanations that invoke 
entities at a lower level (compared to the level at which the explanandum phenomenon 
is situated). The quantum mechanical explanations described in Section 6.3 are clearly 
bottom-up explanations in this sense: they involve decomposing atoms into nuclei and 
electrons, and thus invoke entities at a lower level. However, as we will see in Section 
6.5.2, mechanistic explanations are usually thought of as a species of causal explanations. 
In Section 6.5.3 I show that this implies that the quantum mechanistic explanations of 
chemical properties cannot be seen as mechanistic explanations. 
6.5.2 Mechanistic explanations as a species of causal explanations 
The causal nature of mechanistic explanation is clearly explicated by Stuart Glennan – 
one of the leading philosophers favouring a mechanistic approach to scientific 
explanations – in a recent joint paper with Meinhard Kuhlman. They write:  
One way to summarize the mechanistic consensus is this: Mechanisms consist of 
parts (entities, components) that are so organized that the activities and 
interactions of these entities are productive of a phenomenon. (Kuhlman & Glennan 
2014, p. 339) 
They do not define what a mechanistic explanation is. Like most mechanistic 
philosophers, they focus on defining and clarifying what a mechanism is: for my purposes, 
it is good to also have a definition of what a mechanistic explanation is. The  definition I 
propose is: 
A mechanistic explanation for a phenomenon is an explanation in which the 
explanans describes the mechanism that produces this phenomenon. 
This is a static characterisation. From a dynamic point of view, mechanistic explanations 
can be characterised as follows: 
All mechanistic explanations begin with (a) the identification of a phenomenon or 
some phenomena to be explained, (b) proceed by decomposition into the entities 
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and activities relevant to the phenomenon, and (c) give the organization of entities 
and activities by which they produce the phenomenon. (Illari & Williamson, 2012, 
p. 123) 
This is a dynamic characterization which tells us how mechanistic explanations are 
construed. It fits perfectly with the definition of the end product and the definition of 
mechanisms given by Kuhlman & Glennan. 
Kuhlman & Glennan discuss four important features of mechanisms and mechanistic 
explanations. The second feature is important for us here: 
A second feature of the New Mechanist consensus is the idea that phenomena 
exhibited by the mechanisms are produced by the activities and interactions of 
parts. The terms ‘activity’, ‘interaction’, and ‘produce’ are all transparently causal. 
If the activities and interactions are not genuinely causal, then mechanism can’t 
produce anything. Mechanistic explanation is a species of causal explanation and 
the legitimacy of mechanistic explanation depends upon the interactions between 
parts being genuinely causal. (2014, p. 339; italics in original)  
I will use this feature in 6.5.3. The third feature they mention is also important for me:  
A third feature of the New Mechanist consensus is its focus on organization. It is the 
organization of the entities (and their activities) that allows the mechanism to 
produce the phenomenon that it does. A pile of lawnmower parts does not [make] 
a lawnmower. While mechanists emphasize the importance of spatial and temporal 
organization, it is ultimately the causal organization upon which the productive 
capacities of the mechanism depend. (2014, pp. 340-341) 
This feature will also be used in 6.5.3. 
6.5.3 Application 
The quantum mechanical explanations invoke entities at a lower level: they involve 
decomposing atoms into nuclei and electrons. These elements have a strict, orderly 
organisation: the characteristic electron configuration of each type of atom.  
A first potential trouble lies with the activities. Being located in an orbital is a property 
but it is debatable whether it is an activity: nothing is ‘done’. ‘Being there’ is, it seems, a 
passive property rather than an activity.  
 120 
Secondly, in a mechanistic explanation the causal organization is essential to the 
explanation:  
To clarify the role or organization in mechanisms, consider as a brief example the 
mechanism for starting a lawnmower engine. The engine is started by rapidly 
pulling a cord while the throttle is set to an appropriate level. The cord is attached 
to a flywheel which in turn engages a clutch which causes the crank shaft to move, 
which in turn moves the piston, allowing air and fuel into the cylinder. The flywheel 
is also connected to a magneto—a device which uses the rotation of magnets to 
generate a voltage. The magneto is attached to the sparkplug which produces the 
spark that ignites the fuel-air mixture in the piston. The production of the 
phenomenon (namely the starting of the mower) depends essentially on organization. 
The parts must be spatially organized so that the same part—the flywheel—may 
simultaneously engage the clutch and turn the magneto. Timing is also essential 
here. The parts must be so organized that the spark generated by the spark plug 
enters the cylinder at the correct time in the piston’s cycle. These spatial and temporal 
arrangements determine the causal organization of the system. (Kuhlman & Glennan, 
2014, p. 341; emphasis added) 
Even though the chemical elements have a strict, orderly organization, i.e.: the 
characteristic electron configuration of each type of atom, this is not a ‘causal 
organization’. The spatial organization is not connected to any causal interaction that 
there may be between the electrons. For instance, it is certainly not the case that only 
electrons within the same orbital can have an influence on each other’s behaviour.  
6.6 Why the QM-models are explanatory 
Since the mechanistic, the causal-interventionist and the causal ancestry account of 
explanations do not fit what happens in the QM explanation, the question arises whether 
QM provides any causal explanation at all. In the literature it appears that there is no 
consensus about whether or not quantum mechanics is compatible with our views on 
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causality26. Instead of arguing that QM-models are causal explanations or non-causal 
explanation, I would like to start from the question: if QM models are not causal, can they 
still be explanatory? 
In order to answer this question, I focus on plain explanation-seeking questions, for 
instance: 
Why is lithium a good electrical conductor? 
I will come back to the resemblance questions in 6.7. 
The QM-model answers this question by referring to the electron configuration: 
The good electric conductivity of lithium physically depends on its electron 
configuration, viz. 1s²2s. 
One might argue that this is an example of purely derivational unification, but it is not. 
On the contrary, I will argue that it is purely ontological.  
First, the chemical properties cannot be directly derived from the electron 
configuration. As seen in section 6.3.: 
There is a problem with the claim that the periodic table is deductively explained 
by quantum mechanics. A feature that seems to generally go unnoticed is the need 
to assume the empirical order of shell ﬁlling rather than trying to derive it from the 
theory. The order in which orbitals are occupied with electrons is not derived from 
ﬁrst principles. It is justiﬁed post facto and by some complex calculations. (Scerri, 
2007, p. 237) 
That the QM models do not provide a full deductive account, might be a problem for 
physics, but it does not need to be a problem for the explanatory status of QM-models. 
Deductive information can be relevant in certain explanations, but it is not what makes 
an explanation explanatory. As I have written in Chapter 5, it is the mirroring of deductive 
relations to physical dependency relations that make a derivation explanatory. 
Dependencies always guide us towards explanations, derivations do not.  (Woodward, 
2003, p. 203). 
 
                                                     
26 For some interesting papers about this topic I refer to Brukner, 2014; Plotnitsky, 2010;  Riggs, 2009;  Ringbauer 
et al 2016 and Winter, 2017. 
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The idea is that these derivations trace or mirror the relations of physical 
dependency that hold between the explanans conditions and the explananda 
phenomena-relations that would be revealed if, for example, we were to physically 
intervene to alter the explanans conditions. (2003, p. 201) 
Throughout the dissertation I have used this criterion of representing physical 
dependency relations as the demarcation between an explanation and a description that 
is non-explanatory. Nowhere in Woodward’s criterion is the condition that these 
relations need to be causal: 
The underlying or unifying idea in the notion of causal explanation is the idea that 
an explanation must answer a what-if-things-had-been-different question, or 
exhibit information about a pattern of dependency. (2003, p. 201; italics added) 
Causality is not a criterion for the representation of physical dependency relations, it is 
the other way around. If we accept that the QM models mirror such physical dependency 
relations, they can be classified as explanatory according to Woodward’s view. More 
generally, in order to accept QM derivations as explanations we have to accept claims of 
the following format: 
Chemical property X of atoms of type Y physically depends on their typical electron 
configuration.  
The constituents that form the base of the QM explanation of the periodic law, the 
electrons, obey three organizational principles: the Aufbau principle (Mandelung rule), 
Hund’s rule and the Pauli Exclusion Principle.  These principles can be seen as pure 
mathematical rules. For instance, the Pauli Exclusion Principle can be formulated as: no 
two electrons can have four identical quantum numbers. Usually the principle is 
formulated making also an ontological claim such as: no two electrons can 
simultaneously occupy the same quantum state with respect to orbital and spin. Concepts 
such as ‘occupy’, ‘quantum state’ and ‘orbital spin’ suggest more than pure mathematical 
constraints of behavior. They tell us something about how electrons can behave, about 
certain characteristics they may have. Quantum mechanics not only provides useful 
mathematical tools but also makes ontological claims: 
Quantum mechanics neatly accommodates the existence of particles that are 
indistinguishable in principle: we simply construct a wave function that is 
noncommittal as to which particle is in which state. […] This is the famous Pauli 
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exclusion principle. It is not (as you may have been led to believe) a weird ad hoc 
assumption applying only to electrons, but rather a consequence of the rules for 
constructing two-particle wave functions, applying to all identical fermions.  
(Griffiths, 2005, p. 204)  
Quantum mechanics does tell us something about relations of physical dependency. 
However, section 6.4 and 6.5 suggest that if there is such a physical dependency, it is a bit 
spooky: it is not causal dependence (unlike what is the case in causal network unification 
and mechanism unification) and it does not supervene on causal relation (unlike what is 
the case in optimality explanations). So, in line with the idea that physical dependencies 
can be non-causal, I define structural explanations as follows: 
An explanation is structural if and only if the explanandum physically depends, in 
a non-causal way, on the micro-structure described in the explanans. 
With this definition in place, the derivations from the QM models may be called structural 
explanations. 
Some people may say that structural explanations as I define them cannot exist, 
because they reject the idea of “physical dependency in a non-causal way” as spooky 
metaphysics. In their view all physical dependency relations are causal or supervene on 
causal relations. If the QM-models are non-causal, they would consider them as non-
explanatory.   
6.7 The QM explanations provide structural unification 
This section is meant for those readers who accept the idea that physical dependency 
relations that do not supervene on causal relations exist. If structural explanations exist, 
then a kind of ontological unification that is based on those structural explanations 
becomes possible. 
I define structural unification as follows: 
Structural unification consists in the act of answering a resemblance question by 
identifying crucial common features in a given set of structural explanations. 
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Note that this presupposes that you have a set of structural explanations. Hence, if the 
QM models do not provide structural explanations, they do not provide structural 
unification.  The notion of structural explanations means that the explanandum 
physically depends on the micro-structure described in the explanans, in a non-causal 
way. 
Consider the following example: 
Why are lithium, natrium, potassium, rubidium, caesium and francium good 
electrical conductors? 
The answer is: 
They all have a single electron in the highest energy level; the rest of the 
configuration is like that of the preceding inert gas. 
The unifying explanation in this answer refers back to common features in the set of 
structural explanations of those elements: they all have a single electron in the highest 
energy level.  
The notion of structural unification means that a resemblance question is answered by 
identifying common features in a given set of structural explanations. The idea that there 
is a more fundamental structure showing how disconnected phenomena are only 
apparently disconnected, but are manifestations of one and the same structure is 
structural unification. This is not purely derivational unification, but a matter of 
successfully representing how things are physically dependent upon one another in the 
world. In this section I claimed it is possible to have an explanation that is based on 
physical dependency relations that do not supervene on causal relations. Furthermore, 
answering resemblance questions by referring to the similarities in those non-causal 
physical dependency relations, is a new kind of ontological unification.  This kind of non-
causal ontological unification is structural unification. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this sixth chapter a form of unification that is non-causal was found by studying the 
QM explanation of the periodic law. In sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 the necessary background 
information was given: the development of the periodic law, how this systematization is 
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both an explanans and an explanandum and how the periodic law is explained by 
referring to quantum mechanics and electron configurations. As an explanandum the 
periodic law raises several resemblance questions and thus some form of unification is 
required to answer those questions.  
In sections 6.4 and 6.5 previous types of unification were considered, but neither causal 
network unification nor mechanism unification was applicable. In 6.6 it was argued that 
if QM-models are not causal, it can still be accepted that they are explanatory, since they 
provide structural explanations. In 6.7 I argued that if such structural explanations are 
possible, there is also a kind of ontological unification that is based on the common 
features in these structures. In my view the QM explanation for the resemblance 
questions is a genuine explanation based on structural unification. This form of 
unification is still ontological, because it is based on physical dependencies, even if those 
dependencies do not supervene on causal relations.  
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Part III 
Further reflections and conclusions 
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Introduction to Part III 
This third and final part of my dissertation contains some further reflections and 
conclusions. During the course of this research I have experienced how the philosophy of 
explanation is dominated by accounts of causal explanation. Explanatory unification is 
often considered old-fashioned. However, last year, there was one person, Sorin Bangu, 
who wrote a paper about unification. The goal of his paper is similar to this dissertation: 
rethinking unification and bringing it back into the picture.  In Chapter 7 I will compare 
his approach to mine.  
In the final chapter I will formulate my primary results, and I will elaborate on their 
implications for thinking about unification and explanation. The reader may have noticed 
that my approach to explanation is as disunified as my approach to unification itself. The 
different forms of ontological unification were quite diverse. This relates to the method I 
have used. Throughout this dissertation the types of unification that were discussed 
emerged from digging into scientific practice. During the research for this dissertation I 
could explore topics from a variety of scientific fields. This philosophy-of-science-in-
practice approach steered me towards a pluralistic view on unification and on 
explanation.  
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Chapter 7  
Unification in the current philosophical literature 
In 2017 the European Journal for Philosophy of Science published a paper by Sorin Bangu: 
‘Scientific explanation and understanding: unificationism reconsidered’. At first, I was 
enthusiastic to read that the aim of the paper was to revive unificationism by revision of 
its doctrines. Finally, I found someone with a similar research interest. 
In section 7.1 I will explain how Bangu rethinks unification by adding an ontological 
constraint.  In section 7.2 I will clarify why my enthusiasm was short-lived. 
7.1 Unificationism reconsidered by Sorin Bangu 
Bangu rightly diagnoses that unification in its classical form is flawed (2017, p. 104). By 
making the notion of unification more precise and replacing it with what he calls 
‘ontological-reductive’ unification, he hopes to reconnect unification with explanation 
and understanding (2017, p. 104). Bangu uncovers two assumptions about unification: 
explanations provide understanding, and understanding is achieved through unification. 
The nature of understanding and the relation between explanations and understanding 
does not need to be problematized for the purpose of this section27. It is the relation 
between unification and explanation that deserves our attention. Bangu states that 
 
                                                     
27 For more on the nature of understanding and the historical variation of criteria for understanding in 
science I refer to the work of Henk de Regt (2009) (2017).  
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explanation is an ordered triple [EXS, d, EXD] consisting in the phenomenon to explain 
(i.e., the explanandum, abbreviated as EXD), the assumptions made when explaining (the 
explanans, EXS), and a dependence relation d, which makes explicit how EXS and EXD are 
connected (2017, pp. 105-106). Schematically this looks like this:  
EXS |                EXD 
In order for the explanandum to be explained, the explanans needs to be identified and 
the relation d is specified (2017, p. 106). One way to fill in the dependence relation is 
Hempel’s deductive-nomological model. But as seen in 1.2.2 this led to several problems. 
Bangu analyzes unification approaches to explaining by distinguishing two strategies. 
The first strategy adds a third condition to the criteria for an explanandum to be 
explained. This third condition constrains the explanans. Schurz and Lambert fit this 
strategy, since they require that the explanans is in less need of an explanation than the 
explanandum (Schurz, 1999, p. 97) (Schurz & Lambert, 1994, p. 105). Another way to fill in 
this strategy condition is the requirement that the explanans is the cause of the 
explanandum. Also Friedman’s account of unification (1974) fits this first strategy, 
according to Bangu, since the explanans must be “more comprehensive” (Friedman, 1974, p. 
19; italics in original). The explanans should not only enable us to derive the 
explanandum but other phenomena as well. The requirement that is added by Friedman 
is that the explanans needs to be a unifier (Bangu calls this UEXS). 
A second strategy does not constrain the explanans but the appropriate dependence 
relations. This is what Kitcher (1981) does by claiming an explanandum is explained if it 
can be derived from an argument pattern.  This dependence relation, or argument pattern 
in Kitcher’s terminology, is further limited with requirements such as the size of the 
conclusion set, the number of and similarity of argument patterns and the stringency of 
those patterns. Just as with Friedman’s strategy this is an objective criterion, because it is 
measurable.  
Bangu schematizes Friedman’s and Kitcher’s views on unification as follows: 
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Figure 5 Schematic representation of two strategies of unification by Bangu (2017, p.111 and 
p. 114). Diagram f presents unification according to Friedman (1974), diagram k presents the 
Kitcher-style unification (1981). 
 
 
According to Bangu both types of unification have their merits. Friedman-style 
unification increases understanding by reducing the number of brute phenomena. 
Kitcher-style unification reduces the number of dependence relations. But both 
approaches see understanding as a global feature. According to Bangu neither approach 
provides a satisfactory answer to how our understanding of individual phenomena is 
increased when we derive it from a unifier or by using an argument pattern (2017, pp. 
113, 116).   Bangu tries to do better. He considers the Newtonian mechanical framework 
and its capacity to derive Kepler’s and Galileo’s mechanical results and the combined gas 
law to show how unificationist accounts can enable us to give better descriptions of 
individual explananda. The unifying descriptions are better because the explanandum is 
conceptually enhanced: 
That is, the unifier UEXS, once identified, does not leave the descriptions of the 
phenomena to be unified unchanged, but unifies while re-describing (and/or 
correcting). Thus, the key-question to which the standard unificationist didn’t have 
an answer—how is our understanding of an individual phenomenon increased 
when we derive it from a unifier?—now receives one: we can claim a better 
understanding of an individual explanandum because of our capacity to provide a 
conceptually enhanced description of it.  (Bangu, 2017, p. 118)  
Unifying explanations redescribe the phenomena that were in need of explanation by 
introducing a different ontology than that of the explanandum before the unifying 
explanation. For instance, an atom in group I of the periodic table is no longer just an 
atom, but a conglomerate of neurons, protons and electrons that behave in a specific way. 
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Bangu concludes that genuine unification is ontological-reductive: it assumes a sparser 
ontology than the ontology of the phenomenon/-a derived from it.  
Summarized, for Bangu a phenomenon is explained if and only if: 
(i) an ontologically-reductive unifier explanans is identified, and 
(ii) the way in which this explanans ensures the phenomenon arises is 
presented. (2017, p. 123) 
This means that an explanation needs to unify the explanandum and the explanans, by 
showing that the explanandum can be derived from the explanans. (This limits the 
dependence relation between EXD and EXS.) Furthermore, the unification needs to be 
ontological-reductive: the explanandum needs to be redescribed in a sparser ontology 
than before the explanantion. (This limits the EXS.) 
Unfortunately, there is a high price to pay: genuine unification is difficult and hard to 
get28.  But, if it is reached, this genuine unification is superior to causal explanations, 
according to Bangu: it provides both local and global understanding (2017, p. 124).  
7.2 Problems for Bangu’s proposal 
There are several reasons why my enthusiasm of Bangu’s paper was premature. In 
Bangu’s definition an explanation is triple of an explandum, an explanans and a 
dependence relation between both of them.  
My first problem relates to the first part of his strategy to grasp genuine explanations: 
constraining the explanans. Bangu argues that an explanans has to be an ontological-
reductive unifier. However, this position ignores cases where the explanans does not have 
to be a unifier. Scientists solve problems in different explanation-seeking contexts. There 
are contexts in which unification is completely irrelevant for explanation. Weber & Van 
Bouwel 2009 et al. argue convincingly that there are explanation-seeking contexts in 
 
                                                     
28 For instance, in a footnote on page 123 Bangu acknowledges that as a consequence of his view Maxwell’s 
unification of electromagnetism should not be considered as genuine unification. 
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which the sole aim of the explanation is uncovering causal relations between the 
explanans and the explanandum. 
A second problem is related to the dependence relation between the explanans and the 
explanandum. Bangu remains vague about the dependence relation, as mentioned in his 
second criterion of explanation:  “the way in which this explanans ensures the phenomenon 
arises is presented.” (2017, p.123).  According to a footnote on p.110 the nature of the 
dependence relation is ultimately left open. But how open can a dependence relation 
really be if ontological reduction is required? It seems to me that this requirement 
unnecessarily constrains both the nature of unification and the nature of explanation. 
Even if we restrict ourselves to contexts where unification is the aim of an explanation 
his criterion is still too limited. Let us compare two examples to show this. 
Remember these resemblance questions:  
A. Why was there a revolution in Bourbon France, Manchu China and in 
Romanov Russia? (Chapter 3) 
B. Why do all dung flies copulate for approximately 36 minutes? Why is there 
so little variation? Why do they all behave more or less the same? (Chapter 
5) 
Question A was answered by showing that all three revolutions had common causal 
factors. Both Bourbon France, Manchu China and Romanov Russia state’s repressive 
capacity was weakened due to a fiscal crisis because of large military expenses. They all 
had a strong sense of community among peasants. Nowhere is it claimed that the 
phenomena can be reduced to these common causal factors. Although the revolutions 
were similar, they are not the same. The causal ancestries of the three revolutions are not 
identical. The revolutions cannot be reduced to their common causal factors. The 
dependence relation between the explanandum (the three revolutions) and the 
explanans (the common causal factors) is one of causal network unification: ontological, 
causal but non-reductive. 
Question B was answered by constructing an optimality model to show how copulating 
time of 36 minutes is an optimal strategy to maximise the number of eggs fertilized per 
time unit. In order to work optimality models need to use a number of idealizing 
assumptions such as an infinite population, randomized mating, the inheritance of 
copulating strategies. All the dynamics, thus the causal factors that make dung flies 
copulate for 36 minutes, are left out of the model. Tradeoffs are not causal relationships 
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between values: ‘average fertilization rates’ does not cause ‘copulating time’.  Similarly, 
the explanandum is not ontologically reduced to the explanans. An optimality model does 
not give a new ontological description of the phenomenon so that it can be reduced to 
this new level, but it exhibits a physical dependency between populations, population 
level traits, the environment, fitness and selection. The dependence relation between the 
explanandum (copulating time) and the explanans (optimality model) is one of physical 
dependency unification: this is a form of ontological and non-reductive unification29.  
The two of the examples used earlier in this dissertation show that unification often is 
non-reductive in the sense that Bangu requires.  
7.3 Conclusion 
The value of Bangu’s paper is that he attempts to bring unification back into the picture 
and that he does this in an ‘ontological way’.  However, they are problems, as clarified in 
7.2. The first problem that I have mentioned there relates to Bangu’s monism about 
explanation (all explanations have to be unificatory). The second problem relates to 
Bangu’s monism about unification (unification is always ontological-reductive). In 
Chapter 8, I discuss the implications of the view that I have developed throughout this 
dissertation. I am a pluralist about explanation and a pluralist about unification. This is 
another way to understand my disagreement with Bangu.  
 
 
 
                                                     
29 The nature of unification in optimality models is also derivational, the equilibrium state is mathematically 
derived from the trade-off relations and the constraints. But the equilibrium state cannot be reduced to those 
trade-offs and constraints. 
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Chapter 8  
General conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, it is time to take stock and to summarize the main results of this 
dissertation. The main goal defined in the general introduction was to bring unification 
back into the picture by rethinking the concept. To reach this aim I have followed a new 
strategy: looking for ontological unification in scientific practice. 
The primary results that I have reached by means of this new strategy are: 
(1) Causal network unification exists. I have analyzed how it works and shown why it 
is important.  
(2) Mechanism unification exists. I have analyzed how it works and shown why it is 
important. 
(3) Physical dependency unification exists. I have analyzed how it works and shown 
why it is important. 
(4) Structural unification exists. I have analyzed how it works and shown why it is 
important. 
These primary results have two important implications:  
1) I am a pluralist about the nature of unification.  
2) I am a pluralist about the nature of explanation. 
I will discuss these implications in sections 8.2 and 8.3. In section 8.4 I will make some 
suggestions for future research. 
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8.2 Pluralism about unification 
The primary results summarized 8.1 have four main implications for my views on 
unification: 
1) Unification in adequate explanations is sometimes, but not always 
derivational.  
2) Unification in adequate explanations is always ontological. 
3) Unification plays a variety of roles in explanations. 
4) Ontological unification can take on different forms. 
 
Each implication marks a difference with all or most traditional accounts discussed in 
Chapter 1. And each implications is an aspect of my ‘pluralism about unification’. I discuss 
each of them below. 
First, unifying explanations, in the traditional accounts, are derivational and require 
subsumption. In order to explain something, one has to construct an argument to show 
that the explanans is to be expected and/or is an instance of a (set of) law(s). In my view 
unification does not need to be derivational. Causal network unification, mechanism 
unification and structural unification do not presuppose that the explananda are derived 
from overarching premises. In the case of the physical dependency unification in 
optimality models unification is mixed, it is both derivational and ontological. So 
unification is sometimes derivational, and sometimes not. 
Second, unification is always ontological. Mäki proposed this broad idea in 2001, but 
elaborate examples from scientific practice are not mentioned in the paper (he briefly 
mentions the Newtonian unification of mechanics).  This notion of ontological unification 
implies that a set of phenomena is unified if they share the same ontic foundations. In the 
case study of the social revolutions the ontic unification is based on a network of common 
causal factors, which I called causal network unification. In the example of general 
anaesthesia, a common causal mechanism was found that explains why all those different 
substances induced general anaesthesia. This was called mechanism unification. In Chapter 
5 optimality explanations were analysed. This taught us that there is a type of unification 
that is based on physical dependency relations that supervene on causal relations in the 
world. This was called physical dependency unification.  In the QM explanation of the 
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periodic phenomena the physical relations do not supervene on causal relations in the 
world, but there still is a deeper ontological structure that forms the basis for the 
unification. This was labelled structural unification.  In all examples the unification was not 
purely derivational, but was based on a deeper, underlying common ontological 
structure.  In this concluding chapter, I will take the liberty to make an extra claim: 
derivational unification is not explanatory.  This is a consequence of the criterion that I 
have used throughout this dissertation to classify descriptions as explanations: 
representing physical dependency relations (Woodward, 2003, p. 201). If unificatory 
derivations mirror those physical relations, in other words if there is also ontological 
unification, then they are explanatory, otherwise they are not. This is why I cannot adopt 
the accounts of Kitcher and Schurz, because they allow for purely derivational 
explanations. 
Third, unification plays a variety of roles in explanations. Contrary to Kitcher (1981, 
1989) I do not claim that unification always is a necessary ingredient of explanation. A 
causal explanation without unification can be adequate (cf. the example in the following 
section). However, Chapter 2 shows that unification can be an explanatory virtue of causal 
explanations. The example of the mercury thermometers and the ideal gas law 
demonstrate how adding unification to a causal explanation can improve that 
explanation in at least two ways: it can result in a higher explanatory power and in more 
cogent explanations. In other circumstances (cf; chapters 3, 5 and 6) unification is a 
necessary condition of adequacy for explanations. This is connected then to the fact that 
one tries to answer resemblance questions.  
Fourth, if unification is a necessary aspect of an explanation, it can take on different 
forms. I have shown that at least four different kinds of ontological unification exist (see 
chapters 3, 5 and 6). 
These four implications result in a pluralist perspective on unification. This pluralism 
is the indirect result of the strategy used in this dissertation. Starting from scientific 
practice made sure I kept an open mind on what an explanation is and what unification 
is. From thee diverse case studies, a new framework for thinking about unification 
emerged. In a way, giving up unification as traditionally presented by philosophy of 
science enabled me to embrace new pluralist ideas of unification conveyed by scientific 
practice.  
 140 
8.3 Pluralism about explanation 
The third result in the previous section states that unification can take on a variety of 
roles in explanation. This pluralist view on unification, does not automatically entail a 
pluralist view on explanation. I this section I will briefly explain why I adopt pluralism 
about unification but also about explanation. 
The pluralistic perspective on explanation, is related to the liberal pragmatic approach 
Van Fraassen proposes: 
So scientific explanation is not (pure) science but an application of science. It is a 
use of science to satisfy certain of our desires; and these desires are quite specific 
in a specific context, but they are always desires for descriptive information. … The 
exact content of the desire, and the evaluation of how well it is satisfied, varies from 
context to context. It is not a single desire, the same in all cases, for a special sort of 
thing, but rather, in each case, a different desire for something of a quite familiar 
sort. (1980, p. 156) 
The key idea of explanatory pluralism is that, depending on the structure of the 
explanation-seeking question and the motivation behind it, the answer will have 
different conditions of adequacy. 
After reading the previous chapters it should be clear that I am at least an explanatory 
pluralist in the following senses: 
Some adequate explanations are mechanistic, others are not; 
Some adequate explanations require causation, others do not; and 
Some adequate explanations require derivation30, others do not. 
Despite the pluralism that I am committed to, one could argue that it is possible for me to 
uphold the following monistic thesis: 
Unification always plays a role in explanation, either as an aim or as a virtue. 
However, my view is that besides being a virtue or an aim, unification can be completely 
irrelevant for an explanation.  Let me make a brief detour about Van Fraassen’s 
pragmatism to elaborate this. Van Fraassen proposed a simple but very effective 
 
                                                     
30 This is not derivation in the sense of Kitcher (1981, 1989) or Hempel (1965). 
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perspective on explanation: “an explanation is not the same as a proposition, or an 
argument, or a list of propositions; it is an answer.” (1980, p. 137).  Explanations are 
answers to why-questions. Those questions typically take the form ‘Why P?’, but, 
according to Van Fraassen, they all have the underlying structure: “Why P in contrast to 
X?” (1980, p. 127).  The contrast-class is determined by the context, which in turn is 
defined by a set of background assumptions. Van Fraassen’s own example (1980, p.127) 
makes this clear: 
Why P:  (a) Why did Adam eat the apple? 
In the simplest form “Why X rather than Y?” contrastive questions have two important 
features: the topic (in this case X) which is taken to be true and the foil or contrast-class 
(in this case Y) which is taken to be false. In the case of (a) the question can be interpreted 
in at least three different explanation-seeking questions: 
(a) Why was it Adam who ate the apple, rather than Eve? 
(b) Why was it the apple Adam ate, rather than a pear? 
(c) Why did Adam eat the apple, rather than throwing it away? 
Depending on the context, the plain why-question (a) will have the underlying structure 
of (b), (c) or (d).  
I partially adopt these pragmatist ideas, but I also modified them. I accept the idea that 
explanations are answers to why-questions. But contrary to Van Fraassen, I do not accept 
the strong claim that all explanation-seeking questions are contrastive questions. In most 
case studies the explanations that were analyzed were answers to resemblance questions. 
These questions, that are present in scientific practice, focus on similarities instead of 
differences. So, I do accept an adapted claim: there are different kinds of explanation-
seeking questions, and explanations need to provide a satisfactory answer to those 
questions. The focus on resemblance questions in this dissertation does not stem from a 
believe that these are the only kind of explanation-seeking questions. The focus on these 
questions is directly related to the aim of this dissertation: bringing unification back into 
the picture. 
Several philosophers present convincing case studies to argue for explanation-seeking 
contexts where unification is irrelevant. Weber et al. have constructed the fictitious 
example of two neighboring cities, Koch City and Miasma City to illustrate how some 
explanation-seeking questions require only causal information (Weber, Van Bouwel, & 
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Vanderbeeken, 2005; Weber & Van Bouwel, 2007).  This implies that on top of the pluralist 
claims already mentioned, I also adopt the following view: 
Depending on the kind of explanation-seeking question, ontological unification can 
be a virtue, a necessary aim or completely irrelevant for a satisfactory explanation. 
A complete account of explanatory pluralism is beyond the scope of this dissertation, for 
this I can refer to the book ‘Scientific Explanation’ of Weber, Van Bouwel & De Vreese for 
some interesting perspectives (2013)31. Remember that pluralism was one of the four 
possible positions in the literature about the relation between unification, causation and 
explanation. At the end of this dissertation, it becomes clear that I accept an adapted 
version of position (4), the pluralist approach: 
(4') Ontologically unificationist explanations and causal explanations (with or 
without embedding of ontological unification) are possible types of explanations 
among other types. What is the aim of an explanation is contextually 
determined. 
Critics of this ‘pragmatic explanatory pluralism’ could claim that this approach can only 
lead to scattered, fragmented results, since they are so context-specific. Indeed, my 
approach to unification seems very disunifying. The different case studies result in 
different types of unification. However, they are all instances of ontological unification. 
Without assuming that science is uniform in its use of unification in explanatory contexts, 
the result of this research is more than mere particular results. It shows that a general 
idea, namely that of rethinking unification as an ontological strategy rather than a 
derivational tool is much more fruitful to get a grip on different scientific practices.  
 
                                                     
31 I do not completely follow their views on explanation, since they still accept purely derivational unification 
as explanatory. 
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8.4 Prospects for future research 
At the end of a dissertation one would expect to feel some relief that the work is done. 
The reality is quite the opposite, as this is just a beginning. With every insight, new 
questions emerge. So, how could this project to rethink unification be further developed?    
One obvious strategy is to increase the inventory of case studies from scientific 
practice. I have tried to include examples from different scientific disciplines but time is 
limited.  Scientific practice was my guide to find different types of ontological unification. 
I am convinced that the types brought forward in this dissertation are not the only 
instances of ontological unification.  Exploring other scientific disciplines could result in 
a wider range of examples and could refine our overall picture of unification. 
Another strategy could be to further develop the pragmatic approach to explanation 
and unification. Acknowledging that science is a human activity and that humans have 
many different interests paves the way for a pluralist approach to explanation.  But there 
is another feature of pragmatism that remains unexplored here. Andrea Woody (2014) 
points out that retreating from abstractions clears the decks for questions about the 
social nature of scientific practice. One line of research could explore how the concept of 
unification is generated and transmitted, how it is entangled with issues of authority, 
expertise and trust.  To shift the focus from how an individual scientist, or a group of 
scientists, use unification in their practice to how unification is treated within 
(philosophy of) science. It could be interesting to investigate how unification was treated 
as a virtue and/or a vice over the course of history in specific disciplines.  
A third strategy could be to investigate the role of unification in other scientific 
activities. This is the position of Halonen and Hintikka, who claim that unification has 
nothing to do with explaining, but it is a great criterion for theory choice (1999). Also 
Margaret Morrison argues that even in the most impressive cases of unification in 
science, this unification is not explanatory (2000). 
Finally, and at least one of my supervisors will frown at me for adding this, one thing 
that always intrigued me is why human beings are so prone to unification.  Even the most 
passionate defenders of purely causal approaches to explanation admire the unifying 
power of Newtonian mechanics, Einstein’s special relativity, Maxwell’s theory of 
electromagnetism, Darwin’s evolution theory etc. Despite all the literature on causal 
explanations, it is still one of the main aims of fundamental physics to find one unifying 
theory. Science transcends the mere practical concerns as Hempel points out: 
 144 
The second basic motive for man’s scientific quest is independent of such practical 
concerns; it lies in his sheer intellectual curiosity, his deep and persistent desire to 
know and to understand himself and his world. (1965, p. 333) 
But why do we want a unified worldview? Is this urge for unification something that can 
be found beyond the boundaries of science? Another broader line of philosophical 
research could start from the human condition itself.  
 
As a final note and future promise, I solemnly swear that next time I am asked if anyone 
still believes in explanatory unification, I will definitely raise my hand. 
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Epilogue 
The scientific process is less apparent than it sometimes seems. Research does not always 
start from a clear-cut hypothesis, it is an organic process with ideas, mistakes, doubts and 
new insights. Often it is only at the end of the process -the writing and rewriting of the 
dissertation- that everything falls into place. Claiming that this dissertation is a 
chronological reconstruction of the actual research process would be misleading. And 
yet, I still remember the moment where the seed for this was planted. It was during a 
lecture at EPSA 2009 in Amsterdam. The lecture was not particularly interesting (for me), 
so I started reading Mäki’s article from 2001 on explanatory unification. On my notepad I 
drew two simple schemes. They looked a bit like this: 
 
Figure 6 Reconstruction of notes made during EPSA 2009 while reading Mäki’s article on 
explanantory unification (2001) for the first time. 
 
 
 146 
At that moment, my first hypothesis was born: what if the classical direction of 
unification was turned upside down? A first presentation of the idea was published in the 
proceedings of EPSA2009 (Weber et al., 2012), there it was presented as bottom-up 
unification, in contrast to Kitcher-style derivational unification. From that moment on I 
was triggered to explore scientific practice to find diverse examples of ontological 
unification. The names I used for what is now called ontological unification would change 
more than once during my research. But whatever it is called, it led me to an interesting 
journey along physics, sociology, chemistry, biology and even anesthesia.   
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Summary in English 
Thanks to Philip Kitcher’s seminal essay ‘Explanatory Unification’ (1981) the unification 
account became a very influential way of thinking about scientific explanations in the 
1980s. It was the main rival of Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical account, which 
received its full presentation in Salmon’s book Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure 
of the World (1984). In Kitcher 1989, the two approaches are compared; as can be expected, 
Kitcher argues that the unification account is superior. 
 In the 1990s, unification was still respected, but often integrated in a pluralistic 
view. In the new millennium, unification became unfashionable. This was mainly due to 
the development of two alternative views that became very popular: the counterfactual 
theory of Jim Woodward (2003)  and the mechanistic approach, which started with 
Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000. and is further elaborated in, e.g., Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 2005 and Craver 2007.  
Today most philosophers of science consider unification as outdated, irrelevant for 
explanation or infeasible. The overall aim of this dissertation is to bring unification back 
into the picture in the philosophical study of scientific explanation.  
This dissertation starts with a concise overview of what philosophers of science have 
written about unification and its role in scientific explanation during the last 50 years to 
provide the reader with some background knowledge (Chapter 1).  
In order to bring unification back into the picture, I have followed two strategies, 
resulting respectively in Parts I and II of this dissertation.  
In Part I the idea of unification is used to refine and enrich the dominant causal-
mechanist and causal-interventionist accounts of scientific explanation. In this part of 
the dissertation I bracket the classical ideas about unification: deduction and derivation. 
I do grant, for the sake of argument, that explanations are causal and argue that 
unification is important from within this causalist perspective.  
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In Chapter 2 two examples will be constructed – one about mercury thermometers and 
one about the ideal gas law – to demonstrate how unificatory information can have a 
surplus value. Unifying causal explanations can result in a higher explanatory power (this 
is a first possible virtue) and they can result in more cogent explanations (this is a second 
possible virtue). 
In Chapter 3 I construct two examples from scientific practice – one about social 
revolutions and one about general anaesthesia – to demonstrate that scientists are 
interested in similarities between particular facts or between regularities. Answers that 
aim to provide an adequate explanation for these resemblance questions need both causal 
information and unification. In this chapter I define two kinds of ontological, non-
derivational unification: causal network unification and mechanism unification. 
In Chapter 4 I will clarify some theoretical-philosophical implications of my results. 
My strategy to search for cases of ontological unification in scientific practice, and to use 
them to rethink unification, resulted in a new possible relation between unification, 
causality and explanation: embedding unification in causal accounts of explanation. 
In Part II I continue my strategy of digging into scientific practice to find cases of 
ontological unification. But here I distance myself from the dominant literature that all 
explanations must be causal. I will investigate whether explanatory unification is possible 
in non-causal explanations.  
In Chapter 5 optimality explanations in biology will be investigated. These are highly 
generalized explanations about population traits. Since a good optimality model needs to 
be applicable to the whole population and to future populations of a species, or even to a 
set of populations, the unifying aspect will not be difficult to uncover. What is at stake 
here is whether or not this is an example of a causal unifying explanation or a non-causal 
unifying explanation. In the case of optimality models, it will be argued that the 
explanation is not causal, but is based on physical dependency relations. These relations 
supervene on causal relations in the world. I call this physical dependency unification.   
In Chapter 6 I will use an example of chemical systematization, better known as the 
periodic table, to show that something unifying is happening in the absence of causal 
relations. It will be argued that the QM model for the systematization of chemical 
elements can be explanatory, even in the absence of causal explanations. Furthermore, if 
one accepts the possibility of non-causal structural explanations, then structural 
unification becomes possible.   
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The upshot of Chapters 5 and 6 is that some legitimate scientific explanations are 
unifying without being causal. This is a second way in which I want to bring unification 
back into the picture. 
Part III contains some further reflections and conclusions. During the course of this 
research I have experienced how the philosophy of explanation is dominated by accounts 
of causal explanation dominate the literature. Explanatory unification is often considered 
old-fashioned. However, last year, there was one person, Sorin Bangu, who wrote a paper 
about unification (2017). The goal of his paper is similar to this dissertation: rethinking 
unification and bringing it back into the picture.  In Chapter 7 I will compare his approach 
to mine. 
In the final chapter I will formulate my primary results, and I will elaborate on their 
implications for thinking about unification and explanation. The different forms of 
ontological unification were quite diverse. This relates to the method I have used. 
Throughout this dissertation the types of unification that were discussed emerged from 
digging into scientific practice. This philosophy-of-science-practice approach steered me 
towards a pluralistic view on unification and on explanation.  
In this dissertation I do not try to develop a new model of explanation and compare it 
to existing models. The aim is to show that there are important types of explanatory 
practice which cannot be properly analyzed if we neglect unification as a desideratum for 
explanations.  
 
  151 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
Dankzij Philip Kitchers baanbrekende essay ‘Explanatory Unification’ (1981) werd 
unificatie een heel invloedrijk model voor wetenschappelijke verklaringen in de jaren 
1980. Het was de belangrijkste rivaal van het causaal-mechanistische model van Wesley 
Salmon, uiteengezet in Salmon’s book Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the 
World (1984). In Kitcher 1989 werden de twee modellen vergeleken, en zoals verwacht, 
argumenteert Kitcher dat het unificatiemodel superieur is.  
In de jaren 1990 werd unificatie nog steeds waardevol geacht, maar het werd meestal 
geïntegreerd in een pluralistische visie op verklaring. In het nieuwe millennium werd 
unificatie beschouwd als voorbijgestreefd. Dit is vooral te wijten aan de ontwikkeling van 
twee alternatieve modellen die enorm populair werden: de tegenfeitelijke theorie van Jim 
Woodward (2003) en de mechanistische benadering die begon met Machamar, Darden en 
Craver 2000 en verder uitgewerkt werd door o.a. Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005 en Craver 
2007. 
Vandaag beschouwen de meeste wetenschapsfilosofen unificatie als ouderwets, 
irrelevant of onbereikbaar. Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is om unificatie terug onder 
de aandacht te brengen in het filosofisch onderzoek naar wetenschappelijke 
verklaringen. 
Dit proefschrift start met een beknopt overzicht van hoe wetenschapsfilosofen 
unificatie en haar rol in wetenschappelijke verklaringen benaderd hebben tijdens de 
laatste 50 jaar.  
Om unificatie terug onder de aandacht te brengen heb ik twee strategieën gevolgd, die 
resulteren in respectievelijk Deel I en Deel II van dit proefschrift.  
In Deel I werd het idee van unificatie gebruikt om de dominante verklaringsmodellen, 
namelijk de mechanistische en causaal-interventionistische benaderingen, te verfijnen 
en te verrijken. In dit deel neem ik (voorlopig) aan dat alle verklaringen causaal zijn. Het 
hoofdargument van dit deel is bijgevolg dat unificatie ook binnen deze causale modellen 
belangrijk is. Wat ik echter verwerp zijn is het traditionele idee dat unificatie deductief 
en derivationeel is.  
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In Hoofdstuk 2 worden twee voorbeelden uitgewerkt – een over kwikthermometers en 
een over de ideale gaswet – om aan te tonen hoe unificatie een meerwaarde kan bieden. 
Het unificeren van causale verklaringen kan bijdragen tot een hogere verklaringskracht 
en het kan zorgen voor meer overtuigende verklaringen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 worden twee voorbeelden uit de wetenschapspraktijk ontwikkeld – een 
over sociale revoluties en een over algemene verdoving – om aan te tonen dat 
wetenschappers geïnteresseerd zijn in gelijkenissen tussen feiten of regelmatigheden. Dit 
soort vragen worden gelijkenisvragen genoemd. Antwoorden die een adequate 
verklaring vormen voor deze vragen dienen zowel causale informatie als unificatie te 
bevatten. In dit hoofdstuk definieer ik twee ontologische, niet-derivationele vormen van 
unificatie: causale netwerk unificatie en mechanisme unificatie. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden enkele theoretisch-filosofische implicaties van de resultaten 
uit de vorige hoofdstukken toegelicht. De gehanteerde strategie, namelijk zoeken naar 
voorbeelden van ontologische unificatie in de wetenschapspraktijk, en deze gebruiken 
om unificatie te heroverwegen, resulteert in een nieuwe mogelijke relatie tussen 
unificatie, causaliteit en verklaring: unificatie inbedden in causale benaderingen van 
verklaringen.  
In Deel II blijf ik zoeken naar voorbeelden van ontologische unificatie in de 
wetenschapspraktijk. Hier distantieer ik me niet alleen van de klassieke visie op 
unificatie, maar ook van de dominante visie in de literatuur dat alle verklaringen causaal 
moeten zijn. Ik zal onderzoeken of verklarende unificatie mogelijk is bij niet-causale 
verklaringen. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 worden optimaliteitsverklaringen in de biologie onderzocht. Dit zijn 
sterk gegeneraliseerde verklaringen over populatiekenmerken. Een goed 
optimaliteitsmodel moet toepasbaar zijn op de hele populatie en op toekomstige 
populaties van een soort, of verzameling van soorten. Het unificerende aspect van 
dergelijke verklaringsmodellen is dus niet moeilijk te ontdekken. Wat hier op het spel 
staat is of deze modellen ook causale verklaringen zijn. In het geval van 
optimaliteitsmodellen wordt er geargumenteerd dat de verklaring zelf niet causaal is, 
maar gebaseerd is op fysieke afhankelijkheidsrelaties. Deze relaties superveniëren 
evenwel op causale relaties in de wereld. Deze vorm van unificatie zal ik fysieke 
afhankelijkheidsunificatie noemen. 
 
 
  153 
In Hoofdstuk 6 gebruik ik de systematisering van de chemische elementen, beter 
bekent als de periodieke tabel, om aan te tonen dat er iets unificerends gebeurt in de 
afwezigheid van causale relaties. Er wordt geargumenteerd dat kwantummechanische 
modellen van de periodieke tabel verklarend kunnen zijn, zonder dat ze causaal zijn. Als 
deze structurele verklaringen aanvaardbaar zijn, dan wordt een vierde soort ontologische 
unificatie mogelijk: structurele unificatie. 
Het resultaat van Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 is dat er legitieme wetenschappelijke verklaringen 
bestaan die unificeren zonder causaal te zijn. Dit is een tweede manier om unificatie terug 
in beeld te brengen. 
Deel III bevat verdere reflecties en conclusies. Tijdens het onderzoek heb ik ervaren 
hoe dominant de causale benaderingen van verklaringen zijn in de 
wetenschapsfilosofische literatuur. Unificatie wordt vaak gezien als ouderwets. Toch was 
er vorig jaar een persoon, Sorin Bangu, die een paper publiceerde over unificatie (2017). 
Het doel van zijn paper is gelijkaardig aan het doel van dit proefschrift: unificatie 
heroverwegen en terug onder de aandacht brengen. In Hoofdstuk 7 vergelijk ik zijn 
benadering van unificatie met mijn visie. 
In het finale hoofdstuk formuleer ik de primaire resultaten en werk ik hun implicaties 
voor het benaderen van unificatie en verklaring uit. De vier vormen van ontologische 
unificatie waren nogal divers. Dit kan toegeschreven worden aan de gehanteerde 
methode. De verschillende soorten unificatie die besproken werden in dit proefschrift 
zijn het resultaat van onderzoek gestuurd door bevindingen uit de wetenschapspraktijk 
zelf. Deze filosofie-van-de-wetenschapspraktijk-benadering stuurde me naar een 
pluralistische visie op unificatie en op verklaring. 
In dit proefschrift heb ik niet geprobeerd om een nieuw verklaringsmodel te 
ontwikkelen en dit te vergelijken met bestaande modellen. Het doel was om aan te tonen 
dat er belangrijke types van verklarende praktijken bestaan die niet naar behoren 
geanalyseerd kunnen worden als we unificatie negeren als een desideratum voor 
verklaringen.  
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